Information on the current losses of the Russian Federation due to sanctions as of 07/30/2026.
1. Ukrainian drones attacked Russia’s logistics and fuel infrastructure.
– On the night of July 30, Ukrainian drones attacked several logistics and fuel infrastructure facilities in Russia.
– In Penza, a large Wildberries sorting center covering an area of about 90,000 m² was hit. According to OSINT communities, a major fire broke out on the complex’s premises. The center is one of Wildberries’ key logistics hubs in the Volga region, so its damage may lead to delivery delays, disruption of logistics chains, and additional costs for the company.
– Additionally, according to Exilenova+, the port in Taman (Krasnodar Kraï) was also attacked at night, where a fire broke out after the strike.
– Local residents also report an attack on another Wildberries warehouse in Sarapul (Udmurtia).
2. Ukraine changed its long-range strike tactics: the new target is critical refinery nodes that are the hardest to restore.
– Ukraine has changed its approach to strikes on Russian oil refining infrastructure, focusing on hitting critically important components whose recovery or replacement requires significantly more time and money.
– Before planning operations, Ukrainian drone operators receive consultations from energy engineers and industry experts who identify the most vulnerable elements of the facilities.
– The aim is not only to inflict immediate damage but to maximize the downtime of refineries and increase the cost of their recovery for Russia.
– Several backup targets are also formed during the preparation of operations. If the main target cannot be hit due to air defense or other factors, drones are redirected to pre-determined secondary or tertiary targets.
– Satellite images indicate that Ukrainian forces repeatedly strike already damaged equipment before repair work is completed, complicating the resumption of enterprise operations.
3. Russia’s Sberbank worsened its forecast for the Russian economy and reported problematic loans of nearly 3 trillion rubles.
– Russia’s largest bank, Sberbank, has downgraded its GDP growth forecast for Russia in 2026 to 0–0.5% from the previously expected 0.5–1%, and also reported a deterioration in the quality of its loan portfolio.
– By the end of the second quarter, the share of impaired loans increased from 4.8% to 5.5%. With a loan portfolio of 52.6 trillion rubles, this corresponds to approximately 2.9 trillion rubles of problematic debt. The volume of overdue loans reached 2.6 trillion rubles, of which 1.6 trillion rubles have not been serviced for over 90 days.
– The biggest issues have been recorded in corporate lending, consumer loans, and mortgages. The bank expects a further worsening of the situation in the second half of the year due to weak economic growth, tight monetary policy, and a strong ruble, which worsens the financial condition of exporters.
– Separately, Sberbank reported an increase in credit risks in the e-commerce sector after Ukrainian strikes on Wildberries’ logistics centers. The bank has already received about 300 applications for loan restructuring from companies associated with marketplaces, and their number may grow.
4. Another major Russian bank reports an increase in bad loans and starts mass layoffs after a profit decline.
– Russia’s second-largest state bank, VTB, has begun large-scale staff reductions amid worsening financial performance, rising loan defaults, and a fall in shares to a historic low. The bank plans to lay off 10% of its head office staff by the end of 2026.
– In the first half of 2026, VTB’s net profit decreased by 20% to 225.2 billion rubles, and in the second quarter, the decline accelerated to 34% — to 92.6 billion rubles.
– At the same time, the bank increased its provisions for bad loans by almost a third — to 66.5 billion rubles for the quarter, and the return on equity decreased from 20.5% to 13%.
– VTB’s financial results significantly lag behind the average figures of the banking system: net interest income and profitability are nearly half as much, and capital adequacy has approached the minimum permissible level — 10.7% against the Central Bank’s standard of 10%. Problems with the quality of the loan portfolio are also intensifying.
– By the end of 2025, the share of non-performing loans at VTB increased by nearly 1.5 times — to 14.2%, which is about a third higher than the average for the Russian banking system.
– A significant part of the problematic loans is associated with credits issued to enterprises that served the needs of Russia’s military-industrial complex.
5. Russia uses India to import Western technologies circumventing sanctions.
– Russian defense and security companies are using India as a key transit hub for importing critical technologies from the UK and EU countries, circumventing sanctions.
– Over 50,000 shipments of controlled and critical goods have been tracked, which were re-exported from India to Russia after the start of the full-scale war. These include electronics, industrial equipment, precision instruments, transport components, metals, and advanced electrical products.
– From early 2022 to early 2025, the export of sensitive goods to Russia, produced in the UK, via India increased by 180%, from Switzerland by 131%, from Sweden by 455%, and from France by 98%. The supply of German-origin products remains significant as well.
– French carbon fiber, used in the production of missiles, drones, and aerospace technology, also reached a Russian company associated with the military-industrial complex. The importer cooperates with several enterprises under international sanctions.
– Besides re-export, Western components may be assembled in India into finished products, which are then supplied to Russia. Additional risks are created by joint ventures of the state corporation “Rostec” with Indian partners within the “Make in India” program.
6. Discounts on Russian Urals oil for India have decreased due to supply disruptions from the Middle East.
– Discounts on Russian Urals oil for Indian buyers this week have decreased to $1–2 per barrel relative to the Brent benchmark. At the beginning of July, the discount exceeded $10 per barrel, but the situation changed after the escalation of hostilities in Iran and disruptions in shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. This forced Indian refineries to more actively purchase alternative raw materials, including Russian oil.
– Urals shipments for delivery at the end of August to early September are already being offered to Indian buyers with a discount of only $1–2 per barrel.
– At the same time, Chinese refineries have returned to purchasing Russian oil, as they also faced supply disruptions from the Middle East.
– This situation is not due to improved positions of Russian exports but due to short-term disruptions in the global oil market caused by instability in the Middle East region.
7. The US remains dependent on Russian enriched uranium despite a future import ban.
– American nuclear energy continues to significantly rely on Russian enriched uranium used in nuclear power plants, which account for about 20% of electricity production in the US. This complicates the plan to completely abandon Russian uranium by 2028.
– According to the US Energy Information Administration, in 2025, American nuclear operators purchased 3.28 million separative work units (SWU) from Russia, which is nearly 26% of all uranium enrichment services purchased. In comparison, ten years ago, this share was 17%.
– Overall, 77% of uranium enrichment services purchased by American operators in 2025 were provided by foreign suppliers, with Russia remaining the largest among them.
– The law passed in the US in 2024 prohibits the import of Russian uranium, but allows the Department of Energy to issue temporary exemptions. These powers will be valid no longer than until January 2028.
– This scheme creates additional risks for the American nuclear industry, as supplies depend both on US permits and Russian export licenses, making energy companies vulnerable to further deterioration in relations between the countries.
8. Greece has significantly increased the number of Schengen visa refusals for Russians.
– In July, Russian citizens faced a sharp increase in the number of Schengen visa refusals from Greece, one of the few EU countries that continues to issue Schengen visas to Russians.
– According to Russian tour operators, the refusal rate for several large companies reached 50%, and among tourists applying independently, up to 70%. Tour operators report a sharp increase in negative decisions in recent weeks.
– Even applicants with a full set of documents, confirmed bookings, paid tours, bank statements, and property documents receive refusals.
– Processing times for applications have also increased. While previously obtaining a visa took 2–3 weeks, the procedure can now take up to one and a half months.
– According to the European Commission, in 2025, Greece issued about 59,000 Schengen visas to Russian citizens, of which 41.6% were multiple-entry. The refusal rate was 11.2%, which is almost double the average in the Schengen area (6.4%).
9. An Estonian citizen faces up to 40 years in prison in the US for supplying secret electronics for the Russian military-industrial complex.
– An Estonian citizen pleaded guilty in a Brooklyn federal court to conspiring to violate US export laws. According to the US Department of Justice, he organized a scheme to purchase and supply secret electronics to Russia for the military-industrial complex, bypassing sanctions. He faces up to 40 years in prison.
– He also agreed to pay about $1.5 million. He was detained in Estonia in 2023 and extradited to the US in August 2025.
– The investigation established that the accused illegally exported electronics from the US worth over $1 million. The supplied products included high-frequency communication components, analog-to-digital converters, and other high-tech products used in military systems such as avionics, missile weaponry, and electronic warfare systems.
– According to the US Department of Justice, dual-use goods were regularly transported to Russia via Estonia and eventually reached the Russian military-industrial complex, despite international sanctions.
