Information on current Russian losses due to sanctions as of 04/22/2026.
1. Two Russian oil refineries have halted operations following drone attacks.
– These are the Novokuibyshevsky and Tuapse refineries owned by Rosneft. The facilities stopped processing oil due to damage from UAV strikes.
– The Tuapse refinery, the only one on Russia’s Black Sea coast, ceased operations on April 16 following drone attacks on the Tuapse port. Another strike occurred on April 20. The attacks damaged port infrastructure and oil tanks. The resulting fire caused massive smoke — a smoke plume stretched approximately 300 km and reached Stavropol. Due to the inability to ship oil products through the port, the facility had to stop its only primary oil processing unit with a capacity of 12 million tons per year.
– Another strike hit the Novokuibyshevsky refinery with a capacity of 8.3 million tons per year, which stopped on April 18. Last year, the plant produced approximately 1.1 million tons of gasoline and 1.6 million tons of diesel fuel. After the drone attacks, both primary oil processing units — AVT-11 and AVT-9 — were shut down.
– A series of strikes on oil processing infrastructure is increasingly undermining Russia’s ability to maintain stable fuel production and oil product exports.
2. Russia faces the largest oil production decline since the pandemic.
– In April, Russia reduced oil production due to strikes on port infrastructure and the shutdown of the Druzhba pipeline. The decline may be the sharpest since 2020.
– Estimates suggest a decrease of 300–400 thousand barrels per day in April compared to the average level at the beginning of the year. Compared to the end of 2025, the reduction amounts to 500–600 thousand barrels per day.
– One of the key reasons was the increased drone strikes on Russian oil ports and refineries in recent weeks. Amid this, companies are finding it increasingly difficult to maintain previous production volumes, especially considering scheduled spring repairs at refineries.
– Another factor was the shutdown of the Druzhba pipeline, which supplies oil to Hungary and Slovakia through Ukraine. Its operations ceased following attacks at the end of January. The reduction in production has already affected exports: sea shipments of Russian oil have fallen to the lowest level since summer 2024 and, by the end of April, may reach their lowest level since 2023.
– Meanwhile, some losses may be offset by high oil prices. Estimates suggest that in April, Russia’s budget revenues from mineral extraction tax may amount to about 700 billion rubles — twice as much as in March, and 10% more year-over-year.
3. Russia switches to manual control of the fuel market after a series of strikes on oil refining infrastructure, which significantly reduced production capacities.
– In 2025, drone attacks disabled about 20% of Russia’s refinery capacities. In 2026, the situation worsened: at least five major plants were shut down in the last month alone.
– Since the beginning of the year, at least 12 refineries have been hit. Among them: “Kinef” in the Leningrad region (capacity about 20 million tons per year, the second-largest refinery in Russia); “Nizhnegorodnefteorgsintez” (about 17 million tons); Novokuibyshevsk, Saratov, and Tuapse refineries.
– Strikes on the infrastructure have already led to fuel disruptions: in 2025, some regions experienced gasoline shortages, and gas station prices rose at record rates — up to 12.7% annually in the fall. By the end of the year, growth slowed to 10.8%, but remained almost twice the official inflation rate (5.6%).
– Against this backdrop, the Russian government plans to introduce mandatory targets for oil companies regarding gasoline and diesel production volumes to stabilize the domestic market and compensate for losses due to refinery damage.
4. The windfall profits Moscow may gain from rising oil prices are unable to restore the Russian economy, which is approaching recession.
– Even additional revenues from energy exports do not compensate for the structural problems of Russia’s economy. The main issue is that massive budget spending stimulates demand but hardly affects production.
– A significant portion of resources is directed to the military industry, whose products are effectively destroyed on the battlefield and do not create long-term economic returns. As a result, economic activity increasingly depends on government spending, which simultaneously intensifies inflationary pressure.
– If the Russian authorities decide to allocate additional oil revenues to further increase budget spending beyond the already planned level, it will only exacerbate inflation and force the central bank to maintain a tight monetary policy for longer.
– Despite the regulator gradually lowering the key rate over the past nine months and reducing it to 15% in the last meeting, the real cost of loans remains close to historical highs. Russia’s GDP likely contracted in the first quarter of 2026 after industrial production fell by nearly 2% in the first two months of the year.
– If these trends are confirmed, it will be the first quarterly economic decline since early 2023. At the same time, investment activity in the first quarter fell into negative territory for the first time since the beginning of 2022.
– Even within the Russian government, there is growing caution regarding the prospects of energy revenues. According to the updated macroeconomic forecast, officials are setting the average price of Russian oil at around 59 dollars per barrel, and they also expect a stronger ruble than previously forecasted.
– Together, this means that real income from oil exports may be lower than the figures budgeted. Even rising oil prices due to the conflict around Iran could bring the Russian budget only an additional 1–3 trillion rubles in 2026.
– However, these funds are insufficient to compensate for the decline in production, the reduction in investments, and the overall economic slowdown amid the war and sanctions pressure.
5. Russia tries to resolve the small aviation crisis using mid-20th-century technology.
– The Siberian Research Institute of Aviation has proposed restoring the airworthiness of approximately 700 Soviet An-2 aircraft currently in storage.
– The idea arose after failed attempts to create a modern replacement for this aircraft, which has been used for decades on local airlines. The An-2 was developed back in the 1940s and remained a staple of small aviation first in the USSR and then in the Russian Federation.
– In total, about 17,500 of these machines were built in various countries, including Ukraine, Poland, and China. Most of them have long been written off or scrapped: according to industry estimates, over 14,700 have already been destroyed.
– As of 2025, only 249 of this type of aircraft remained in operation in the Russian Federation, with another 276 in the DOSAAF fleet. From 2024, the authorities stopped the mass decommissioning of old machines and began returning some of them to service. During this time, 16 aircraft from those in storage and awaiting disposal were restored.
– SibNIA believes that the modernization and repair of old An-2s can temporarily address the deficit of aircraft on local routes for about 5–7 years — until new aircraft of this class, whose creation in the Russian Federation is constantly delayed, appear.
– The problem is that key import substitution projects in this area have effectively failed. The “Baikal” aircraft, intended to replace the Soviet machines, has had its certification delayed several times and still has no clear launch deadlines.
– Another An-2 modernization project also did not receive full governmental support. As a result, the authorities are forced to revert to the operation of equipment created over seven decades ago.
– Even the plan to restore old aircraft is hindered by an engine shortage. One proposed option includes using American engines from Pratt & Whitney or Honeywell, but their supply to the Russian Federation is restricted by sanctions.
– The alternative Russian engine TVD-10B exists only as a project, and the prospects for its mass production remain uncertain.
6. Russia prepares to increase oil exports after port restoration.
– Russia resumes maritime oil exports after several weeks of disruptions caused by drone strikes and expects an increase in shipments soon. Shipments from key ports — Primorsk, Ust-Luga, and Novorossiysk — have already resumed, with most berths operational again. This sets the stage for increased exports.
– On average, in the four weeks leading up to April 19, maritime deliveries were 3.11 million barrels per day — the lowest since August, and about 500,000 barrels less than the month before. Meanwhile, volumes rose to 3.53 million barrels per day in the last week.
– The export growth comes amid a supply shortage in the global market due to the Middle East crisis and de facto restrictions on shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, which typically handles up to 15 million barrels of oil per day.
– An additional factor was the US extending permission to purchase Russian oil loaded by April 17. This stimulated demand, particularly from India, where refineries actively purchased accumulated volumes. As a result, Russian oil stocks on tankers were reduced by about 40 million barrels — from a peak of around 140 million in January to current levels, where most volumes are already in transit.
– At the same time, potential resumption of pipeline oil pumping to Hungary through Ukraine could partially limit maritime export — approximately by 150,000–200,000 barrels per day.
– Despite the restoration of flows, the consequences of previous attacks continue to affect total volumes.
7. Russia stops transit of Kazakh oil to Germany from May 1.
– Russia will stop transporting Kazakh oil to Europe through the northern branch of the “Druzhba” pipeline starting May 1. This is reported by industry sources.
– This concerns supplies that since 2023 became an alternative to Russian oil for Germany following the imposition of sanctions. It is estimated that Berlin will lose about 43,000 barrels per day of Kazakh raw material for approximately ten days.
– In 2025, Kazakhstan exported 2.146 million tons of oil through “Druzhba,” mainly to the refinery in Schwedt, which after the start of the war came under the control of the German government and rejected Russian oil.
– In the first quarter of 2026, supplies to Germany doubled to 730,000 tons, with a record of 2.5 million tons expected for the year. Simultaneously, Kazakhstan began diversifying exports: in 2025, test deliveries were made to Hungary — 85,000 tons through Croatia.
– Meanwhile, the southern branch of “Druzhba” may resume pumping Russian oil to Hungary and Slovakia soon — approximately at around 200,000 barrels per day.
– Moscow states its readiness to resume transit provided a route through Ukraine is opened. Hungary and Slovakia remain some of the most dependent EU countries on Russian oil and actively advocate for maintaining energy supplies. Against this backdrop, the situation with “Druzhba” becomes an additional pressure factor in energy negotiations between Moscow, Kyiv, and Brussels.
8. Ukraine resumes “Druzhba” oil transit.
– Ukraine plans to resume transit of Russian oil via the Druzhba pipeline soon. Kyiv anticipates that this move will accelerate the receipt of financial support from the EU amounting to €90 billion. Earlier, President Volodymyr Zelensky announced the completion of repairs on the damaged pipeline section.
– Meanwhile, the Foreign Minister of the Czech Republic reported that Hungary and Slovakia have confirmed their readiness to support the allocation of this funding and new sanctions against Russia after the resumption of oil supplies.
9. The EU may reduce funding for the Venice Biennale due to the decision to allow Russia to participate in the 2026 exhibition.
– This was stated by the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs, Kaja Kallas, after a meeting of the union’s foreign ministers. According to her, Russia’s return to one of the world’s most renowned art exhibitions is unacceptable against the backdrop of the war against Ukraine.
– Kallas emphasized that while Russia destroys Ukrainian museums, churches, and attempts to annihilate Ukrainian culture, it should not be permitted to use international cultural platforms to showcase its projects.
– In connection with this, the EU is considering reducing funding for the exhibition. The Venice Biennale plans to welcome Russian participants for the first time since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
– This has sparked a sharp reaction among European countries. A group of 25 European states opposed Moscow’s participation. Latvian Minister of Culture Agnese Lace stated she would boycott the opening ceremony on May 9 if the Russian delegation takes part in the event.
– The Latvian Ministry of Culture emphasized that Russia’s participation effectively grants legitimacy to the aggressor state through a prestigious European cultural platform partially funded by EU money.
– Additionally, 37 Members of the European Parliament have appealed to European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and Kaja Kallas to suspend funding for the exhibition, estimated at around 2 million euros over three years, as well as consider restrictive measures against individuals associated with the Russian pavilion.
– The organizers of the Biennale, in turn, stated that the exhibition should remain a space for dialogue, where art is separated from politics. However, in many European capitals, the stance is increasingly that such “cultural neutrality” seems unacceptable while the war against Ukraine continues.
