Maksym Beznosiuk and William Dixon, CEPA / Translation by iPress
Maksym Beznosiuk – an associate researcher at GLOBSEC on strategy and security, and William Dixon – a senior associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) in an article for the Center for European Policy Analysis, ahead of the G7 summit, pose a question that recently seemed premature: what happens when Russia loses? The authors note a turning point in the course of the war – for the first time in years, Kyiv is reclaiming more than it loses – and call on the West to immediately shift from Ukraine’s survival strategy to forming a post-war order. Europe must become an active architect of this order, not a passive observer, combining the maximalist deterrence of border states with the possibility of reintegrating a future Russia under certain conditions. Without this work now, the West risks repeating the post-Soviet collapse mistake that resulted in Putin.
When G7 leaders gather in Evian on June 17, alongside President Volodymyr Zelensky, they will find themselves in a strategic environment remarkably different from last year’s.
By mid-2025, the transatlantic community was gripped by a grim deterministic idea: Russia was stuck in a steady war of attrition, where time and sheer force supposedly worked for the Kremlin. Today, this flawed axiom is collapsing.
NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte recently confirmed that Kyiv is pushing back the front line, reflecting a broader reality: Putin’s military machine is facing serious structural bottlenecks.
As evidenced by a recent assessment from the Institute for the Study of War, the balance on the battlefield may be shifting against the Kremlin. One usually reliable open-source data source reported that in May, Ukraine gained more territory than it lost for the first time since 2023. Although the plumes of smoke from burning oil refineries in St. Petersburg on June 3 and 5 – right in the midst of Putin’s main economic conference – may have seemed primarily symbolic, the signal remains unchanged: Russia is not winning, and it’s hard to imagine how it could.
The Kremlin is spending manpower at a pace its recruitment system cannot keep up with; it has lost control of the Black Sea and couldn’t secure its own Victory Day parade in May. Currently, Kyiv is striking targets deep within Russian territory – disabling oil refineries, destroying military infrastructure including airfields and ammunition depots, and hitting the suburbs of Moscow and St. Petersburg. In leading circles in the West, the dominant narrative is quietly shifting: from whether Ukraine will survive to whether Kyiv, along with its allies, is beginning to win.
For four years, every European capital echoed with one central question: will Ukraine survive? Gradually, new questions are coming into focus, questions that are much harder to answer: what happens if Russia loses? Can Europe agree on a unified policy on what it actually wants from such a moment?
No one truly knows how and when the war will end. Putin might escalate, as he has in the past. He might negotiate from a weak position but survive politically. He could be removed. Russia may escalate or begin to disintegrate. Each scenario generates different pressures, negotiators, and timelines. Yet, a pre-agreed framework is more valuable as the end remains uncertain. Therefore, the G7 summit should not be yet another meeting on supporting military efforts; it’s a moment for the West to ask themselves: what should happen afterward?
The coalition that has supported Ukraine throughout years of war was united by one goal: to prevent Russia from winning. They never agreed on what should follow, because it would immediately expose the cracks European leaders have skillfully masked so far. For the border states of Central Europe, the Baltics, and Scandinavia, the answer is instinctive and non-negotiable: deterrence. In Western Europe, Paris and Berlin share legitimate strategic concerns: a permanently isolated and hostile Moscow, with no path for return, poses a long-term threat—especially considering its increasing dependence, possibly even subordination to China.
These differences touch on the core question: can Europe finally emerge as a cohesive, sovereign strategic entity capable of determining its own security? They need to be resolved before the war ends, not after.
For the border states—Poland, the Baltic countries, and Finland—there is one clear priority: deterrence. Such a policy would mean permanently bolstering NATO’s eastern flank, actively countering any Russian hybrid aggression, continuing military support for Ukraine regardless of truce status, and not recognizing the occupied territories under any circumstances.
The economic dimension of a deterrence policy is clear: there is broad agreement that Russia must be held accountable for what it has done to Ukraine. The scale of destruction is enormous: housing, energy infrastructure, industry, transport networks, and cities turned into ruins. Ukraine’s recovery needs have already exceeded 588 billion dollars. The Council of Europe’s damage registry has received nearly 150,000 claims and continues to record them.
Therefore, the first element of any post-war order should be the complete restoration of Ukraine, financed by frozen Russian assets where legally possible, supplemented by large-scale coordinated commitments from Europe and the G7.
However, the maximalism of the border states carries its own strategic risks. If Europe cannot impose a change of course on Russia, it may become divided. Therefore, Europe must become an active architect of any post-war order, not a passive observer awaiting change from Moscow.
Europe must pre-agree on a path any new Kremlin leadership might follow and make the incentives clear. There should be a second stage of recovery—a conditional path for Russia. It would entail a gradual lifting of sanctions, restoration of trade and investment ties, and deeper economic integration, linked to political reforms. The ultimate goal should be to deprive Russia of any incentive for new imperial ventures.
The bar here should be set high, with transparent auditing and a strict tie to institutional reforms. True incentives should make transformation a more rational choice for any future Russian leadership than continuous confrontation with the continent’s democracies or subordination to Beijing. This proposal, it is quite understandable, will be unacceptable to many, and some will dismiss it as naive. However, it is much better than the alternative of perpetual confrontation – though it must be acknowledged that this could ultimately be the result if Russian irredentism is not eradicated.
Donald Trump could become Europe’s most important ally in launching this process. The administration must realize that every month Russia spends in China’s embrace strengthens America’s main rival; a split between the two authoritarian states aligns with American grand strategy; and Ukraine’s recovery opens up huge economic opportunities that American capital will seek to access.
Europe cannot repeat the mistakes of Versailles in 1919–1920 or the period after the Cold War. The West celebrated the collapse of the USSR, with no consistent policy on what Russia should become.
This mistake now has a name. It is called Putin. It is very easy to repeat. Instead, Europe must help Ukraine recover and at the same time integrate it into some form of military and economic union. And it must ensure that Russia eventually – on terms and with verifiable possibilities – has an incentive to choose a different, peaceful path.
These are colossal tasks, but the reward is equally colossal: a transformed continent.
Illustration: Max Moshkovsky
