Today, the Orikhovo-Zaporizhzhia direction.
The enemy (Russian troops) continues offensive operations in the zone of its 58th Combined-Arms Army (CAA) of the “Dnipro” troop grouping, aiming to reach the outskirts of Zaporizhzhia from the south and southeast. At the same time, the command of the Russian 58th CAA focuses its main efforts on the right flank of its offensive zone, towards the Orikhiv defense sector of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU).
Moreover, in the center and on the left flank of this army’s zone, it simultaneously conducts quite active attacking/assault actions with assault groups, trying to reach the area of Mahdalynivka — Zapasne — Pavlivka — Luk’yanivske with the main forces of its forward units, and continue advancing towards Prymorske, Stepnohirsk, and northwards.
The enemy attempts to break through directly to the city of Orikhiv, acting directly from the south through Novodanylivka, while simultaneously trying to encircle the eastern and western flanks of this AFU defense area.
In turn, on the section from Mali Shcherbaky to Plavni, the enemy conducts active infiltration and assault actions with its small infantry groups, attempting to disorganize the AFU defense system in the tactical zone directly towards Zaporizhzhia and create conditions for its advanced units to reach the Konka River (towards the line Prymorske — Veselyanka), as well as in the area of Komyshuvakha.
1. In the Orikhiv direction, the enemy has managed to break through with several small infantry groups through Uspenivska Balka into Novodanylivka (where they are recorded in the southern part of the village, at the intersection of highways T-0408 and T-0803), and also infiltrate similar infantry groups into the southeastern part of Mala Tokmachka and the area of the local penal colony (PC).
Furthermore, it is evident that the enemy also managed to bring several “ultra-small” infantry groups directly into Orikhiv and conceal a similar group in a small forest between Orikhiv and Mala Tokmachka, south of the T-0815 highway and the railway leading towards Zaporizhzhia.
It is also likely that several assault groups of the forward units of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division (MRD) of the 58th CAA enemy have managed not only to push the AFU out of the Shcherbaky and Mali Shcherbaky area but also advance to the west and southwest of Orikhiv in the directions of Shcherbaky — Novopavlivka (up to 2 km) and Nesterianka — Novoandriivka (up to 3.5 km).
However, the enemy’s attempts to develop and strengthen their tactical success over the past 2 weeks have not yet yielded significant results. It is likely that the Ukrainian units defending this sector managed to block and isolate these several “very small” Russian infantry groups within Orikhovo itself (in the area of Pryvokzalna Street, Gymnasium No.1 “Svizirya,” and the firm “Business-Agro”), as well as push the enemy out of the northern and central areas of Novodanilivka.
Despite this, the likelihood of further attempts by the enemy to increase the number of their assault infantry (even intensify them) both in Orikhovo itself and in Novodanilivka and Mala Tokmachka remains. Since small enemy infantry groups that had previously “infiltrated” these areas are trying to hold on in the southern part of Novodanilivka, in the area of the Uspenivska gully, and in the southeast of Mala Tokmachka for a kind of “intermediate accumulation” of subsequent infiltration groups.
In turn, the rather intensive activation of the enemy from the side of Shcherbaky and Nesterianka clearly aims to move its advanced units to the heights in the area of Novopavlivka and Novoandriivka. This will allow the enemy, in case of further advancement of its advanced units in these directions, to significantly increase the fire impact on the communications of the Orikhovo defense district, leading toward Tavriiske and Komyshuvakha.
Thus, in the near future, it is quite possible to expect a sharp increase and intensification of attempts by the Russian command in the Orikhovo direction to increase the number of their infiltrated infantry not only in the city of Orikhovo itself but also to the southwest, west, and southeast of it. It is apparent that the command of the Russian 58th Army and its 42nd Motorized Rifle Division, in particular, are trying to implement the same tactical “scenario” regarding this defense district of the AFU as their “colleagues” have already implemented in other directions — in Pokrovsk, Kupiansk, and Kostiantynivka.
2. Zaporizhzhia Direction
In this direction, the command of the Russian 58th Army has also intensified the “penetrating” actions of its small infantry groups by “infiltrating” along the Kamianske — Lukianivske direction (observed between Lukianivske and Pavlivka, southwest of Lukianivske and northeast of Kamianske), as well as in the direction of Mali Shcherbaky — Pavlivka (observed in the area of Novoboikivske, between Pavlivka and Novoiakivlivka, as well as south and east of Pavlivka itself).
However, it should be noted that this is not the first attempt by the enemy to disrupt the defense of the Ukrainian Armed Forces at the tactical level in these directions. Usually, all these small enemy infantry groups are blocked in the tactical depth of the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ defense and after several weeks of their “functioning,” they are quite actively “cleared” during search-and-raid actions by specially allocated forces and means of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, mainly with active use of tactical drones. Since their more or less long-term survival, consolidation, and accumulation are associated with the enemy facing significant logistical difficulties, especially regarding accumulation. This is because, in this direction, due to the area’s operational features, the enemy command needs to conduct these actions across significant open (visible) areas, unlike urban areas where there are, although ruined, various buildings including basements where it is quite possible to hide from detection (and of course, further engagement).
In this sense, the most promising for the enemy in these directions is only one of its small infantry groups, which managed to infiltrate northeast of Kamyanske directly from their forward unit positions and therefore have direct communication with them and support from their side.
In turn, in the “triangle” of Prymorske — Stepnohirsk — Plavni (north of Kamyanske, along the former Kakhovka reservoir’s former course), fierce battles with Russian assault groups continue. However, here the enemy’s successes are significantly more modest.
In this respect, it is worth noting a small Russian infantry group that is blocked north of Stepnohirsk (in a planting area east of the intersection of Hnidyi Street and the E-105 highway), as well as the persistent attempts by the enemy to expand their control zone directly in Stepnohirsk itself, acting from the “Vysotka” area they hold. So far, these attempts have resulted in the Russian assault teams occupying only a few ruined buildings along the southern side of Tavriyska Street, as well as several attempts to advance north of Pokrovska Street in Prymorske, the results of which are measured in hundreds of meters.
It is evident that here the enemy finds it quite difficult to conduct active assault actions since the Ukrainian Armed Forces continue to hold one of the key tactical areas in this direction — the “Ring” road junction between Stepnohirsk and Prymorske.
Moreover, the Ukrainian Armed Forces are likely quite successfully defending their positions directly in the village of Plavni, advancing and fortifying there south of the “Ring” by more than 2 km and taking control of the railway station of the same name, as well as securing positions along the E-105 road, also south of the “Ring” by more than 1.5 km.
Due to this, the Russian assault groups attempting to attack in Prymorske, in the area of Pokrovska Street, evidently can only replenish and supply themselves in a “semi-autonomous mode,” that is, through the former course of the Kakhovka reservoir. This probably complicates these actions in itself.
In summary…
Most likely, in an operational-tactical sense, the command of the Russian 58th Combined Arms Army, as well as its attached forces and assets from the “Dnepr” operational group, planning their further offensive on Zaporizhzhia, came to a rather logical conclusion that without eliminating the Orikhiv defense area of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, this would, so to speak, be “fraught with significant difficulties.” Primarily, due to the quite probable active flanking counter-offensive actions by the Ukrainian Armed Forces in such a case.
In fact, the consequences of such an assessment of the situation by the Russian command, which I described at the end of the spring — beginning of summer this year, are what we are witnessing now. Before organizing and conducting a “massive” offensive on Zaporizhzhia, the enemy clearly intends to eliminate this particular defense area of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, using not only the forces and means of the 58th Combined Arms Army from the “Dnepr” operational group but also the 5th and 35th Combined Arms Armies from the “Vostok” operational group, which are also advancing towards Orikhiv but on the Hulyaipole direction.
Photo: General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
