Sanctions on time. 29.06.2026

Sanctions on time. 29.06.2026
Volodymyr Omelyan

Information on current Russian losses due to sanctions as of June 29, 2026.

1. The fuel crisis in Russia is beginning to affect not only gasoline prices but also the prospects of the entire economy.

– The rapid rise in fuel prices is increasing inflationary pressure and casting doubt on further reductions in the central bank’s key rate. According to Rosstat, retail gasoline prices rose by 3% in the week leading up to June 22 — the sharpest jump in the available statistics period.
– Since the beginning of the year, fuel prices have risen by nearly 10%, marking the highest level in the last 14 years. In May, oil product production decreased by 13.5%, and in June, the decline could reach 25%.
– Against this backdrop, the Central Bank may refrain from further easing of monetary policy. Inflation has already accelerated to 5.9% year-on-year, and price growth rates have increased for the fourth consecutive week. On June 19, the Bank of Russia reduced the key rate by only 0.25 percentage points — to 14.25%. The bank’s head warned that opportunities for further rate reductions are narrowing due to the fuel crisis and government plans to increase budget spending.
– Financial markets are also showing increased pessimism. While the interbank market still allows for a slight rate cut by the end of the year, the government bond market is already factoring in a scenario of its new increase.
– Due to the deepening inflationary pressure, the central bank may be forced to return to a more rigid monetary policy despite an economic slowdown.

2. Russian airlines keep 19.3% of their fleet grounded – slow repairs.

– The largest Russian airlines have 130 aircraft (19.3% of the fleet) grounded, whereas during peak season the norm is up to 10%. The reason for the high downtime is the prolonged maintenance of the aircraft. As of June 28, 130 out of 673 aircraft from 11 major Russian airlines were not flying.
– Excluding Aeroflot, eight companies have a third of their fleet grounded — 93 out of 322 aircraft, while the summer norm is up to 10%. Aeroflot has 37 out of 349 aircraft not flying, most of which are in the subsidiary “Russia.”
– Three out of six Airbus 320neo aircraft have not flown for over a year. The largest number of aircraft, or a third of the fleet, is grounded in the largest private airline S7: 32 A320neo family aircraft and one Embraer face engine problems. Overall, the company has 104 passenger aircraft.

3. The Kremlin has effectively acknowledged the fuel crisis.

– Putin stated that queues persist at Russian gas stations, and the required grade of gasoline “cannot always be found.” According to him, both motorists and businesses, particularly the agricultural sector, are experiencing problems.
– Despite Russia utilizing maximum refinery capacities, de-conserving fuel reserves, banning the export of gasoline and aviation kerosene, and even considering halting diesel exports, the deficit has not been overcome.
– Restrictions on gasoline sales are already in place in many regions. Notably, a country that is one of the world’s largest oil exporters is forced to purchase gasoline abroad. Imported fuel will be more expensive than Russian, creating additional pressure on the domestic market.
– Essentially, the Kremlin acknowledged that even unprecedented administrative measures could not compensate for the impacts of strikes on Russia’s oil refining infrastructure. The war increasingly affects Russia’s own economy, forcing it to import gasoline despite its status as one of the world’s largest oil-producing states.

4. The gasoline deficit in Russia has impacted logistics and freight transportation.

– Due to the gasoline and diesel deficit, transporters are facing fuel supply disruptions, limits at gas stations, and queues that last many hours, or in some cases, days.
– In Siberia, southern Russia, and border regions, serious difficulties in fueling trucks are already being reported. The average daily mileage for trucks on routes to China has been reduced from 600–700 to about 500 km due to forced stops. At the same time, fuel companies have almost completely eliminated discount programs for carriers. Previously, the fuel discount could reach 16%, but now it has decreased to 3.5%.
– Small transport companies are also facing restrictions—no more than 60 liters of fuel per filling. As a result, carriers are forced to refuel more often, wait in queues, and increase expenses.
– Transport companies have already begun raising transportation rates by approximately 10%, creating additional inflationary pressure on the Russian economy. The fuel deficit extends far beyond a problem for motorists.
– The crisis is already disrupting logistics operations, increasing the cost of transportation, and gradually impacting the entire domestic market in Russia.

5. Russia is attempting to increase the export of liquefied natural gas by expanding its own “shadow fleet.”

– At least 21 tankers have been used to transport LNG from sanctioned projects. One of them was the Arctic Express gas carrier, which changed its flag to Russian in May.
– The vessel loaded LNG for the first time from the “Saam” floating storage in the Murmansk region, where products from the sanctioned “Arctic LNG-2” project are received.
– Despite these efforts, Moscow’s capabilities remain significantly limited. The main obstacle to increasing exports is the shortage of specialized gas carriers capable of delivering LNG to buyers. This lack of fleet hinders the full launch of “Arctic LNG-2,” which the Kremlin considered one of the key projects to compensate for the loss of the European gas market.
– To bypass this limitation, Russia bolstered its “shadow fleet” this year with four gas carriers that previously operated on an export LNG project in Oman.
– In May, “Arctic LNG-2” exported over 400,000 tons of liquefied natural gas — a record figure since the start of the project in 2024. However, even such volumes do not change the overall picture: sanctions and the lack of specialized vessels continue to limit Russia’s export potential and complicate the implementation of its gas strategy.

6. Italy has made it more difficult for Russian citizens to obtain visas.

– The processing time for applications has increased to over 60 days — 50% more than before. Until 2025, obtaining an Italian visa for Russians usually took about 20 days, and later this period increased to 40 days.
– Despite this, Italy remains one of the few EU countries that continues to actively issue visas to holders of Russian passports.
– In 2025, about 160,000 applications were approved, and the approval rate exceeded 90%, although the number of multiple-entry visas has significantly decreased.
– The possibility for Russian citizens to travel to the EU remains, but the process is becoming increasingly slower and less predictable.

7. The British energy company Petrofac Facilities Management Limited (PFML) paid the UK tax authority 569,157 pounds as part of an out-of-court settlement for violating the sanctions regime against Russia.

– This is the first instance where the British authorities have publicly named a company that agreed to such a settlement. Violations were committed in 2022–2023 during PFML’s winding down of operations in Russia.
– The company supplied sanctioned industrial goods to individuals related to Russia and provided technical assistance related to these goods. PFML reported the violations to the UK tax service voluntarily and fully cooperated with the investigation.
– The UK tax service emphasized that non-compliance with sanctions against Russia is a serious offense, and public disclosure of violators is intended to enhance business accountability for adhering to the sanctions regime.

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