Orikhiv-Zaporizhzhia direction
The enemy (Russian forces) continues its offensive actions within the zone of its 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA) of the “Dnepr” troop group with the aim of neutralizing the Orikhiv defense area of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) and reaching the main forces of its forward units and formations from the south and southeast to the outskirts of the city of Zaporizhzhia.
In order to achieve these operational goals, Russian forces within the 58th CAA zone are currently attempting to solve at least two tactical tasks:
– Envelop the flanks (from the west and the east) of the Orikhiv defense area of the AFU, while infiltrating the maximum possible number of their assault infantry into the limits of the city of Orikhiv itself.
– Also, to resume the advance of their forward units along the Dnipro River (from south to north) directly towards the city of Zaporizhzhia.
However, as of last evening, the enemy has not managed to accomplish any of these tasks.
1. In this direction, Russian forces are acting with the following forces and means (approximately):
The 58th CAA is acting in this direction with its main forces:
– The 19th Motor Rifle Division (MRD) — 392nd, 429th, and 503rd Motor Rifle Regiments (MRR) — operates on the left flank and partly in the center of the 58th CAA’s offensive zone;
– The 42nd MRD — 70th, 71st, and 291st MRR + the 270th MRR “Akhmat-Caucasus,” 50th Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment (SPAR). The presence of separate units of the 78th Separate Motorized Regiment (SMR) “Sever-Akhmat” and 349th MRR “Akhmat-Russia” is possible — operates in the center and on the right flank of the 58th CAA’s offensive zone;
– The 136th Separate Motor Rifle Brigade (SMRB), likely part of its forces make up part of the 58th CAA’s operational reserve;
– The 100th Separate Reconnaissance Brigade (SRB), likely operates in this direction with its main forces;
– The 49th Separate Airborne Assault Brigade (SAAB) — in reality, this is an exclusively assault formation that does not belong to the “classic” Russian Airborne Forces (Airborne). Since it has minimum “airborne” and a lot of “assault.” It is most likely the basis of the 58th CAA’s operational reserve;
– A Composite Regimental Tactical Group (RTG) of the 4th Military Base (Tskhinvali, South Ossetia);
– The 291st Artillery Brigade (AB) – operates in this direction with its main forces.
Reinforcement measures:
– 47th MRD of the 18th CAA – 1152nd, 1153rd, and 1154th MRR. This is a “mobilization” unit formed on the territory of the occupied Crimean Peninsula. It operates in this direction, most likely using forces from 2 of its 3 “regular” motor rifle regiments;
– Airborne Forces (AF), likely operating with the 108th and 247th Air Assault Regiments (AAR) of the 7th Air Assault Division (AAD). In addition, units from the 76th AAD and the 45th Separate Special Purpose Brigade (SSPB) of the AF may also be present;
– Moreover, in the zone of the 58th CAA, the presence of separate units of the 205th Separate Motor Rifle Brigade of the 49th CAA is quite possible.
In the context of further strengthening the 58th CAA to bring its forward units and formations to the outskirts of the city of Zaporizhzhia, it is likely to be reinforced with additional forces and means from the “Dnepr” task force. Most likely, this would involve the concentration and deployment of additional parts and units from the 47th MRD, 104th AAD, or 98th Airborne Division (AD) in its zone.
2. Current situation in this direction is characterized by constant, yet ineffective attempts by the enemy to directly assault the city of Orikhiv, as well as to encircle it from the flanks, specifically:
– In the direction of Novopokrovka — Mala Tokmachka, Ukrainian forces have again managed to significantly reduce the presence of Russian infantry directly in Mala Tokmachka. Currently, only two small Russian infantry groups are recorded on its territory (one in the basements of the destroyed correctional colony, the other in a few buildings near the demolished local branch of “Nova Poshta”).
Several Russian assault groups that previously “secured” the southeastern outskirts of the village have either withdrawn to Bilohirya or pulled back to an area 2 km northeast of it.
– In the direction of Robotyne — Novodanilivka, the enemy managed to occupy at least half of the Uspenivska gully and maintained control of an “intermediate” position (toward Novodanilivka and Orikhiv) with one of its assault groups.
In Orikhiv itself, apparently, the number of Russian infantry is minimal. Only one small infantry group (possibly up to 5-6 infantrymen) has been detected acting “in a functional mode,” entrenched on the southeastern outskirts of the city (from the Novodanilivka side).
– West of Orikhiv, the AFU continues to confidently hold Nova Andriivka and Novopavlivka, despite fairly frequent attempts by the enemy to advance in the directions of Mali Shcherbaky — Novopavlivka and Nesteryanka — Nova Andriivka. The maximum the enemy has achieved in this direction after more than a month of intense counter-combats is up to 2.8 km (to the northeast of Mali Shcherbaky and 1.8 km north of Nesteryanka).
Furthermore, the command of the Russian 58th CAA is apparently also attempting to resume the advance of its forward units directly towards Zaporizhzhia from the south to the north along the former Kakhovka Reservoir channel. Specifically:
– North of the village of Stepove and northwest of the village of Mali Shcherbaky, the enemy conducted a series of “penetrating” actions, allowing them to infiltrate up to two small infantry groups in the area a few kilometers southwest and northeast of Pavlivka. Additionally, advancing in the direction of Kamianske — Lukyanivske, Russian forces moved 2-2.1 km east of Stepnohirsk with their forward units.
– In Stepnohirsk itself, the enemy continues to hold its southern part (the “Vysotka” area) and regularly attempts to secure a foothold in the southern part of the village of Prymorske (Pokrovska Street area), acting with small infantry groups along the former Kakhovka reservoir bed, thus bypassing Ukrainian positions near the village of Plavni. They also use it for the actions of their small infantry and sabotage-reconnaissance groups (DRG) towards the village of Malokaterynivka.
Therefore, it can be stated that the noticeable activation of the advanced units and detachments of the Russian 58th Combined Arms Army over at least the past 1.5 months has not yielded any significant (operational) results for their command. They are limited exclusively to the tactical zone. Moreover, even from this perspective, they cannot yet be considered particularly significant.
3. Regarding further development prospects throughout the Orikhiv-Zaporizhzhia direction, several quite characteristic tactical factors should be noted:
– The command of the Russian 58th Combined Arms Army continues to concentrate its main efforts precisely on the Orikhiv defense area of the Ukrainian Armed Forces (i.e., on their right flank). This is largely due to the relatively successful actions of the troops of the neighboring 5th and 35th Combined Arms Armies of the Eastern Group, advancing towards Huliaipole — Orikhiv. This particularly pertains to the area of Myrne — Bilohirya, where the enemy has a fairly apparent tactical success.
– The persistent desire of the Russian command to reach the Novopavlivka — Novoandriivka line, acting from the direction of Nesteryanka and Shcherbaky, as well as relentless attempts to entirely “infiltrate” Mala Tokmachka with their assault infantry from the direction of Novopokrovka and Bilohirya, indicate that the enemy still considers the deepest possible encirclement of the Orikhiv defense area of the Ukrainian Armed Forces from its western and eastern flanks as one of the most crucial elements of their assault and subsequent elimination. Hence, they are unlikely to abandon these attempts in the near future.
– In turn, the enemy’s attempts to resume the advancement of their forward units directly on Zaporizhzhia from the south along the Dnipro, are likely connected with their own flanking tactical actions on the Mali Shcherbaky — Pavlivka and Kamianske — Lukyanivske directions against Ukrainian units stubbornly holding positions north of the villages of Lobkove and Stepove.
This is quite an obvious tactical decision by the Russian command. Since the enemy cannot currently act directly on the Kamianske — Stepnohirsk direction (i.e., on a fairly narrow coastal strip no more than 6 km wide), they are forced to initially secure the right flank of their forward units conducting combat operations in the Stepnohirsk and Prymorske areas from possible counterattacks by the Ukrainian Armed Forces from this area.
The active infiltration actions of the enemy from Kamyanske to the northeast (i.e., towards Lukyanivske) and similar actions from Maly Shcherbaky towards Pavlivka are quite telling in this context. The Russian command is clearly trying to first “push back” Ukrainian units from the villages of Stepove and Lobkove as much to the north as possible before “moving” again towards Stepnohirsk.
Overall, in an operational-strategic sense, the intensification of offensive actions by Russian troops in the Orihiv-Zaporizhzhia and Hulyaipole directions, at least over the last two months, apparently has a somewhat “alternative” character compared to their Slovyansk-Kramatorsk offensive operation.
After all, a hypothetical breakthrough of Russian troops to the outskirts of Zaporizhzhia could be quite comparable to their success in the equally hypothetical capture of the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration. Primarily, concerning the significance and degree of influence of such an outcome on the overall course of the war.
The other question is whether the Russian command practically has enough “strength” to simultaneously attempt to realize these strategic ambitions in completely different strategic operational zones?
As for me, the answer to this is very debatable and not as straightforward as it seems at first glance. For one simple reason. By distributing efforts more or less evenly simultaneously in two operational-strategic directions, which the aforementioned ambition would evidently require, the Russian command may ultimately fail to achieve its goals in either direction. Especially due to a specific lack of strength at the decisive moment in each of these directions.
