Information on current losses of the Russian Federation due to sanctions as of 10/05/2026.
1. Ukrainian strikes have disabled over half of Russia’s oil refining capacity.
– According to assessments by intelligence, the General Staff, and the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, 51% of Russia’s refinery capacities are hit. The Ministry of Defense of Ukraine stated that the assessment takes into account the effects of recent strikes by Ukraine’s Security and Defense Forces.
– According to the department, systematic attacks are aimed at reducing Russia’s capacity to produce fuel and weakening its military-economic potential.
– The impact on more than half of the oil refining capacities creates additional problems for the Russian fuel market, which is already facing disruptions in refinery operations, a reduction in the production of petroleum products, and the need to increase fuel imports.
2. Russia’s oil and gas revenues fell by 22% despite rising oil prices.
– In September, they amounted to 452.4 billion rubles. Most of the income is being “eaten up” by budgetary expenses on compensations to refiners due to the difference between domestic and world fuel prices.
– In September, they were increased from 197.3 billion to 305.5 billion rubles.
– Since the beginning of the year, oil and gas revenues totaling 5.47 trillion rubles have flowed into the Russian treasury, which is 17.2% less than in January-September 2025.
3. Russia is cutting road construction due to a funding deficit.
– In 2026, Russia is reducing spending on road infrastructure, with further cuts expected next year. In April, the government reduced funding for federal highway maintenance by 11 billion rubles — to 432 billion.
– In 2027, it is planned to be cut by another 20 billion. The six-year road program was reduced by 100 billion rubles — to 9.1 trillion, and underfunding relative to standards has reached 1.85 trillion rubles. The budget for “Avtodor” was cut by more than 20 billion — to 188.5 billion rubles.
– In 2026, under the national project “Infrastructure for Life,” work is planned on about 20.5 thousand km of roads compared to over 23 thousand km in 2025. This is a reduction of approximately 12–13%.
– An additional problem is a shortage of bitumen. Over five years, its production has decreased by 11% — from 8.1 million to 7.3 million tons. Disruptions at Russian refineries may exacerbate the shortage.
– In 2027, spending on the “national economy” is planned to be reduced by 7.4%, and in 2028 by 9.9%. Because of this, road construction will continue to decrease, and state programs will increasingly focus on repairing existing roads rather than building new ones.
4. Demand for steel in Russia fell by almost a third during the years of war.
– As of January–August 2026, steel demand in Russia decreased by 16% compared to 2024. Since the beginning of 2024, the decline is about 31%.
– The reduction in demand is associated with a high key rate and expensive credit costs, which restrain construction and business activity. Additionally, the market is pressured by a cooling of residential construction, the postponement of infrastructure projects, cuts in support programs for machinery, and competition with imported products.
– The metallurgical industry is also burdened by rising tariffs, logistics costs, and wages. According to market participants, significant recovery in metal demand is not expected before the second half of 2027.
– Weak domestic demand intensifies the problems of Russian metallurgy, which simultaneously faces high costs and limited growth opportunities.
5. Russia increased LNG exports to Asia ahead of the EU ban.
– In September, Russia increased its liquefied natural gas exports by 35% year-on-year to 3.36 million tonnes. The main growth was in the Asian direction.
– About 2.12 million tonnes of LNG were supplied to the Asia-Pacific countries — China, Japan, and South Korea — in September, compared to 0.72 million tonnes to Europe. The growth in exports is partly due to the resumption of supplies from “Yamal LNG” after scheduled repairs and the seasonal opening of the eastern route of the Northern Sea Route.
– Over nine months, Russia exported 25.35 million tonnes of LNG — 14% more than the same period last year.
– Supplies to Asia increased by 16.9% to 12.82 million tonnes. China increased its purchases by 60% to 7.43 million tonnes. Supplies to the EU over nine months also grew by 7%, but the share of the European market in Russian exports is declining.
– Starting January 1, 2027, the EU will implement a full ban on the import of Russian LNG. Russia is trying to compensate for the future loss of the European market by increasing supplies to Asia, primarily to China.
– At the same time, the Asian direction depends on the seasonal availability of the Northern Sea Route and has longer logistics.
6. Russian military may have received a Chinese portable air defense system.
– Russian military may have used a Chinese portable anti-aircraft missile system to combat Ukrainian drones. This is suggested by footage on Russian television.
– In a video shot in the Rostov region near the Ukrainian border, a Russian soldier showcases a portable air defense system and claims it has a range of about 4 km. It does not resemble Russian “Igla” or “Verba,” which are typically used by Russian forces.
– According to Der Spiegel, the weapon appears more like Chinese portable systems QW-18 or QW-19. The exact origin of the system remains unknown, as it lacks distinctive markings.
– One possibility is that the system reached Russia not directly from China, but through a third country. For instance, Iran previously purchased Chinese QW-18s and later produced its own version called Misagh-3. Another possibility is that such systems are manufactured in Russia under license.
– The appearance of a Chinese system in the Russian military could indicate closer military cooperation between Moscow and Beijing than currently known. At the same time, China officially does not acknowledge supplying lethal weapons to Russia.
– Russia’s need for additional air defense means is increasing due to large-scale Ukrainian drone attacks. Ukraine attacks Russia with over 17,000 drones monthly, adding additional pressure on the Russian air defense system.
7. “Lukoil” lost a lawsuit in the USA over accusations of fuel price inflation.
– “Lukoil” lost a lawsuit in the USA related to fuel pricing for its franchisees. The court dismissed the Russian oil company’s motion, allowing owners of nearly 30 “Lukoil” gas stations in Pennsylvania and New Jersey to proceed with the lawsuit.
– 20 franchisees in New Jersey and another 9 in Pennsylvania accuse “Lukoil” of inflating gasoline prices. They believe the company is trying to compensate for income losses after US sanctions.
– In the lawsuit filed in April, gas station owners claimed that “Lukoil’s” actions caused them multimillion-dollar losses. They also allege that the company forced them to operate at intentionally unprofitable hours, issued unapproved invoices for additional maintenance, and refused funding for necessary repairs.
– The judge denied “Lukoil’s” motion without explanation. The case may now proceed to further substantive examination.
8. Germany prepares for the privatization of the nationalized “Gazprom” subsidiary.
– Germany has begun preparations for the privatization of the gas company SEFE, a former subsidiary of “Gazprom,” which was nationalized by German authorities after the full-scale war by Russia against Ukraine began.
– The German Ministry of Economics and Energy has announced a tender for legal support in the privatization process. A contract with a law firm is planned to be concluded no later than November 1. Simultaneously, investment banks and the state development bank KfW are vying for mandates to organize the sale of the company.
– Germany nationalized SEFE in 2022, effectively stripping “Gazprom” of control over the asset. The company was then valued at approximately €6 billion. Its current valuation is also approximately €6 billion.
– The privatization of SEFE will signify the final confirmation of “Gazprom’s” loss of this asset in Germany. The Russian company, which before the war used SEFE as an important link in its gas business in Europe, will no longer control the company, and its sale will make returning the asset to the Russian owner even less likely.
