Sloviansk Direction
The enemy (Russian troops) continues offensive operations in the general operational direction of Siversk – Sloviansk in the area of its 3rd Combined Arms Army (CAA) from the “South” military grouping with the aim of advancing its main forces of forward units and formations from the east to the near approaches of the city of Sloviansk.
The command of the Russian 3rd CAA is focusing its main efforts on the right flank of its assault area, advancing from east to west along the southern bank of the Siversky Donets River, attempting to break through into the area of the village of Mykolaivka and Slavonic TPP.
At the same time, part of its forces attempt to advance along the E-40/M-03 road from Bakhmut to Sloviansk in a general southeast to northwest direction, as well as engaging with part of its forces towards Kramatorsk and Druzhkivka. As of last evening, the enemy troops (forces) of the 3rd CAA have not yet achieved the aforementioned goals.
The main forces of their forward units and formations occupy advanced positions along the following line of contact (LoC) — eastern part of Kryva Luka village — area 2 km west of Kalenyky village — 1 km northwest of Rai-Oleksandrivka village, as well as the central and eastern parts of this village — 1.2 km northwest of Dibrova village (not reaching 0.5 km to the Siversky Donets — Donbas Canal) — 1.5 km southwest of Dibrova village — and further along the eastern bank of the Siversky Donets — Donbas Canal, to the area 1.5 km west of Novomarkove village, on the western bank of this canal — Fedorivka village — area 1.5 km west of Maiske village — 1.2 km northwest of Chasiv Yar city.
1. The enemy operates in this direction with the following forces and means (approximately):
The 3rd CAA — with the exception of its 84th Motor Rifle Division (MRD), which operates in the Kostiantynivka-Kramatorsk direction, is operating on this direction with most of its troops (forces):
– 6th Separate Motor Rifle Brigade (SMRB);
– 85th SMRB;
– 88th SMRB;
– 123rd SMRB;
– 127th SMRB;
– 2nd Artillery Brigade (AB).
Forces and means of reinforcement:
– The 70th Motorized Rifle Division (MRD) from the 18th Guards Army Group “Dnepr” — 24th, 26th, and 28th Motorized Rifle Regiments (MRR), 17th Tank Regiment (TR), 81st Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment (SPAR). In fact, it is operatively subordinated to the 3rd Guards Army Group and operates with its main forces in the separate operational-tactical direction of Chasiv Yar — Druzhkivka.
– The “Russian Volunteer Assault Corps” (RDAC, sometimes “Dobrokor”) is a collection of “remnants” of Russian volunteer formations (usually at the “brigade/battalion” level, but actually “combined” companies and battalions), which have not yet joined the 85th and 88th separate motorized rifle brigades (SMRB) of the 3rd Guards Army Group, “formed” from various types of mercenaries and “private military company members.” It operates under the direct guidance of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation through “PMC Redut” and is operatively subordinated to the command of the 3rd Guards Army Group.
2. Current situation in this direction is characterized by constant attempts by the Russian command to infiltrate its assault infantry in the tactical zone as much and as far as possible.
At the same time, it quite often changes the sections and directions of this infiltration (obviously trying to “probe” weakly covered tactical interpositional gaps in the defense of the Armed Forces of Ukraine), seeks to use the features of the current climatic situation and terrain in the attack zone of its 3rd Guards Army Group, actively uses separate reconnaissance groups to determine the optimal routes and paths of infiltration of its assault infantry into the combat formations of the advanced units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
However, for at least 2 weeks, the Russian 3rd Guards Army Group has not achieved significant tactical results in this direction. Moreover, in some areas, the Armed Forces of Ukraine, having conducted a series of rather intensive search-and-raid actions and short counterattacks in the tactical zone, have managed to significantly reduce the number of sections and areas of “infiltration” by the assault groups of the forward units and subunits of this army. Specifically:
– In the directions Kryva Luka — Piskunivka and Rai-Oleksandrivka — Mykolaivka, the enemy managed to infiltrate several of its assault groups, which secured a fairly significant section between Piskunivka and Rai-Oleksandrivka, as well as in Piskunivka itself and in the area of the neighboring Starodubivka. However, the enemy was unable to break directly into Mykolaivka.
The Armed Forces of Ukraine, in turn, apparently completely eliminated the Russian assault troops that had previously infiltrated Mykolaivka and pushed back other Russian assault groups in the direction of Orikhuvatka — Rai-Oleksandrivka. Only southeast of Orikhuvatka, in one of the “plantations,” is there still a small Russian infantry group of 2-3 servicemen reported.
– The Armed Forces of Ukraine continue to successfully hold the villages of Yurkivka and Nikanorivka, apparently having “cleansed” earlier a few Russian infantry groups to the north of Yurkivka and successfully repelling attempts by the Russian assault infantry to advance from the village of Malynivka along the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas canal from south to north. Similar attempts by the enemy, made from the direction of Dibrova in the same direction, likely have also been unsuccessful so far.
– The enemy continues to hold a number of positions with its assault infantry on the western bank of the canal in the directions of Pryvillia — Malynivka and Minkivka — Tykhonivka. However, they have not yet been able to advance the main forces of their forward units beyond the canal (i.e., west of it), and they continue to occupy positions on the eastern bank of the canal.
Long and fairly intense attempts by Russian “ultra-small” infantry groups (2-3 infantrymen) from Malynivka and Tykhonivka towards Vasyutynske, Pershomariika, and Vasylivska Pustosh also did not lead to a mass infiltration of the entire area by Russian assault infantry. Apparently, in this sector, the Ukrainian Armed Forces mainly identify and neutralize these small groups in time.
– In the area of its 70th Motorized Rifle Division, the Russian command, apparently with its separate assault groups, managed to advance 1.2 km west of Fedorivka along the chalk hills towards Bilokuzmynivka and Semenivka.
In the directions of Mayske — Virolyubivka and Chasiv Yar — Virolyubivka, after the withdrawal of the forward units and infantry groups of the Ukrainian Armed Forces from positions in Chasiv Yar, the situation remains stable. The enemy occasionally attempts to advance north of Mayske and south of the railway running from Chasiv Yar to Kramatorsk, but the results are minimal, even from a tactical point of view. Usually, they amount to single/pair positions or observation posts in the “gray zone.”
Thus, one can state that as of today, there is a noticeable and substantial slowdown in the pace of the advance of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army even at the tactical level. Its command, with its sporadic offensive actions on certain tactical directions, currently appears more focused on holding and securing individual areas and sections of terrain previously infiltrated by its assault groups than on increasing the pace and depth of the overall advance of its forward units.
3. Regarding the further prospects for the development of the situation in this direction, I would highlight several factors:
– It is evident that the command of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army will shortly continue to focus its main efforts on the right flank of its offensive strip. And this is quite logical.
Here, the enemy already has an area of noticeable size measuring about 6.2 x 8.3 km, which is quite densely infiltrated by Russian assault groups, particularly in the forest southeast of Mykolaivka (located approximately 2.6-3 km from it). The enemy can fully exploit this territory for further accumulation of its assault infantry and its subsequent penetration into Mykolaivka. Moreover, the presence of the aforementioned forest in this area is quite convenient for the enemy, as it allows them to do all this quite covertly.
Furthermore, the alternative “method” of penetrating Mykolaivka, namely the “passage” of Russian infantry along the road from Rai-Oleksandrivka, is apparently still complicated for the enemy. Since Ukrainian units are likely quite successfully holding their positions south of Mykolaivka and even occasionally conducting counterattacks east from Orikhuvatka and Pump Station No. 2 on the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas canal.
– Meanwhile, it should be remembered that part of the forces of the 3rd Combined Arms Army, including the operatively subordinate 70th Motorized Rifle Division, which is directly aimed at Kramatorsk and Druzhkivka, after a short pause, is likely to also resume active offensive actions. And, first and foremost, in the direction of Druzhkivka.
Objectively, this is related to the situation in the sector of the Russian 3rd Army Corps, which adjoins the strip of the 3rd Combined Arms Army on the left, and where its forward units in the direction of Predtechyne — Bezimenne managed to infiltrate their assault groups into a fairly significant territory between the villages of Molocharka and Stinky.
It is natural that the command of the Russian UV “Yug,” which operates both in the Sloviansk and the Kostiantynivka-Kramatorsk directions, would have the “brilliant” idea to link the offensive actions of the 70th MSD and the 3rd AC into a single “plan” to break through with their advanced units to the line of Semenivka-Kurtivka, thus approaching Druzhkivka from the east and northeast.
Overall, it is clear that the command of the enemy’s 3rd CAA currently faces a challenging situation regarding the numbers and staffing of their assault groups and units. The majority of infiltrator groups in their zone have consisted mostly of 2-3 “bodies” for quite some time, and less often 5-6. It is not uncommon for individual infantrymen to be sent on “infiltration” missions.
Although the Russian assault infantry attempts to “break through,” accumulate, and sometimes assault almost daily, its current numbers in the 3rd CAA’s zone, which have decreased to a minimum, speak for themselves.
Therefore, for the continuation of the offensive, not to mention further increasing its pace, the command of the Russian 3rd CAA will need significant replenishment of its forward units and personnel in the near future, especially their assault groups.
This means spending ADDITIONAL time and resources (since all this infantry needs to be not only “gathered somewhere” but also delivered directly to the army’s first echelon). It is already clear that before the start of the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk offensive operation, the Russian military strategic command had replenished the 3rd CAA with personnel to ensure it had enough assault infantry for the duration of the campaign. However, this proved insufficient (the assault infantry of this army was “minimized” in numbers before the 3rd CAA reached the approaches of Sloviansk). That’s precisely why the 3rd CAA has slowed down on the Sloviansk (its main) direction over the past few weeks.
Moreover, during its offensive (especially during the phase of active and massive infiltration of its assault infantry into the tactical zone), it needs almost CONSTANT and regular replenishment. At least to be able to “secure” the already infiltrated areas, let alone increase efforts for further advancement. If this is not done, all these groups will eventually be detected, blocked, and eliminated by the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Even the most stubborn and “heroic” among them (which, by the way, can be observed in other directions besides Sloviansk).
Based on the above, I doubt that the current capabilities of the Russian 3rd CAA command in this area currently extend over its entire zone of operation. Apparently, in the near future, it will have to “naturally” narrow the areas and directions of the next phase of its offensive. In other words, drastically and decisively transition from a general offensive across its entire zone to offensive and massive assault actions only in certain areas and directions.
The other question is where exactly this will happen or could happen?
But that is clearly a topic for a separate discussion, and likely not a public one.
Photo: General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
