Information on current losses of the Russian Federation due to sanctions as of 09/29/2026.
1. Ukraine struck a plant involved in Russian missile programs.
– As a result of the Ukrainian strike on the Azov Optical-Mechanical Plant (AOMP) in the Rostov region of Russia, five production workshops were damaged. The strike occurred on the night of September 26, and the extent of the damage is confirmed by satellite images.
– Fire traces and significant damage were recorded in the foundry. The roof partly collapsed in the mechanical workshop; the optical production, assembly, and galvanic workshops were also affected.
– The strike on AOMP was confirmed by the Security Service of Ukraine. According to them, Ukrainian Neptune cruise missiles and Ruta, Palyanitsa, and Bars reactive drones were used for the attack.
– AOMP is part of the Tactical Missile Weapons Corporation and participates in the production chains of at least seven Russian missile programs, including R-37M, X-101, and ballistic missile “Oreshnik.”
– The enterprise produces radar and infrared homing heads, flight automation units, cable harnesses, bodies and switching units for missiles, as well as components for guided aerial bombs.
2. Russia closed data on refinery operations, energy exports, and drone attack consequences.
– Putin signed a decree that restricts access and prohibits the dissemination in media and online of data regarding the operations of the Russian fuel and energy complex. Information on processing and production volumes of Russian refineries, as well as planned sales volumes of gasoline and diesel and concluded exchange deals for their implementation, was banned.
– It is also forbidden to publish data on energy resource exports—their volumes and prices, sellers and buyers, intermediaries, terms of payment, ships, routes, terminals, warehouses, and the timing of operations. The restrictions also apply to customs statistics.
– Closing information will complicate the assessment of the consequences of drone attacks on Russian refineries, oil depots, and terminals: information on damage, production stoppages, loss volumes, and recovery times will be harder to verify and compare with independent sources.
– The new restrictions will complicate monitoring compliance with Western sanctions and may help Russia conceal sanctions circumvention—particularly through intermediaries, route changes, transshipment, and the use of opaque supply schemes.
3. Russia will increase military spending in 2027 by 27%.
– The Russian authorities plan to increase spending on the army and arms procurement in 2027 to 17.1 trillion rubles. Compared to the previous plan for 2027, spending will increase by 27%: when approving the previous three-year defense budget for 2027, 13.5 trillion rubles were planned to be spent.
– This is 32.2% more than the 12.93 trillion rubles included in the 2026 budget.
– Defense will account for about 35% of all federal budget expenditures in 2027. On average, the war will cost the Russian budget 1.42 trillion rubles a month, 46.9 billion rubles a day, or almost 2 billion rubles an hour.
– The authorities do not plan significant reductions in military spending in the coming years. In 2028, 16.6 trillion rubles are budgeted for defense, and in 2029 — 16.3 trillion. In total, about 50 trillion rubles are planned to be spent on defense from 2027 to 2029.
– The increase in military spending occurs simultaneously with the deterioration of the Russian budget. The budget deficit in 2026 was increased by the authorities to 3.2% of GDP from 1.6% earlier, and the forecast for oil and gas revenues was reduced from 8.9 trillion to 7.6 trillion rubles.
– To cover the deficit, Russia is increasing borrowing and plans to use 459 billion rubles from the National Welfare Fund.
4. The Russian budget will miss 1.6 trillion rubles in oil and gas revenues.
– The Russian Audit Chamber forecasts that federal budget oil and gas revenues in 2026 will amount to 7.3 trillion rubles. This is 1.6 trillion rubles, or 17.9%, less than the approved plan.
– One of the main reasons for the shortfall was the significantly stronger ruble than budgeted. The average dollar exchange rate in the first seven and a half months of the year was about 76.9 rubles against 92.2 rubles budgeted.
– It is estimated that each strengthening ruble decreases budget revenues by 140–160 billion rubles. Additionally, Russian oil companies face significant increases in export costs.
– Freight from Russian ports to India costs about $20 per barrel on some routes, and insurance and brokerage costs can further increase the total delivery cost.
– As a result, even high world oil prices do not provide the Russian budget with corresponding revenue growth: a strong ruble reduces ruble revenue from exports, and higher logistics costs decrease the profitability of Russian oil supplies.
5. In Russia, 45% of schools have closed in 25 years, mostly in rural areas.
– The number of secondary schools in Russia has decreased by 45% since 2000 — from 68.8 thousand to less than 38 thousand in 2026. During the same period, the number of school-age children decreased by only 13.5% — from 20.5 million to 17.7 million.
– The largest reduction occurred in rural areas. The number of state schools in villages decreased from 45.4 thousand in 2000 to 20.6 thousand in 2026 — about 55%. In cities, the number of schools decreased from 22.7 thousand to 16.3 thousand.
– The number of private schools during this time increased from 635 to 982, but they account for only 2.5% of the total number of institutions. Meanwhile, the average number of students per school increased from about 300 to 470.
– As a result, in 2026, Russia had fewer schools than Germany: less than 38 thousand compared to over 40 thousand, although Russia’s population is roughly twice as large.
6. Lithuania has banned Friedman and Usmanov from entering for five years.
– Lithuania has added Russian businessmen Mikhail Fridman and Alisher Usmanov to the national list of undesirable persons and banned them from entering the country for five years. The restrictions took effect on September 25, according to Rokas Pukinskas, a representative of Lithuania’s Migration Department.
– The decision was made after the EU in September removed Fridman and Usmanov from its sanctions list. Lithuania opposed the lifting of sanctions and, following the EU’s decision, decided to impose its own restrictions.
– The ban will last for five years, after which it may be reviewed and extended. Lithuania is also preparing a decision on the possible freezing of funds and economic resources of both businessmen.
– Latvia has also imposed national sanctions against Fridman and Usmanov, and Estonia announced its own restrictions.
7. Estonia accused Russian intelligence services of arson at a defense enterprise.
– Estonian authorities have stated that the arson of the Milrem Robotics defense enterprise in Tallinn on August 15 was sabotage ordered by Russian intelligence services.
– According to Prime Minister Kristen Michal, the conclusion is based on information from the Estonian Internal Security Service (KAPO).
– Milrem Robotics manufactures ground robotic complexes and supplies Ukraine with THeMIS unmanned combat vehicles. Three people have been detained in the arson case, two of them in Latvia.
– Estonian Foreign Minister Margus Tsahna said the incident is part of a broader Russian campaign in Europe. Moscow denies the allegations, calling them unfounded.
8. Humo Bank in Tajikistan began warning Russian clients about card blocking starting in October.
– To continue their use, the bank requires personal biometric identification in the country by September 30.
– Customer support is also informing clients about service restrictions for certain categories of non-resident individuals and recommends withdrawing funds from accounts by October 1. Some Russian clients are already complaining about transfer issues.
– After Visa and Mastercard exited the Russian market, Russians began obtaining bank cards in “friendly” countries for use abroad.
– However, banks in these countries increasingly tighten restrictions for Russians, fearing sanctions and other risks from servicing Russian clients.
