Russia currently shows no real readiness to end the war. On the contrary, the Kremlin continues to operate with a logic of prolonging the conflict, expecting that time is on their side. A war of attrition, they believe, will gradually undermine Ukraine’s capabilities and force Kyiv to agree to Moscow’s terms.
This logic is not new. It is based on the belief that Russia’s resources are greater, and its political system more resilient to prolonged shocks. But this strategy has a weak point — the economy.
The Russian economy remains vulnerable, and this vulnerability has a clear source: dependence on the oil and gas sector. Despite all attempts at diversification, energy exports continue to provide key budget revenues. Formally it’s about 20%, but in reality, the impact is much broader. Considering related industries, employment, internal demand in regions where oil refining is concentrated, it becomes clear that this share may reach 40-50%.
That’s why strikes on this sector have strategic rather than tactical significance.
Ukraine has already demonstrated that it can hit Russia’s critical infrastructure — oil depots, terminals, processing facilities. And this opens up a completely different logic of war — not just on the frontlines, but economic as well. What can be termed “sanctions at a distance” may prove to be much more effective than traditional diplomatic efforts.
Negotiations during the active phase of the war are almost never decisive. They do not guarantee the fulfillment of agreements and often only reflect the current balance of power. And the balance of power, in turn, is determined not by words, but by resources.
External circumstances currently partially favor Moscow. Instability in the global energy market, related to conflicts in the Middle East, allows Russia to earn income from oil exports. But this is a temporary factor. The market is changing, and in the long term, it cannot compensate for systemic infrastructure losses.
It is this gradual destruction of infrastructure and the increasing cost of the war for Russia itself that may change its behavior. It’s not about the Kremlin’s political “awakening” but a much more prosaic issue — the need to save its own economy. At some point, the Russian authorities might have to agree to a pause, not because they want peace, but because they need time for recovery.
Ukraine has effectively realized one of Russia’s key weaknesses. The question is how systematic and sustained this pressure will be.
Because the outcome of this war will be determined not only by events on the battlefield but also by the ability to undermine the economic foundation of aggression. And if this pressure is sufficient, the Russian economy may sooner or later find itself unable to meet the needs of the war.
And then it won’t just be the rhetoric that changes — the reality itself will change.
