Eric Schmidt, Washington Post / Translation by iPress
Former CEO and Chairman of Google, and Chairman of the Special Competitive Studies Project, Eric Schmidt, warns in a column for the Washington Post that Ukraine’s advantage in rapid adaptation and technological innovations is swiftly diminishing: Russia is increasingly successful in combining mass weapons production with its own technological solutions. In his view, the war is entering a phase where not only quality and ingenuity but primarily industrial capacity, production rates, and the ability to sustain a prolonged war of attrition are decisive. Ukraine has engineering potential and combat experience but cannot match Russia’s resources alone. Therefore, the West needs to integrate Ukraine’s defense industry into its own production system and provide Ukraine with a sufficient number of interceptors, ammunition, and long-range weapons.
One summer night, as my colleagues and I were traveling by train from eastern Ukraine to Kyiv, we received warnings of dozens of approaching Russian ballistic missiles. We arrived in Kyiv and, along with the crowd, rushed to underground shelters. Within minutes, numerous explosions erupted nearby: missiles were falling one after another, and the station where we were hiding shook. Hundreds of passengers squeezed in with us, many of them families with children, all waiting for the Russian barrage to cease.
I had visited Ukraine several times during its prolonged war with Russia, helping Ukrainian military develop advanced battlefield technologies. But after this last trip, I returned more concerned than ever since the start of the full-scale invasion.
Russia has significantly improved its conduct of this war, and Washington must realize that it is moving towards a strategy of total war, mobilizing industry and human resources to force Ukraine to capitulate under relentless strikes. To defeat Russia, it is no longer sufficient to simply transfer weapons. Ukraine needs the West to combine its resources at a scale sufficient to surpass the enemy in production volumes and endure the war of attrition longer.
For much of the war, Ukraine’s main advantage was its ability to quickly adapt and innovate. Russia had more soldiers, more money, and a much stronger industrial base, but resourceful Ukrainian engineers could develop a new weapon or system, test it on the front lines, and improve it within weeks. Decentralized networks of military, engineers, and defense tech companies in Ukraine refined developments faster than the cumbersome Russian military bureaucracy could respond.
This advantage is rapidly diminishing. When Ukraine developed interceptors capable of destroying swarms of Russian Shahed drones, Russia adapted by deploying faster jet-powered Shaheds, which are much harder to intercept. Russia is also deploying a satellite network intended to compete with Starlink, which Ukrainian drone units use to strike Russian forces in occupied territories of Ukraine. For years, the Kremlin’s strategy was to counter Ukrainian innovations with the scale of industrial production, but now they are combining this scale with their own technological innovations.
In Ukraine, I saw a battlefield that would have been hard to imagine at the start of this war. Commanders sit deep underground, monitoring video feeds from sensors, while thousands of drones conduct reconnaissance, deliver supplies, and hunt soldiers and equipment. Movement on the surface has become almost suicidal. Up to 80 percent of Ukrainian military casualties occur while moving between positions. Once they reach the front lines, some remain underground for months because going outside is too dangerous.
Yet this war is by no means static. It involves the fastest technological competition we have ever seen. A new drone can be extremely effective when it first appears, but within a few months it can become obsolete. The enemy can change the radio frequencies they use, create electronic warfare countermeasures, deploy faster interceptors, or otherwise alter tactics. This begins the cycle of adaptation anew.
Ukraine is exceptionally strong in this process, but innovations alone do not solve the problem of scaling up production to the volumes required by a full-scale high-intensity war. I spoke with commanders who know what needs to be done to stop the Russians but lack enough resources to do so. One of them mentioned that his unit stopped searching for new targets because they did not have enough drones to strike all those already detected. This is one of the defining features of the current war. An outstanding drone produced in hundreds is interesting; a good drone produced in hundreds of thousands is what can change the course of the war.
Russia is mobilizing for total war. It is considering another large-scale mobilization, expected by Ukraine to occur this fall, and is building industrial capacities for mass weapon production. Ukraine cannot match such scales on its own. The next winter will be critically important. Russia is already exploiting the lack of Ukrainian missile defense systems capable of intercepting ballistic missiles, striking power stations and substations to soon plunge Ukrainians into darkness, cold, and suffering.
Ukraine has the engineers, determination, and spirit of innovation needed to wage this total war. It lacks the industrial capabilities on the scale that only Western partners can provide. Ukraine urgently needs interceptors, munitions, and long-range strike weapons, as well as investments to expand its production capabilities. The West should treat Ukraine’s defense industry as part of its own: jointly producing weapons, eliminating supply chain bottlenecks, and ensuring that Ukrainian commanders never have to limit target numbers due to a shortage of striking means.
The battle-hardened and highly lethal Armed Forces of Ukraine are shaping the future of warfare directly at the frontline every day. Closer integration with them can help Western armies ensure Ukraine’s victory, learn critical modern warfare lessons acquired at great cost, and strengthen the international order to counter threats that will define the coming decades.
When the immediate threat in Ukraine passed that night, we emerged from the underground shelter. That night, Russia launched dozens of cruise missiles, as well as ballistic and hypersonic missiles at Kyiv; 17 people were killed, over 40 were injured, with victims pulled from the rubble of a school and a children’s hospital. For more than four years, Ukraine has endured blows that would have broken many other countries. It refuses to surrender.
But praising the resilience of Ukrainians is not a strategy, and courage alone cannot protect Ukrainian cities or win the war. Ukraine has given the West four years, paying for them with the blood of its soldiers and the ingenuity of its engineers. We cannot allow it to face another winter alone under Russian bombardment.
Photo: Ministry of Defense of Ukraine
