Briefly about the situation in certain directions.
1. Kostiantynivka direction
It seems that the units of the Russian 70th Motor Rifle Division (MRD), reinforced by the forces and means of the 3rd Combined Arms Army (CAA), which are likely part of the tactical group (TG) “Bakhmut,” made several quite persistent attempts to advance in the area of Chasiv Yar over the past week. Specifically, using several units of armored vehicles and light motorized means (motorcycles, buggies, etc.).
First of all, this pertained to the direction of the “Novopivnichnyi” neighborhood — Stinky. Additionally, the enemy (Russian troops), having bypassed the local Dnipro pond from the west, tried to enter Mykolaivka from the northwest with the forces of several small infantry groups.
It is apparent that the command of the Russian 70th MRD has a clear order to “immediately assist” the parts and units of the 3rd Army Corps (AC), which, in turn, are trying to break through to the east and northeast of Kostiantynivka.
As far as I understand, they are trying to solve this problem by reaching the line Virolyubivka — Novodmytrivka, for which they have intensified attacks/assault actions on both sides of the railway leading from Chasiv Yar to Kramatorsk (along Pryvokzalna Street) towards the villages of Stinky and Virolyubivka, and are also making quite active attempts to bypass the Ukrainian units defending in the area of Mykolaivka, in the general direction of Chasiv Yar — Podilske and further to Novodmytrivka.
So far, Russian troops have not managed to achieve significant successes in the zone of their 70th MRD. They have managed to capture exactly three forest belts to the northwest of the “Novopivnichnyi” neighborhood (that is, north of the railway), but have yet been unable to break into Virolyubivka itself or simply secure positions in Podilske or Chervone.
In Kostiantynivka itself, in its eastern part, there are currently fierce close combat battles with individual assault groups of Russian troops who have broken through to the outskirts (presumably assault groups from the 72nd Separate Motor Rifle Brigade (SMRB) of the 3rd AC or its 6th MRD). The infiltrated Russian infantry is currently desperately trying to “cling” to urban development in the area of Martenska and Parkova streets (this is south of Novodmytrivka), as well as in the area of Bakhmutska and Kotelnykovykh streets. This is the easternmost “edge” of the city.
Assault units of the Russian 3rd AC for this purpose are operating from the villages of Predtechyne and Stupochky (actually along the T-0504 Pokrovsk-Bakhmut road that passes through Kostiantynivka). The enemy, to infiltrate this part of the city, actively uses forest plantations between the city cemetery and the remains of the “Margarita” café, located near the road east of the city.
As far as I understand, Russian units have not yet managed to securely establish positions in these areas due to the active resistance of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, which periodically counterattack them and attempt to “cleanse” small infantry groups of Russian troops that appear on the eastern outskirts of the city. In turn, the rapid reinforcement and buildup by the Russian command in designated areas of Kostyantynivka is significantly complicated by the intense impact of Ukrainian tactical UAVs on all approaches to the city from the east.
In the sector of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army, it is evident that its command has concentrated its main efforts on its right flank, specifically towards Kostyantynivka. In reality, to storm the city from the south and southwest, its command has focused the majority of the combat-ready forces and assets from the 150th and 20th motorized rifle divisions, as well as reinforcement assets from other parts and units of the Dzerzhynsk Task Group. Their main task is to break through to the western (central) part of Kostyantynivka from Berestok and through Illinivka.
The problem for the adversary is that the Ukrainian Armed Forces continue to hold several positions in the areas of Ivanopil and Pleshchiivka, as well as in the Stepanivka area. This means on the flanks of the enemy infantry units that have advanced to the Berestok area. This, in turn, allows the Ukrainian command to timely detect the buildup of Russian assault infantry towards Berestok – Kostyantynivka and to respond accordingly to any attempts by the Russian command to advance northwards with significant forces.
Moreover, the forward units of the Dzerzhynsk Task Group have still not managed to capture Illinivka, as the only feasible way for the Russian command to strengthen its efforts in this direction (essentially a overgrown ravine stretching from the interchange on the T-0504 road southwest of Berestok to the north, almost to Illinivka) is well known to the local Ukrainian command and is under the regular fire impact of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
In reality, all this has led to the fact that the forward units of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army, from the moment they managed to establish themselves in Berestok and “infiltrate” a few “ultra-small” infantry groups through the aforementioned ravine to the southwestern outskirts of Illinivka (around Naberezhna Street), have failed to move for more than two weeks, that is, to advance to the western (central) part of Kostyantynivka.
Meanwhile, the Russian command, finding it quite difficult to significantly bolster its efforts in this direction, is attempting to “infiltrate” as many of its small and “ultra-small” infantry groups as possible. This is primarily how they operate in three areas — along Dorozhnaya Street (towards the Greenhouse Farm), along the T-0504 road towards the former Magistral auto shop, and they attempt to penetrate the area of the Kostyantynivka Technical School of the Luhansk National Agrarian University (possibly to force the Ukrainian Armed Forces to retreat from their positions in Ivanopil and Pleshchiivka, which are located to the south of it). So far, the adversary cannot boast significant achievements in this regard.
2. Dobropillya Direction
The Russian 51st Combined Arms Army continues to focus its efforts on its left flank near the 2nd Combined Arms Army. Its command has essentially abandoned immediate attempts to reach the area of Novy Donbas — Vilne — Novy Shakhove — Biletske with any significant forces, meaning breaking through to the outskirts of Dobropillia from the east and southeast.
This decision makes sense, given the current combat readiness levels of many of its brigades, which are, to say the least, questionable. Therefore, the command’s decision to concentrate its remaining capable forces and means closer to the advancing, albeit slowly, 2nd Combined Arms Army, to bolster its “pressure” so to speak, appears entirely logical and adequate.
Several “routine” attempts by the army’s forward units to “break through” with small infantry groups into Biletske, carried out from the direction of Zatyshka and Rodynske, have not brought any results for the enemy. Hence, the 51st Combined Arms Army’s command has restricted its actions. Over the past week, it has not shown particular activity south of Kucherevy Yar, in the area of Dorozhne, or in the direction of Vilne.
However, in the south, the command of the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army apparently continued to amass assault infantry in the area of Chervonyi Lyman and the Krasnolymanska mine, where it likely managed to establish several platoon and company strongpoints and has brought in a significant portion of its artillery. Most likely, the enemy intends to use these forces and means, which are being reinforced from Novoeconomichne and Razino, to accomplish at least two tactical tasks that are quite pressing for them:
– Further advance towards Rodynske — Shevchenko.
– And also completely push out the forward infantry groups of the Armed Forces of Ukraine from the area northwest of Myrnohrad by further advancing in the direction of Chervonyi Lyman — Novooleksandrivka.
Additionally, attempts by the 51st Combined Arms Army to “break through” into Biletske from the south and east with more significant forces and securely establish themselves there are also quite possible.
In general terms, however, forward units from various parts and divisions of the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army operating from the Kazennyi Torets bridgehead in the western and northwestern directions are not very active at the moment across the majority of the army’s offensive strip.
In turn, the command of the Russian 2nd Combined Arms Army apparently has a “strict” and unequivocal order — to break through to the outskirts of Dobropillia from the south at any cost. This alone could explain the very persistent and very costly, in terms of its own losses, attempts by the forward elements of this army to advance through a rather narrow front toward Dobropillia (a village south of the city of Dobropillia) solely through Hryshyne and Novooleksandrivka.
The battles for Hryshyne itself, which parts and units of the 2nd Combined Arms Army have been engaged in for over a month, have turned into a real “meat grinder” for them. The Pokrovsk-Hryshyne road, as well as the industrial zones of Pokrovsk in its northwestern part adjacent to it (the area of the 9th fire and rescue brigade, the construction company “Vostok-Profil,” the vicinity of the “Nasha Ryaba” store, etc.), have turned into a sort of anvil that the Armed Forces of Ukraine almost “on constant standby mode,” that is, round the clock, have been and continue to hit with all their available means. Starting from various types of drones to different artillery.
However, the command of the Russian 2nd CAA continues with a certain manic persistence to pull more of its forces and resources into this rather narrow “bottleneck” (at its widest point — about 4-4.5 km), primarily assault infantry, to break through this “corridor” from the south to Vodyanske and Dobropillia (villages). Moreover, in practice, for a month now, the rate of advancement of the forward Russian units in the Hryshyne area is estimated at no more than hundreds of meters per week.
I cannot say that the command of the Russian 2nd CAA, in this context, are complete fools who do not understand the true meaning and content of all this bloody idiocy they are committing. To be fair, it should be noted that they have indeed tried and continue to try to expand this “corridor” with quite active actions, not only by themselves. Specifically, to the north through the road between Hryshyne and Rodynske towards Shevchenko (obviously, to enhance the desired effect, they at some point involved units of the 51st CAA in the hope that they would succeed in expanding this corridor), as well as regular attacks towards the Pokrovsk-Pavlohrad road in the area north of Kotlyne. But, “praise be to Allah,” they are not very successful. The pace of advancement of Russian units there is the same as in the main “corridor,” if not slower.
I suspect that such actions of the Russian 2nd CAA command are driven not by some “misunderstanding” of the basics of such a complex military science as “troop command” or the nuances of operational art, but most likely by entirely different circumstances. For example, unilateral and persistent orders from their own “higher” command and political leadership, namely “to take Dobropillia” within defined deadlines at all costs.
Photo: 26th Artillery Brigade named after General-Coronet Roman Dashkevych
