Oleksandr Kovalenko / Obozrevatel
In October 2026, Russian occupying forces suffered the largest personnel losses since the beginning of the full-scale invasion—despite one of the lowest rates of combat encounters. The command of the Russian Occupational Forces could not improve the occupiers’ position on the battlefield from the spring-summer period of the offensive campaign—it only worsened.
More details about the losses of the Russian army in various categories can be found in the new material from the joint project of OBOZ.UA and the group “Informational Resistance”.
Personnel Losses
So. This day has come. In October, Russian occupation forces suffered an absolute record of losses—54,400 people.
The previous record was set in December 2024 (48,670 personnel), and it remained the highest loss figure for a long time. However, we observed a trend of growth in this category since March 2026, so it was entirely expected that the threshold would eventually be overcome.
Notably, an absolute record of daily Russian Occupational Forces losses was also set in October: October 21—2,250 people.
Meanwhile, the enemy captured a net 49 km² during the month, which is one of the lowest figures since the start of the year.
If we calculate the ratio of losses to the area captured, it would amount to 1,110 people per 1 km², which is also a record figure for the month.
Having suffered the heaviest losses since the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the enemy had minimal advancement. At the same time, in several directions, they failed to hold positions, stabilize the front, and were forced to retreat. The total territorial losses of the enemy exceed 110 km², but the advance of Ukrainian Defense Forces is officially confirmed only in some areas, while most remain under a regime of silence.
It is also noteworthy that in October, the Russian Occupational Forces conducted a relatively low number of combat encounters—6,376 (or an average of 206 per day). Meanwhile, the ratio of losses to the number of combat encounters increased to 9 personnel per 1 combat encounter.
The efficiency rate of Russian Occupational Forces’ assault activities in October was 130 combat encounters per 1 km² captured. All the above figures indicate that October not only continued the trend of diminishing combat potential of the Russian Occupational Forces in 2026 but also currently stands as the worst in the category of personnel losses and combat effectiveness. The worst not just this year but since the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
Meanwhile, there is no point in talking about any change in the current trend for the Russian Occupational Forces—due to the lack of not only a vision for further combat operations at the tactical level (not to mention operational or operational-tactical) but also technical, technological, and engineering capabilities.
It is evident that the war for the Russian Occupational Forces in Ukraine has reached a dead strategic end.
Tank Losses
In October, 63 tanks were lost by the Armed Forces of Russia, which is the lowest figure since 2022 and the same as in May 2026, when 63 MBTs were also lost.
However, the absence of tanks on the battlefield cannot be attributed to them being depleted in Russia – this is a misconception. The Russian command has long avoided deploying MBTs due to their vulnerability as large targets for inexpensive attacks and the lack of technological means to effectively increase the survivability of the combat vehicles.
Meanwhile, Russian factories continue the decommissioning, repair, modernization, and even production of MBTs. As of today, the adversary has more operational tanks than in 2022, although many are very old Soviet models like the T-62, T-54/55, and T-72A.
APC Losses
In October, the occupying forces lost a traditional number of APCs, which has long become average – 158.
The reason is similar to that of tanks – the Russian command sees no reason to deploy them on the battlefield.
On Russian territory, similar to MBTs, there is an accumulation of APCs, so it’s incorrect to talk about the disappearance of this type of equipment among the adversary overall.
Barrel Artillery Losses
In October, the Armed Forces of Russia lost 1,200 units of barrel artillery, continuing the downward trend that began after record losses in June – 2,074 units. This reduction is a result of the depletion of repairable artillery reserves for the adversary.
This trend we frequently mentioned is now visible in numbers: the enemy has exhausted its stockpile of the most common weapons, which are hardest to destroy due to their high repairability. I believe we’ll no longer see records in this category, and the downward trend in losses will continue, dropping below 1,000 barrels per month.
MLRS Losses
This category continues to see relatively high losses – 75 units in October, yet a downward trend is also noticeable.
Their own MLRS stocks are depleted, supplies from North Korea do not compensate for losses or meet needs, and Ukrainian drone strikes in the mid-rear zone make this equipment as vulnerable as those near the front lines.
Air Defense Losses
After a record-breaking September, with 86 air defense systems hit, October saw a sharp decrease in losses in this category – 47 units.
This may be directly related to the restrictions on Starlink for Ukraine, affecting strikes in mid-rear zones, where Russian air defense systems were often hit. Overall, I think this is situational, and targeting these systems will resume soon.
Vehicle Losses
In October, the Armed Forces of Russia lost 12,852 vehicles.
Despite the fact that the month started quite actively and even set an absolute daily record with 727 vehicles hit on October 4th, which indicated another record-breaking month, from the second half of October, the number of strikes began to decrease.
The reasons for this are weather conditions and Starlink restrictions. However, the latter, I believe, should be put first.
Even considering the obstacles that Elon Musk created for us last month, the number of destroyed Russian vehicles is one of the highest since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine began.
Special Equipment Losses
In this category, the ROV has a fairly good, but rather restrained loss indicator – 87 units.
The reason for such restraint is similar to previous categories – Starlink restrictions that prevent full implementation of middle-strike attacks.
Conclusions
October 2026 became the worst month for the ROV since the beginning of the full-scale war – this is the objective reality.
These are record losses of personnel, minimal net acquisition of territories, a decrease in the intensity of combat clashes, loss of positions, and retreat in several sections, lack of completed tasks above the tactical level, high indicators of equipment losses.
The ROV command did not improve the situation on the battlefield compared to the spring-summer offensive campaign period, and in September and October, it only worsened.
ROV is plunging into a strategic crisis and is trying to partially mask their failures by generating fake news about successes on the battlefield, which not even the most fervent Z-patriots believe.
Demilitarization and denazification of the enemy are proceeding according to plan.
