This fall, U.S. intelligence revealed a Chinese space drone docking with foreign apparatus, while Ukraine launched its first communication satellite into orbit. These two news items, appearing within one week, indicate a shift to a new domain. Whoever establishes dominance here will determine whose drones will fly tomorrow.
The last week of October brought two seemingly unrelated news items. On October 26, the U.S. Department of Defense Intelligence Agency released a report on space security threats with the clearest image yet of a secret Chinese reusable spaceplane. The next day, the Ukrainian defense technology company HIMERA announced that its first satellite, OBRIA NANO, is operational in orbit.
The first news is about a superpower preparing for war in space. The second is about a nation already at war on the ground, finally declaring its interests in space. Together, they highlight a trend that military strategists have discussed for years but is now becoming evident to all: space is no longer the rear of war but a full-fledged battlefield. The battle is already underway.
Let’s start with China, which is aggressively advancing in space. In an image obtained by Americans from a commercial satellite approximately 90 kilometers away, the Chinese spaceplane is docked to another space object with deployed solar panels. The fourth mission of this drone began on February 7, 2026, from the Jiuquan spaceport and, as of the end of October, is still ongoing. U.S. intelligence also recorded the spaceplane approaching other apparatuses and maneuvers near them during previous flights.
Beijing traditionally limits itself to general statements about testing reusable technologies for peaceful space exploration. However, the extended presence of the unmanned spacecraft in orbit, maneuvering near other satellites, docking with them, and subsequent undocking indicate the ability to perform inspection, interception, or even disabling operations on foreign apparatuses. This is how military analysts might evaluate these capabilities.
The U.S. has its own analog—the X-37B spaceplane. The appearance of a Chinese apparatus with similar capabilities indicates that the rivalry between the two superpowers is also extending into orbit, where a new dimension of the arms race is already forming.
More importantly, China is focusing on mass production rather than unique individual apparatuses. The country is deploying two low-orbit networks, “Govan” and “Qianfan,” with over 470 satellites, and in early October, the “Govan” system was even tested in polar latitudes. This summer, China successfully returned the first stage of the Long March-10B rocket for the first time, catching it with a special net on an ocean platform, and in August, the first stage landing was completed by the private Zhuque-3 rocket. Reusable rockets drastically reduce launch costs, and cheaper launches mean Beijing can deploy hundreds of new apparatuses into orbit and quickly replace lost ones.
In space, as in the drone war on the ground, the winner is not the one with the best individual model but the one capable of mass production and launches.
Russia is also actively involved and is purposefully launching its own satellites into orbit. Its response to Starlink, the “Rassvet” constellation of the company “Bureau 1440,” is expanding in batches, with the first launched in March and the second in July 2026. Currently, there are about 40 units in orbit, which Russia officially positions as designed for special and potentially military tasks. The system is being developed with the use of laser inter-satellite communication, enabling data transmission without ground stations. This could potentially extend the remote control capabilities of Russian drones at a significant distance from the front line — particularly deep into Ukrainian territory.
For now, the project faces challenges: some units are losing altitude due to propulsion system malfunctions, and the existing constellation provides coverage only during short time windows each day. However, underestimating these efforts would be a mistake. Moscow continues to launch new batches of satellites, and each subsequent launch provides Russian engineers with additional experience.
Simultaneously, Russia is also increasing its orbital means of exerting pressure on foreign satellites. In April 2026, it launched a group of units from “Kosmos-2609” to “Kosmos-2614,” and within a month, they began maneuvering to synchronize with the Finnish ICEYE radar satellite, whose data is used by Ukraine. On May 26, “Kosmos-2609” approached it within 2.5 kilometers, and at the end of September, “Kosmos-2612” again came almost into the same orbit as the Finnish unit. No satellites have been shot down yet, but in space, a distance of a few kilometers means practically contact, and an adversary who can approach undetected can also jam, blind, or damage the target.
Against this backdrop, the Ukrainian news is not just a technological achievement but a strategic response to the challenge currently posed in space by China and Russia. On October 1, the Ukrainian company HIMERA, together with Danish partners from GomSpace, launched the OBRIA NANO satellite into orbit. It became the first unit of the future independent Ukrainian satellite communication network, which will be controlled by a Ukrainian operator, not a foreign corporation or government. GomSpace clearly explained the logic of the project, emphasizing that dependence on the technologies of other countries, even partners, creates strategic risks, especially during war.
The next step is to localize satellite and ground terminal production in Ukraine. This step is even more important than the launch itself, because a country that can make its own terminals no longer depends on foreign solutions.
Almost simultaneously, it was announced that Finnish ICEYE and Nokia, together with the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, will develop their own satellite communication system. Notably, the very Finnish company whose unit is being pursued by Russian satellites is now building a communication system for Ukraine. Therefore, orbital confrontation in the coming years already has specific addresses and participants.
Of course, one nanosatellite cannot replace thousands of Starlink units, and it would be unfair to present it as a ready network. OBRIA NANO is a test platform, the results of which should determine the parameters of the future comprehensive system. Therefore, developers emphasize that the network will complement European satellite capabilities, rather than compete with them.
However, all large groups started with a single test device. The difference between a country that has such a device and one that does not is measured not by the number of satellites but by the presence of its own engineering school, operators, and experience in orbital management. Ukraine has taken its first step from consuming space services to creating its own solutions, and that is a victory worthy of its name.
Why Ukraine needs its own network is clear, as Starlink once again proved to be an unreliable partner this fall. When the control channel of military equipment is overseen by another state, your army fights only to the extent that aligns with foreign political calculations on a particular day. Therefore, every army that wants to eliminate such dependency today has two options.
- The first is short, and it was the path taken by the Russians, who, after being blocked from Starlink access, massively switched to mesh networks. This system allows drones to transmit signals through each other using Chinese modems costing between 2,000 to 12,000 dollars.
This approach allows control of strike drones at a depth of about 150 kilometers. However, it is ground-based, vulnerable to electronic warfare, and dependent on supplies from China, thus simply replacing one dependency with another.
- The second path is long and expensive, as it leads through space, via its own satellites, terminals, and management infrastructure. This is the path chosen by Ukraine, and it is the one, as recent months show, being taken by all who are thinking about war over the next decades.
Europe, meanwhile, is trying to catch up with reality. At a European Commission briefing on October 14, journalists asked what the EU could offer Ukraine instead of Starlink, and they mentioned the Govsatcom system, which integrates government satellites of the Union’s countries and will be operational in January 2026. Brussels is negotiating Ukraine’s full accession. But we must remember that its own IRIS network of 348 devices will only start launching in 2029. By comparison, as of October 15, over 11,000 active Starlink satellites were operational in orbit. Therefore, the gap with the European plan is approximately 32 times. Europeans have already realized that they need to become independent from the American network, but they currently have no replacement.
The European North is acting much more decisively. On May 4, 2026, Sweden launched its first operational military satellite into orbit. Overall, the Swedish military plans to have about ten such devices. The government also allocated hundreds of millions of kronor for the “Esrange” spaceport to launch rockets into orbit.
Meanwhile, Norway is developing its own “Andøya” spaceport. In March, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz and Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre visited there and announced the deepening of space cooperation. This year, American military communication modules began working for the first time on Norwegian satellites. Additionally, the EU signed an agreement with Norway and Iceland for access to Govsatcom and IRIS². The Scandinavians are well aware of the implications of neighboring Russia. Therefore, they were the first in Europe to understand that having their own access to space is as much a part of defense as tanks or air defense systems.
An even more illustrative example is Japan, which is changing the name of one of its armed forces for the first time in over seventy years. On June 26, 2026, the Japanese parliament passed a law transforming the Air Self-Defense Forces into the Aerospace Self-Defense Forces. The space unit, which in 2020 had only 20 personnel, grew to 670 military personnel by March 2026. By the end of March 2027, it is expected to expand into a command unit with about 880 personnel. Additionally, Tokyo plans to launch its first satellite to monitor space conditions this year.
Even Brazil, far from major military conflict zones, is deciding the fate of its defense geostationary satellite this year, as its operational life is nearing the end.
Thus, from Scandinavia to Japan, nations come to the same conclusion: the significance of space for defense is independent of how far a country is from the front line.
Why all of this is crucial for the battlefield is well understood by anyone working with drones. A modern strike drone or interceptor depends on three things provided by space:
- a communication channel with the operator,
- satellite navigation,
- intelligence data that allows the target to be located.
At the “KRUK” Center, we constantly use Starlink and other satellite communications in training: both in courses for ground robotic complexes and in drone operator courses. Without it, modern equipment simply does not function at the distances required by the front.
Therefore, dominance in orbit in the coming years may translate into dominance over the sky and trenches. A country with its own satellites will be able to develop its own unmanned systems, while a country without them will depend on others—until it is allowed to use them.
At the same time, it would be a mistake to think that an orbital network alone solves all problems. The other half of the answer lies on the ground and is called autonomy. A drone that can use machine vision to recognize a target and complete an attack after losing communication fears neither terminal restrictions nor Russian electronic warfare, which is why Ukrainian developers are quickly moving toward autonomous targeting. The space and autonomous domains complement each other because satellites provide the drone with communication and reconnaissance over long distances, while onboard intelligence allows tasks to be completed when communication is lost. Whoever first combines these two elements into one system will gain an advantage that cannot be offset by sheer volume of technology.
What should be done about this? The answer is quite specific. The state should turn OBRIA and the joint project with ICEYE and Nokia from separate initiatives into components of a long-term program with guaranteed funding and clear implementation timelines. After all, space projects do not tolerate interruptions and underfunding.
Simultaneously, it is worth demanding a clear schedule from Brussels for Ukraine’s accession to Govsatcom and placement in IRIS², presenting this not as a request for help but as a contribution to mutual security. After all, Ukrainian military personnel are currently the most experienced in Europe in using satellite communications in combat conditions. Finally, training operators and designing new drones should be based on working in an environment where the satellite is the primary channel, with autonomy serving as insurance in case of its loss.
America, China, and Russia are already preparing to fight in space. Japan is renaming its armed forces, Scandinavia is building spaceports. Europe promises strategically. And Ukraine, which just yesterday could only request to turn on the connection, is starting to build its own. One small satellite in orbit may not change the balance of power yet, but it changes the main thing – it shows that Ukraine no longer intends to be just a consumer of foreign technologies in the domain where the future of war will be decided. And in this war, the winner will not be the one with more drones, but the one who controls the sky above the sky.
Photo: NASA on StockSnap
