Information on the current losses of the Russian Federation due to sanctions as of 06/22/2026.
1. Ukraine struck at the Russian electronics manufacturer for missiles and air defense systems.
– Ukrainian drones attacked an enterprise in Voronezh specializing in the production of semiconductor components for the Russian defense industry. According to monitoring resources, after the strike, consequences of the attack were recorded on the site, with footage shared by local residents.
– The enterprise produces electronic components used in Kh-101 cruise missiles, “Kalibr”, “Iskander-K” missile systems, as well as in S-400 and “Pantsir” air defense systems. These include microchips, transistor assemblies, diodes, and other elements necessary for guidance systems, radar, and onboard electronics.
– A strike on such an object is significant because the Russian military industry remains dependent on a limited number of advanced electronics manufacturers. The loss or temporary shutdown of such enterprises can complicate the production of precision weapons and air defense systems.
– In recent months, Ukrainian strikes are increasingly targeting not only the oil and gas infrastructure but also enterprises that directly supply the Russian army with critical technologies and components.
2. Ukraine launched a mass drone attack on the Moscow region for the third time in five days.
– On the night of June 22, Ukrainian drones carried out another massive attack on the Moscow region. Due to the attack, flight restrictions were imposed at Moscow’s aviation hub airports. Major airports experienced disruptions, leading to delays and schedule adjustments.
– Russian airlines were forced to cancel some flights. This is already the third massive attack on the Russian capital in the last five days. According to Russian reports, during previous raids on June 18 and 19, dozens and even hundreds of drones were also recorded.
– Moscow increasingly faces the need to redeploy additional air defense forces to protect strategic facilities deep in the rear. The series of strikes demonstrates the growing vulnerability of Russia’s air defense system even in the capital area.
– For the Kremlin, this means the need to spend more resources on protecting the rear regions, while simultaneously weakening coverage in other directions.
– Besides the military effect, regular attacks create problems for transport infrastructure, civil aviation, and business activities in the Moscow region, which remains Russia’s key economic center.
3. Ukrainian strikes on refineries exacerbate the fuel crisis in Russia.
– Russia is facing a growing fuel shortage following a series of Ukrainian strikes on oil refining infrastructure. Queues at gas stations and fuel supply disruptions are becoming an increasingly noticeable problem for the Kremlin, which is trying to hide the economic consequences of the war from the population.
– The latest wave of attacks has incapacitated over 20% of Russian refining capacities. The International Energy Agency called this level of disruption unprecedented throughout the Russo-Ukrainian war.
– The problem is especially acute in the occupied Crimea and regions associated with military logistics. Ukrainian drones regularly attack not only refineries but also fuel delivery routes, complicating the supply of gasoline and diesel.
– Signs of the fuel crisis are now extending far beyond the front-line areas. Restrictions on fuel sales have spread to more than 50 Russian regions, including remote areas of Siberia and the Arctic.
– The situation is complicated by the fact that the Russian authorities no longer publish complete data on oil processing volumes, indicating a reluctance to show the real scale of the problems.
– At the same time, the restoration of damaged plants is becoming increasingly difficult due to dependence on Western equipment and technologies, access to which is limited by sanctions.
– The latest strikes have been particularly painful for Russia as they targeted the largest and most technologically advanced enterprises that produce high-octane fuel. Many of these facilities use critically important imported equipment, the replacement of which requires significant time and resources.
4. Oil fell to $75 per barrel.
– The price of oil has fallen. On Monday, June 22, the price dropped to $75 per barrel, and the benchmark Brent crude fell below $80 per barrel. Thus, on Monday, June 22, the price of a barrel of oil stands at $75.3 per barrel. Meanwhile, the price of the benchmark Brent brand is holding at $79 per barrel.
– Overall, since last working day, Friday, prices have decreased by approximately $1.
5. Russia is experiencing a shortage of fuel for small aviation due to strikes on refineries.
– The fuel crisis in Russia now affects not only road transport but also aviation: due to a shortage of aviation gasoline, small airlines are facing problems ensuring flights in many regions.
– The shortage of aviation gasoline in Russia has sharply intensified: small airlines are forced to independently search for and deliver fuel. Due to shortages and high prices, some operators are switching to automobile gasoline, which increases safety risks for flights.
– The fuel shortage worsened after strikes on Russian refineries: in June, gasoline production fell by approximately 25%, and some large plants went out of operation.
– Due to the fuel shortage, the authorities banned its export, but market participants warn: this does not solve the problem and may further reduce supply.
6. Russia announced the suspension of protective dam construction due to lack of funds.
– Russia has encountered issues with funding infrastructure projects intended to ensure the resilience of military logistics. According to information released in the Russian information space, construction of protective dams near bridges used for transportation and supply has been halted in recent days.
– Such structures were considered as one of the ways to protect critically important logistical objects from Ukrainian strikes. However, work has effectively stopped due to a lack of funding.
– The situation appears indicative against the backdrop of a sharp increase in Russia’s military spending. According to Western estimates, additional war-related expenditures this year could exceed initial plans by 4–5 trillion rubles. At the same time, despite record budget infusions, signals of resource shortages for the implementation of new defense and engineering projects are becoming more frequent.
– Additional pressure on the budget is created by high interest rates, rising borrowing costs, labor shortages, and increased war expenditures. As a result, resources have to be redistributed across different directions, and some projects are postponed or frozen.
– If the information about the halted construction is confirmed, it may indicate that even record military spending no longer allows Russia to simultaneously finance all war needs and the protection of critical infrastructure. This is yet another signal of the growing burden on Russian state finances, which are increasingly dependent on oil and gas revenues and budget reserves.
– Funding issues for protective structures could further increase the vulnerability of logistical routes, which are crucial for supplying Russian troops.
7. A peace agreement between the US and Iran could deal a new blow to the Russian aluminum industry.
– A potential settlement between the US and Iran presents risks for Russia, not only in terms of falling oil revenues but also threatens the aluminum industry, one of the country’s largest export sectors.
– With reduced tensions in the Middle East, nearly 3 million tons of aluminum production capacity could return to the global market.
– Additionally, Indonesia is rapidly increasing its supply, planning to boost production from its current levels to 1.7 million tons per year by the end of 2026 and to 4 million tons by 2030. The total increase in supply will be comparable to the annual production of Russia’s entire aluminum industry.
– For Russia, this means intensified competition on world markets and further pressure on prices. Aluminum has already dropped about 15% from recent highs, and analysts expect the downward trend to continue once the “war premium” in prices disappears.
– Russia’s largest aluminum producer, RUSAL, enters this period in a very weak financial state. Last year, the company recorded a loss of about $500 million. Meanwhile, the ability to cut costs remains limited due to expensive loans, high logistics costs, electricity, and raw materials.
– For the Russian economy, this creates additional risks of losing foreign exchange earnings. Having effectively lost a significant portion of European markets and facing sanctions, Russian metal companies are already operating under more difficult conditions.
– A further drop in aluminum prices could reduce exporters’ profits, tax revenues, and foreign exchange earnings needed by the Kremlin to fund increasing military expenditures.
8. China is preparing a second terminal to receive sanctioned Russian LNG.
– China is preparing a second import terminal to receive liquefied natural gas from Russia’s Arctic LNG 2 project, which is under Western sanctions.
– This concerns the new Longkou terminal in Shandong province, which is expected to be operational by the fall. The establishment of a second supply route will provide crucial support for the $21 billion Arctic LNG 2 project, which faced significant sales challenges after sanctions were imposed.
– Currently, China remains practically the only known buyer of sanctioned gas from Arctic LNG 2. Since August 2025, more than 2.6 million tons of Russian LNG have been received through the first Chinese Beihai terminal.
– At the same time, the situation highlights Russia’s increasing dependence on China for its gas sector. After losing a significant portion of the European market, Moscow is forced to reorient exports to the Asian market and agree to significant concessions to buyers.
– To attract Chinese clients, the operator of Arctic LNG 2 had to reduce supply prices by 30-40%. The new terminal may partially ease Russia’s export problems, but it doesn’t change the overall trend: Russian energy companies are becoming increasingly dependent on a limited circle of buyers, primarily China, which is using this situation to secure more favorable purchasing terms.
9. China is increasing purchases of Iranian oil, intensifying competition for Russian suppliers.
– China is increasingly resuming the purchase of Iranian oil after a noticeable reduction in supplies at the beginning of 2026. Maritime shipping data indicates a recovery in imports, although volumes remain lower than the peak figures of 2024.
– For Iran, this is an opportunity to quickly restore part of its export revenue after a prolonged period of restrictions. For China, it is a chance to receive additional volumes of discounted raw materials and diversify supply sources amid the gradual normalization around the Strait of Hormuz.
– At the same time, this trend creates additional risks for Russia. China remains the largest buyer of Russian oil, but the return of larger volumes of Iranian raw materials to the market means increased competition between the two sanctioned exporters for the same customer.
– In fact, Moscow may lose some of the advantages it gained after Western sanctions against Iran and the reduction of its exports. If Chinese refineries have a wider choice of cheap oil, it will be more difficult for Russian companies to maintain sales volumes without additional price concessions.
– For the Kremlin, this is an especially undesirable scenario, as the Chinese market has become the main source of foreign currency earnings after the loss of a significant part of European buyers.
– The more alternatives Beijing obtains, the weaker Russia’s negotiating position becomes and the fewer chances there are for super-profits from energy exports.
