Information on current losses of the Russian Federation due to sanctions as of 16.04.2026.
1. Drones hit a key petrochemical enterprise in the Russian Federation in Bashkortostan.
– Ukrainian drones attacked the industrial zone of the city of Sterlitamak in Bashkortostan, hitting one of the largest petrochemical plants in the region. A fire broke out at the enterprise site after the strike, with thick black smoke rising over the city.
– Available data indicates that the Sterlitamak Petrochemical Plant was hit — a large enterprise producing synthetic rubbers, chemical components, and materials, including those related to aviation fuel.
– This is not the first strike on the facility: previously, the plant had already suffered attacks, including damage to the production of aviation fuel additives. Ukrainian intelligence noted that the plant’s products are used to meet the needs of the Russian military-industrial complex.
– The impact on the petrochemical sector, which provides fuel and material needs for the army, adds additional pressure on Russia’s military-economic potential.
2. The Russian Federation postpones the revival of the aviation industry: plans cut, deadlines moved to 2035.
– The large-scale program for the restoration of Russian civil aviation is effectively failing: instead of ambitious plans, the Kremlin is forced to sharply reduce volumes and postpone deadlines. The updated plan provides for the production of about 570 aircraft by 2035 — almost half of the initial targets.
– Initially, authorities expected to receive over 1,000 aircraft by 2030, including hundreds of machines to replace the Western fleet. Moreover, by 2028, it was planned to reach production of up to 200 aircraft per year — a level not even achieved during the Soviet period.
– The reality turned out to be drastically different: in 2022–2025, Russian airlines received only 13 new aircraft. Moreover, one of the few Tu-214s is practically not used in commercial aviation, serving government needs instead.
– The new plan foresees phased deliveries, but even they seem unrealistic given previous failures. The industry faces systemic problems — lack of critical components, technological dependence on imports, and a shortage of engineering personnel.
– The attempt to quickly replace Western planes with domestic production has failed. Shifting deadlines to 2035 practically acknowledges that the Russian aviation industry cannot independently meet market needs in the mid-term.
3. Financial results of the Russian developer “MyOffice,” which was positioned as a replacement for Microsoft products, sharply worsened by the end of 2025, demonstrating a crisis in the entire import substitution policy in the IT sector.
– The revenue of the company “New Cloud Technologies” halved — from 2 billion to 1 billion rubles, while the net loss more than tripled — from 1.2 to 4 billion rubles, indicating an increase in losses of approximately 230%.
– After a sharp rise in 2022, when Russian government bodies massively purchased local software solutions in the wake of Western companies’ exits, the company could not sustain its success. For the third consecutive year, its financial indicators have deteriorated, indicating systemic problems with the business model and low product competitiveness even in the domestic market.
– In fact, “MyOffice” existed thanks to administrative support and enforced demand from the public sector, but this proved insufficient for sustainable development. The decline in revenue amid rising losses points to decreasing customer interest and difficulties in retaining even the guaranteed audience.
– The situation also highlights the overall degradation of the Russian IT sector, which, after the departure of international players, could not create a full-fledged replacement for their products. Instead of a technological breakthrough, the market received expensive and inefficient solutions that increasingly depend on budget funding and cannot withstand even limited internal competition.
4. Central Asian countries and Afghanistan have sharply increased imports of Russian fuel due to reduced supplies from the Middle East.
– According to traders, in the first quarter, rail deliveries from Russia and Belarus increased by more than 50% to 3.347 million tons, but this trend is largely explained by the forced redistribution of flows after the loss of premium markets in Europe.
– Despite the formal ban on gasoline exports until the end of July, Russia is forced to make exceptions for certain Central Asian countries under intergovernmental agreements, effectively demonstrating dependency on sales even in less profitable directions.
– The largest importer remains Mongolia, where deliveries rose by 29% — to 840 thousand tons, which only exacerbates this country’s one-sided energy dependency on Russia.
– Even more indicative is the situation with Afghanistan: although it does not fall under Russian exceptions regarding gasoline, a fourfold increase in imports — to 530 thousand tons — became possible through deliveries from Belarus. This scheme indicates Moscow’s attempts to bypass its own restrictions through partners, but at the same time highlights the weakness of control over export policy.
– The reorientation towards Central Asia and Afghanistan cannot compensate for the losses from reduced access to more solvent markets. New directions are characterized by lower margins, logistical limitations, and high political risks, making such growth more of a forced measure than strategically beneficial for Russian energy.
5. The US has reinstated sanctions on Russian oil after the expiration of the temporary easing, which allowed the legal sale of crude batches loaded onto tankers by March 12, 2026.
– The waiver ended on April 11, and Washington decided not to extend it. The temporary easing of sanctions was introduced amid a sharp escalation in the global energy market. After the conflict in the Middle East began and Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz, global oil supplies were reduced by about 13 million barrels per day, causing prices to jump above $100 per barrel.
– In these circumstances, the American administration attempted to temporarily increase supply in the global market by allowing already shipped batches of oil from Russia and Iran to be sold.
– After the end of this waiver, restrictions are once again fully applied to Russian oil exports. This means that transactions with batches of oil not covered by previous permits are again subject to the U.S. sanctions regime.
– A similar short-term easing regarding Iranian oil is set to end on April 19. The U.S. Department of the Treasury has already indicated that it will not continue.
6. Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni rejected the offer from the management of the energy company “Eni” to resume purchases of Russian gas.
– She stated that it is “too early” even to discuss a return to cooperation with Russia in the energy sphere. Meloni emphasized that sanctions and economic pressure on Moscow remain one of the key instruments of Western influence.
– She expressed hope that by 2027 there could be progress in ending the war against Ukraine, but until that time, Europe must maintain a strong stance on Russian energy resources. The head of Eni had previously stated that it would be worth the EU reconsidering plans for a phased refusal of Russian gas.
– The position of the Italian government remains unchanged. Rome supports the EU’s course for a gradual withdrawal from Russian energy resources and maintaining economic pressure on Moscow, despite the risks to the energy market.
7. The U.S. extended easing measures regarding sanctions against “Lukoil” amid rising oil prices.
– According to American officials, the decision to extend the easing of the sanctions regime concerning the Russian oil company was made to curb the rise in oil and fuel prices in the global market.
– This involves permitting gas stations under the “Lukoil” brand outside Russia, including in the U.S. A new license issued by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) allows such gas stations to continue operations until October 29.
– Additionally, Romania secured the removal of the “Lukoil” Petrotel refinery from the sanctions regime, Romanian Energy Minister Bogdan Ivan told Antena 3 CNN.
– The increase in oil prices intensified after strikes by the U.S. and Israel on Iran at the end of February, which led to a war in the Middle East. As a result, gasoline prices in the U.S. exceeded $4 per gallon — the highest level since 2022, despite promises by Donald Trump’s administration to reduce prices.
8. An Estonian company is suspected of helping Russia circumvent sanctions.
– A scandal has erupted in Estonia around the company Lyumivest OÜ from the city of Narva, suspected of possible involvement in schemes to bypass sanctions in favor of Russia. According to the investigation, a structure with a similar name is also registered in Hong Kong, and the contact details of both companies match.
– This may indicate the use of an international network to supply goods to Russia bypassing restrictions. The owners of the Estonian company are entrepreneurs who concurrently run an active business in Russia, particularly in the trade and manufacturing sectors.
– Such dual presence reinforces suspicions about using European jurisdiction as a cover for operations. A key piece of evidence was a court document in Russia that explicitly stated that the supply of sanctioned goods for the needs of the Russian Ministry of Defense was conducted through foreign companies, among which Lyumivest is mentioned. Chinese suppliers and intermediaries are also involved in the scheme.
– The scandal highlights the scale of the problem of bypassing sanctions: even EU companies can find themselves drawn into supply chains for the Russian military-industrial complex, using complex international schemes.
9. Iran secretly received an intelligence satellite from China, used to coordinate strikes on US military bases in the Middle East.
– The TEE-01B satellite, acquired by the Revolutionary Guards, provided surveillance of American facilities before and after drone and missile attacks, allowing for increased precision of strikes.
– The apparatus was created and launched into orbit by the Chinese company Earth Eye, then transferred to Iran along with access to the infrastructure of Emposat’s ground stations. The total cost of the deal was $36.6 million, which is relatively small for technologies of this level, yet demonstrates how quickly China has scaled the export of military-purpose space services.
– The satellite is capable of capturing images with a resolution of up to 0.5 meters, allowing the identification of equipment, aircraft, and other infrastructure objects, effectively providing Iran with tools previously accessible only to leading space nations.
– Gaining such capabilities significantly enhances Tehran’s military potential and alters the balance of power in the region.
– Against this backdrop, Russia’s position, which recently positioned itself as Iran’s key partner in the military-technical sphere, appears particularly telling. Instead, Tehran chose Chinese technologies, indicating the limitations of Russia’s capabilities in the high-tech sector and a loss of competitiveness even among allies.
– In fact, Russia finds itself on the periphery of new defense cooperations, ceding to China not only in space technologies but also in the ability to rapidly commercialize military developments.
– The satellite sale story underscores not only China’s growing role in the global security architecture but also the gradual displacement of Russia from segments that were previously considered its strategic advantage.
10. Ukrainian drones launched a massive attack on Tuapse in the Krasnodar region on the night of April 16, hitting strategically important infrastructure on Russia’s Black Sea coast.
– According to local authorities, objects in the port area have been damaged, and hits have been recorded on the premises of enterprises.
– The Tuapse oil refinery, owned by “Rosneft” and the only refinery on the country’s Black Sea coast, was reportedly hit.
– A fire broke out at the facility after the attack, once again highlighting systemic problems in Russian air defense, which is unable to effectively cover key energy facilities.
– The refinery has a capacity of up to 12 million tons per year and is primarily export-oriented, making it an important element of foreign currency income for the Russian economy.
– Regular strikes on it — at least several in the past year alone — indicate the gradual depletion of Russian refining infrastructure and increasing risks for export flows.
– The war is increasingly returning to Russian territory. The repeat occurrence of attacks and the inability to fully protect critical objects cast doubt on the Russian authorities’ ability to ensure the safety of both strategic infrastructure and the civilian population.
11. Russia is urgently trying to patch budget holes through temporary increases in oil revenues, planning to replenish the National Wealth Fund again from May.
– The Ministry of Finance intends to direct excess revenues to reserves at oil prices above $59 per barrel, which have been significantly depleted due to massive war expenditures.
– However, these plans seem to be more of a forced measure than a sign of stabilization. In the first two months of the year alone, approximately 500 billion rubles were withdrawn from the fund to support the budget, highlighting the deep dependence of Russian finances on energy revenues and their vulnerability to external factors, including sanctions.
– Attempts to return to the budget rule and even resume currency operations earlier than planned indicate a lack of liquidity and the necessity to respond swiftly to oil market fluctuations.
– Meanwhile, the government has already had to revise its plans to strengthen budget discipline, abandoning the immediate lowering of the oil price threshold following an escalation in the Middle East.
– Replenishing the National Wealth Fund depends not on sustainable economic growth but on situational factors, particularly geopolitical tension, which temporarily pushes oil prices up.
– This underscores the instability of the Russian budget model, which remains critically dependent on external markets and lacks sufficient internal sources for long-term reserve recovery.
12. Investment activity of Russian businesses has sharply declined, reaching the lowest level since the pandemic period.
– The balance of responses regarding the investment activity of enterprises for the quarter was –4.8 points — the worst figure since the second quarter of 2020 when the Russian economy faced the consequences of COVID lockdowns.
– Typically, negative assessments of the current situation in business surveys are partially offset by more optimistic future expectations. However, the current responses from Russian entrepreneurs indicate that previous optimism has disappeared.
– According to the regulator’s assessment, expectations for the second quarter foresee the most restrained investment growth since the fourth quarter of 2019. Such survey results indicate a further weakening of investment activity in the Russian economy, which poses risks to long-term economic growth.
– The decline in companies’ willingness to invest is related to high interest rates, sanction restrictions, and the overall uncertainty of the economic situation.
13. The largest Russian microelectronics manufacturer, the “Element” group, suffered a sharp financial downfall at the end of 2025 amid a collapse in orders from the industry.
– The company ended the year with a net loss of 2 billion rubles compared to a profit of 8.3 billion the year before, indicating a rapid deterioration in the state of a key segment of Russia’s high-tech economy. Revenue fell by 12% to 38.6 billion rubles, with the biggest hit on the core business — electronics manufacturing, where the decline reached 29%.
– This directly indicates a decrease in demand from Russian industrial enterprises, which themselves are in a decline and unable to support even the domestic component market.
– The company was forced to cut top management bonuses by four times, highlighting the depth of the crisis. Management acknowledges the dependence on the overall state of the economy, but hopes for a recovery in demand appear doubtful amid a prolonged decline in business activity and technological isolation in Russia.
– The situation with “Element” demonstrates a systemic problem: even the largest industry players failed to take advantage of the import substitution policy and increase stable production.
– Instead, the market faces shrinking orders, falling revenues, and a shift from profitability to losses, indicating the degradation of the Russian microelectronics sector.
14. Russia is intensifying cyberattacks against European infrastructure, moving from relatively simple attacks to attempts to inflict real damage on systems.
– This was stated by Sweden’s Minister of Civil Defense, Carl-Oskar Bohlin. According to him, hacker groups affiliated with Russia are increasingly attempting not only overload attacks on websites, but also more destructive breaches of critical infrastructure.
– Swedish targets also regularly become the focus of such operations. In particular, in 2025, a cyberattack on a thermal power plant in the western part of the country was thwarted — the system was protected thanks to automatic security mechanisms. Authorities do not disclose the details of the incident.
– Similar attempts are being recorded by other Nordic countries. According to the governments of Norway and Denmark, cyber activities associated with Russia are becoming more aggressive and risky, increasing the likelihood of serious disruptions to socially important infrastructure.
– In December 2025, a group linked to Russian military intelligence was also accused of a large-scale cyberattack attempt on Poland’s power grid.
– Additionally, Western security services reported on a campaign by the group Fancy Bear, linked to Russian intelligence, which exploited vulnerable Wi-Fi routers to steal passwords, emails, and other sensitive data from government and military entities in Europe and North America.
15. Russian LNG subject to US sanctions may be delivered to India for the first time.
– A tanker with cargo from the Russian Portova plant on the Baltic Sea is heading to the Indian Dahej terminal. If the delivery takes place, it will be the first such shipment since last year’s statement by US President Donald Trump that Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi allegedly promised to stop purchasing Russian energy resources.
– Meanwhile, the Indian side has not publicly confirmed such commitments and emphasizes that decisions are made based on price, supply security, and consumer interests.
– Previously, Russian LNG subject to sanctions was mainly directed to China, including the port of Beihai. On Wednesday, Gazprom sent a second batch of fuel there from the Portova plant following the restrictions. The Portova plant, with a capacity of about 1.5 million tons per year, has been operational since September 2022.
– However, since January 2025, its exports have faced regular difficulties due to strengthened sanctions. The current voyage is being carried out by the tanker Kunpeng, with a cargo capacity of approximately 138.2 thousand cubic meters, heading to the Indian Dahej terminal.
16. Sandu called for increased sanctions against Russia amid the Russian strike on Ukraine.
– Moldova’s President Maia Sandu, following a massive Russian airstrike on Ukrainian regions, has called for increased sanctions against Russia. Sandu expressed condolences to all those affected by the Russian strike.
– “Now is the time for greater European unity, more support for Ukraine, and more sanctions against Russia, because this war will end when Russia stops,” the president wrote.
17. Czechia replaced Russian oil with Azerbaijani.
– In 2025, Azerbaijan became the largest oil supplier to the Czech Republic, displacing Russia from its long-held leading position in this market. According to Czech media, Azerbaijani oil accounted for over 42% of raw material imports.
– The share of Russian oil sharply decreased to 7.7%, while a year earlier it was about 42%, and in previous years it exceeded 50%.
– Overall, in 2025, the Czech Republic imported over 6.85 million tons of oil, which is 5.5% more than the previous year. The reduction in Russia’s role is linked to the cessation of supplies through the “Druzhba” pipeline in March, which have not been resumed.
– Instead, supplies were diversified: Norway took the second place among suppliers with a share of about 20%, and Kazakhstan third with approximately 18%. For the first time, significant amounts of oil were also supplied to the Czech Republic by Saudi Arabia.
– The main volume of imports comes through the IKL pipeline, which is connected to the TAL system. After modernization, this infrastructure is capable of fully meeting the country’s oil needs without using the Russian route.
– Czech President Petr Pavel previously stated that the country does not plan to return to buying Russian energy resources. According to him, the Czech Republic has already essentially rid itself of dependency on Russian supplies and meets its energy needs through alternative routes from the south and west.
18. Bosnia and Herzegovina has taken a step towards reducing energy dependency on Russia by choosing an American investor to implement a gas connection with Croatia.
– The Parliament of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina supported amendments to the legislation and designated the company AAFS Infrastructure and Energy LLC as the key investor and operator of the “Southern Connection” project, which envisions supplying gas from the Croatian LNG terminal on the island of Krk.
– This decision dealt a blow to Russia’s position in the Balkan energy market, where it previously held a monopoly. Currently, all gas imports to Bosnia come from Russia through Serbia via the “Turkish Stream” pipeline, and the lack of domestic resources makes the country particularly vulnerable to Moscow’s political pressure.
– Notably, the state company BH Gas, which was previously considered as the project’s operator, was excluded from the legislative model, indicating a lack of trust in existing mechanisms and a desire to engage external partners.
– The American company plans to invest about $1.5 billion, significantly exceeding previous expectations and highlighting the strategic importance of the project.
– The decision is also related to upcoming changes in the EU, which plans to cease Russian gas supplies by 2028. Against this backdrop, Bosnia is forced to seek alternatives now to avoid an energy crisis.
– For Russia, this means a further loss of influence in a region traditionally considered its energy presence zone. The gradual displacement of Russian gas from European markets, even in such dependent countries, indicates that the long-term prospects of Russia’s exports remain under serious pressure, and attempts to maintain positions are becoming increasingly ineffective.
19. Spain received the largest shipment of gas from Russia in history during the first month of the Middle East war.
– According to Spanish operator Enagás, in March, the volume of supplies from Russia reached 9,807 gigawatt-hours, the highest figure ever recorded for a single month. This sharp increase, more than doubling compared to February, occurred amid a spike in gas prices following U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran, which created risks for shipments through the Strait of Hormuz.
– Amid the shortage and increased cost of alternatives, Russian gas turned out to be a cheaper option, temporarily increasing demand from traders. However, this surge does not indicate a strategic breakthrough for Russia in the European market.
– Spain acts as a major gas hub with a developed regasification infrastructure, meaning a significant portion of imported Russian gas is actually intended for resale or storage, rather than for domestic consumption.
– This means that Moscow remains dependent on intermediaries and does not control the end markets. Additionally, the European Union has already set a course for a complete abandonment of Russian gas by 2027, which limits the long-term prospects of such supplies.
– As a result, even record export volumes appear to be a short-term effect of a geopolitical crisis, while the overall trend of pushing Russia out of the European energy market remains unchanged.
