Mid-September. Overall, the political season began without surprises – with aggressive “negotiation” and “truce” rhetoric.
Let’s note.
1. Russia intensifies terror against Ukrainian cities and expands the geography of attacks. The enemy sets fire to gas stations in the capital and checkpoints on the western border. Prime Minister Serhiy Koretsky talks about a critical situation in public finances. As for the front-line zone (from Chernihiv to Odesa), I won’t even mention it, it’s all evident.
In Europe, there are almost daily news reports about Russian subversions. At the same time, voices advocating normalization of relations with Russia at the cost of Ukraine’s surrender are getting louder.
The USA (Kushner) openly proposes giving Russia Donbas. Lavrov repeats in other words: if the USA hadn’t declined “Anchorage” (forcing Ukraine into territorial concessions), everyone would have lived in peace for a year already. Saying, do something, please! Trump persistently recommends stopping strikes on Russian refineries to establish an “energy truce”… And so on.
If the world hegemon (the USA) was considered a consistent and reliable ally of Ukraine in the fight against unjust aggression, the combination of these circumstances could be interpreted as: “guys, you are in an extremely difficult situation, the forecast is bad, account for the losses, we will back you here and here on security, take a break, recover, you’ll regain your position in the next stage”.
And, accordingly, make some decision. But since the situation is different, we need to delve into the context.
2. How does the picture look that Putin presents to the general public and “sells” to international partners?
According to official reports from the Russian command (which are reflected on public maps and published by high-ranking officials), Russian troops are allegedly successfully bypassing four cities’ flanks: Lyman, Sloviansk, Kramatorsk, and Druzhkivka.
In the Lyman direction, they have supposedly already captured Sviatohirsk, while Russian troops are allegedly actively advancing southwest of Druzhkivka, with a common goal for both groups – “towards Barvinkove” (Kharkiv region). The objective: to cut off supplies to Sloviansk and Kramatorsk.
In the best case – to force Ukrainian troops to retreat, in a working scenario – to engage in urban battles by November, increasing political pressure (threatening a humanitarian catastrophe in the rear, millions of refugees, etc.) and emphasizing the futility of defense.
In advanced Russian hallucinations, this means triumphantly concluding the main part of the “special military operation” by the end of the year, pressing negotiations and periodic escalations.
This is the mainstream public picture.
The next (more pragmatic) plan variant – to break Ukrainian defense at the approaches to the mentioned cities by winter and to transition to urban warfare in the winter while simultaneously launching attacks on the life support systems of Kyiv and several other large centers in Ukraine. Also increasing the number of subversions in Europe. To force Ukraine into concessions after the winter horrors, particularly by disrupting European support.
3. How does it look in reality? Read the details of the situation at the front (including the Lyman direction) from Kostyantyn Mashovets. The significant summary is approximately as follows.
Even before General Andriy Biletsky’s statements about some movements of the Ukrainian side in the Lyman area, since the end of August, the Russian military community was torn apart by alarming reports.
Without going into details about who is advancing or retreating, the essence is this: there is currently no encirclement of Lyman and Sloviansk by Russians from the flank, nor is it anticipated. Svyatohirsk is not captured, this is complete falsehood.
The situation southwest of Druzhkivka remains difficult, but the Ukrainian command is taking measures, including organizational ones (as reported).
As a result, the entire victorious construction painted by the Kremlin for its subjects and international audience is knowingly destroyed. If no extreme upheavals occur in the Ukrainian rear (and also in terms of international support), Russian troops will not complete their maneuver either by November or by winter or the New Year.
Moreover: with high probability, the Ukrainian army will leave them only one option—to storm the cities head-on, and from winter fields. Looking at the map: maintaining control over Lyman and covering with the Siversky Donets, the Ukrainian Defense Forces will attack with drones on the flank of Russians advancing head-on on Sloviansk.
The mission looks maximally bloody for the Russian troops. The Russian military definitely understands this. How it will end, we don’t know now. For example, the Russians may intensify strikes with KABs, and Ukraine might not have anything to counter them (though there’s a possibility of the first “Gripens” appearing with the appropriate missiles during winter).
As a result, the mentioned cities may turn into rubble by spring. But one way or another, the most realistic scenario at the moment (!) is such: a months-long exhausting campaign on the city’s approach and urban battles with an incredibly high cost for the Russians in terms of losses.
Achieving success with the current set of forces without destabilizing the Ukrainian rear is practically impossible for the Russians. That is, from a purely military task perspective, Putin needs to start compulsory mobilization.
But even if it starts at the end of September, it will only become apparent on the front by the New Year.
Considering that the task is not just military, but military-political, compulsory mobilization would, on one hand, be an acknowledgment of the collapse of the victorious plans.
On the other hand, it would put Trump, who advocates for an “energy truce,” in a very awkward position. His opponents will ask the logical question: what kind of truce, if Putin is openly preparing escalation?
In summary: instead of a spectacular end to the “SVO,” the Russians will face at least the bloodiest grinder until spring with an unknown outcome. Because success is not guaranteed at all, too many variables.
This is if you take the main storyline. But there are no less important ones. And they are interesting.
4. The senior leaders of the economic bloc of the Russian Federation, who, according to the legend, should be coming out from a victorious perspective, have already PUBLICLY declared 2027 as a “lost year” from an economic standpoint. Not a single positive guideline. Absolutely none. How come?
The Minister of Economic Development, Maksim Reshetnikov, amid a 10% drop in investments by the end of the semester, stated that there is no expectation of investment growth until 2028.
Despite alarmist statements from Sberbank’s head, Herman Gref, about the need to reduce the key rate to at least 10–12%, the Central Bank left the rate at 14% during its meeting on September 11.
At the same time, the head of the Bank of Russia, Elvira Nabiullina, directly stated: “Any additional ruble of demand stimulation from the state moves the Central Bank away from lowering the key rate.” That is, until the structure of budget expenditures changes, money for Russian business will remain very expensive. And it will not change.
Against this backdrop, Russian banks are actively increasing reserves for problematic loans, realizing that they will not be repaid. The Central Bank is nervous, as these reserves are insufficient. Russian economic observers note: it is already mid-September, yet there are no hints about what the Russian budget for 2027 will look like. In previous years, there were already guidelines and some professional discussion. Now there is only a general guideline that the budget will remain in deficit until 2029. What surprises are expected next year remain unclear.
There is only a feeling that they will be unpleasant. Much is said about the deficit of the Russian budget, problems in industries, etc. To sum up, in the context of victorious (!) military rhetoric, the forecast for the Russian economy from the Russians themselves is extremely alarming.
And what will happen if these forecasts are adjusted taking into account “realities on the ground”: a prolonged bloody grinder amid an exchange of distant strikes and possible problems in the Russian rear, which were not present before?
5. When “good” drones began dismantling the Russian army’s support system through marketplaces, many Russian emigrants claimed that it would only rally the population around the Kremlin and against Ukraine. Perhaps this rallied some in words. There are videos like “why spoil the vacation in Sochi?!”.
However, the fact is that Russians in good cars, men of well-groomed Russian ladies suffering at resorts and in gas station queues, have not gone to the army for money. And they won’t go voluntarily. The number of those wishing to go to war is not growing.
It is being ground down at a rate of 30+k per month. Stories that small businesses will drop everything and enlist as stormtroopers are not confirmed by practice. The mood “let all this somehow end” is already changing along a gradient. From “finish off Ukraine finally!” to “just finish this quickly somehow.”
The bottom line.
Russia’s victorious military concept is unrealistic. This is a fact. The destruction of these illusions will occur in winter against the backdrop of a deteriorating economic situation.
6. In parallel, a hidden cognitive process is ongoing within the elite, along with bureaucratic wars. Recently, information emerged that the head of the FSB Economic Security Service, Sergey Alpatov, was removed from his position. Gossip suggests the reason was a professional error that resulted in unfounded accusations against Putin’s friend Ilya Traber and the Rotenberg clan. For understanding:
1) the mentioned position is very significant in itself. It controls all business and state funds. The current head of the FSB, Alexander Bortnikov, headed this service. The most influential FSB employee at the moment, First Deputy Head of Service Sergey Korolev, also rose from this position.
2) The departure of Alpatov is interpreted by some observers as a blow to Korolyov’s prospects, who has gained too much influence. In the coming months, rotations in the FSB are expected, with the possible departure of Bortnikov, and Korolyov was among the main candidates for his position.
Currently, the FSB objectively remains one of the real pillars of Russia.
The mentioned individuals are quite capable of assessing the overall situation. Control over the FSB is an extremely important position in Russian power during a period of inevitable turbulence. Therefore, the fight for this position is expected to be intense. There will be casualties and destruction in every sense. At the same time, information is spreading that Russian Defense Minister Andrey Belousov has set the task of dismantling the political contour around the criminal group “Akhmat” that is not controlled by the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff.
The peculiarity is that “Akhmat” has a purely Kadyrov core and a sort of periphery that has scaled up the resources of Dodon and his aides. They will not dare to touch the core, but Kadyrov’s tentacles outside Chechnya will be shortened, including limiting the possibility of looting occupied territories and parasitizing the military budget. These rumors have emerged amid the latest fabrications about Ramzan Kadyrov’s miserable health condition.
In the worst-case scenario, the struggle for real levers of power in Moscow may coincide with the moment of transition in Chechnya. This is one of those variables that adds anxiety and instability… The list can go on.
7. Currently, Putin’s strongest “card” is Trump’s vague campaign against Iran. Trump has already “won” 8 comfortable months for Russia.
Without these maneuvers, the situation at the moment would be completely different. But it is what it is. If one composes an ideal picture for Putin and Trump’s situational interests, they converge by November in a format of some sort of settlement on Russian terms.
For which there are no real prerequisites. To achieve their mutual happiness, one element is lacking: a certain act (or series) of pressure/intimidation that will force Ukraine to make concessions. This can be expected, in principle, after the elections in Russia and Trump’s meeting with Emperor Xi. The nuance is that all of this may not work.
And Russia (as well as Ukraine) will face the prospect of entering an extremely difficult winter. And the consequences will be so traumatic that even a hypothetical prize in the form of the ruins of the conditionally imagined Kramatorsk will not save the Kremlin.
In general, the basic scenario looks like this: Attempts to break Ukraine before winter – fail – everyone enters a hard winter (militarily, politically, economically), from which they emerge shattered, raising the risks of destabilization to the skies. The probability of such a scenario is evident everywhere. And nobody likes it.
Therefore, an interim option is still not excluded: a cooling of relations along the line of contact with some growing diplomacy without dramatic concessions from Ukraine. On the contrary: with Russia’s retreat in exchange for economic normalization and under some victorious grand rhetoric.
“Negotiations” in this direction are ongoing. Last night, the Syzran Oil Refinery took a bright part in them. Before that – “Togliattikauchuk.” And so forth. This is not to mention military targets. Therefore, there are no grounds to exclude the prospect of a hard winter.
As much as possible, preparation is necessary. But fluctuations will continue for another month and a half. Then things will become clearer with the political reality in the USA, the economic contours in Russia, and the objective (un)successes of the Russians on the front. The stories that Putin is doing well and is satisfied are clearly exaggerated. He is not satisfied. And those around him, even less so. Even considering hypothetical victories of Putin’s supporters in Europe, this may worsen the situation for Ukraine, but not improve it for Russia.
Delays are becoming increasingly traumatic each month. The strategy of delay was quite effective a few years ago, a year ago.
Now it is causing not just degradation, but irreversible processes of Russia’s lagging and future upheavals.
Overall, I still see grounds to believe (hope) that the year will end differently than described by the base scenario. The chances are not lost.
The reality might be a cooling down for us amidst the “heating up” in Europe due to the intensification of targeted attacks…
The cost of delay for Ukraine is obvious and horrific. First of all, people will die.
Some will leave. Some will make the final decision not to return.
It is important to remember that amidst the objective difficulties and hardships, there will be attempts to transform/present bad circumstances as hopelessly apocalyptic, to cross the line between merely painful decisions and the process of losing statehood. We must not succumb.
Strength to us all.
Photo: Dmytro Smolenko/ Ukrinform
