The series of strikes on the Southern Bridge in Kyiv demonstrated a change in enemy tactics: the opponent has switched to asymmetric targeted attacks. Cheap drones cannot destroy the bridge, but they paralyze movement and force the closure of key logistical arteries.
Air defense battle statistics in September recorded 20 missile strikes (a decrease of 64% compared to August). Air defense forces shot down 4967 UAVs (66% of those attacking, a 15% decrease). The drop in interception percentage is explained by an increase in the share of jet UAVs of the enemy in each strike.
On October 1 at around 11:30, two Russian drones hit the support area of the Southern Bridge. At the time of the strike, a metro train on the green line was crossing the bridge. The explosive wave raised dust that entered the passenger compartments through ventilation. Passengers and the driver were not injured, and the train’s structure remained intact.
On October 1, around 21:50, a third hit occurred, this time directly on the road surface.
On October 2, around five in the morning, the enemy hit the bridge a fourth time. On the same day at 17:50, Kyiv Mayor Vitali Klitschko reported another hit. By that time, the bridge was already closed to car and metro traffic. Damage included the bridge support, guardrail, road surface, and protective concrete barriers of the metro. Preliminary inspections by “Kyivavtoshlyakmist” specialists found no critical damage to the structure that would threaten collapse.
The Southern Bridge was completely closed in both directions, and movement was limited on the Paton Bridge (from the right to the left bank) and the Metro Bridge (partially – one lane from the left to the right).
It turned out that there is no point in destroying the supports, which is an extremely difficult task. An asymmetric approach is entirely feasible, as the aggressor has clearly demonstrated.
How did this happen?
The analysis of the strikes shows that the drones hit a rather complex target—a vertically positioned bridge pylon with relatively small geometric dimensions, but it is the one that bears a colossal load by holding the cables. The conclusion is that the drone was guided at the moment of impact by an operator, meaning there was a high-quality stable communication channel through which video was sent to the operator.
How is that possible?
The enemy managed to create a very short decision-making chain for engaging targets in Kyiv.
A satellite flies over Kyiv, takes a photo, transmits it to a command post near Moscow, where analysts decrypt it and issue it to the command post where decisions are made. This model requires four to six hours, sometimes even more.
We are dealing with a completely different chain: an enemy UAV transmits video online through a relay (?), as it is about 200-300 kilometers from Kyiv to relays in Belarus, which is quite far for onboard radio equipment that does not use StarLink, Rassvet, or something similar. It is likely that somewhere between Kyiv and the relay outside Ukraine, a drone-relay hovers during the strike, or, as one respected veteran suggested, the relay is directly in Kyiv (raising many questions for the State Service of Special Communication and Information Protection of Ukraine and the Security Service of Ukraine). Experts believe the enemy used commercial 4G/LTE modems utilizing local mobile networks. Thus the chain is: “drone – relay – command post – decision-making – targeting online.”
It is clear that distance from the border with an inadequate neighbor is no longer a protective factor. Considering that the enemy’s strike groups have long used MESH technology (very generally, this is a decentralized radio network with several identical nodes), we can say that we have not yet seen all the problems that await Ukraine in the next two to three months. As for how the enemy transmits the attack of another drone online with one UAV, we won’t mention; everyone has seen it.
The enemy has acquired the ability to perform Battle Damage Assessment in real-time, allowing them to follow up with another wave of attacks on targets that have suffered insufficient damage.
So, on September 22-23—a major drone attack at night, on the day of September 23—jet drones hit Kyiv in the morning, afternoon, and evening. On the day of September 23—a drone attack continues almost all day, the night of September 24—a missile strike with several waves of ballistic missiles. September 29-30—the start of a major combined attack at 18:00, the night of September 30—a massive strike, the day of September 30—drone attacks.
A trend is emerging where the enemy is shifting to the tactic of almost daily attacks, which often stretched from the evening of one day through the whole night and continued into the next day. Kyiv was under especially intense pressure. This became possible due to the presence of both reconnaissance UAVs and strike drones loitering in the airspace over the capital or nearby, waiting for commands, as well as relay stations, whose locations are not quite clear yet. Add to this the ability to strike at emergency rescue teams, medics, track their movement routes, and destroy structures, creating obstacles that hinder movement, and we experience what is called a Transparent Battlefield.
But let’s return to the drones that not only hit bridge supports but also cause them significant damage. Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov informed the public about the appearance of new specialized combat units of the enemy, CRSNL (cumulative-cutting special load).
What is it? The CRSNL is designed specifically for destroying high-voltage power line supports and iron (metal) bridge structures. The device has a main charge weighing about 40 kg plus four additional damaging modules. A strike from four reactive “Geraniums” can destroy a bridge support with an area of up to 4 m2. This is approximately what happened on the Southern Bridge, where UAVs attacked the thinnest part of the pylon (about 3 m2). The GUR had been monitoring the development and preparation of such combat units since mid-August, approximately 1.5 months before their first use.
Those following the topic have already seen photos of a drone belonging to the enemy, either horned or mustached. The Russian office of simple solutions crafted a mechanical detonator from a water pipe. Inside the pipe is a rod; the detonator activates upon contact with metal, as it will almost certainly get entangled in a power line support or bridge cables.
The close cooperation between the enemy’s defense industry and military (unfortunately, we must acknowledge this) allowed them to bypass all sanctions at once, avoiding the need to produce thousands of ballistic missiles. Yet, they solved the same task – to disrupt Ukrainian strategic logistics. And for significantly less money.
Overall, the idea for the new warhead is found in military textbooks from the 60s-70s, which should be in the library of the Kamyanets-Podilsky engineering alma mater. Interestingly, concerned Ukrainian engineers have made a similar warhead. Ours. Maybe even better than the enemy’s. The casing was made at our factory from sheet steel for a four-digit sum of hryvnias, packed with explosives (which were obtained), and the result was pleasing: in tests, the charge pierced a sandwich of two airfield slabs with a meter of earth between them (based on this model, shelters at enemy drone ports are built). The upper slab was cut in half and thrown about 10 meters in different directions. By the way, such a slab weighs 3200 kg.
And what? Nothing! We ran out of money for veteran sports, and there was no money for progressive warheads for drones either.
The forecast is as follows: the enemy brought an experimental batch of KRSN to the DAP, either 50 or 200 pieces, the exact number is unknown. From September 20, intelligence noticed preparations for the launch of Geran-4 UAVs with KRSN in the Kursk and Navlya, Bryansk region. The enemy has a window of about two months before we find countermeasures and produce interceptors in commercial quantities. During these two months, the enemy will try to damage most bridges, including those across the Dnieper, through which Western aid and other resources needed by the Defense Forces reach the East. Movement towards the western border will also be limited, if not completely stopped. All cable-stayed bridges are potential targets. Because they’re easy. The pipes of thermal power plants that are still standing are also targets. Overpasses and railway bridges are next in line.
The winter will be even more challenging than expected.
