Information on current losses of the Russian Federation due to sanctions as of 10.03.2026.
1. Russia is increasing gasoline and diesel imports from Belarus due to disruptions at refineries.
– Gasoline deliveries from Belarus to Russia over nine months may exceed 1 million tons, with more than 200 thousand tons in September.
– Belarusian fuel already accounts for about 6% of the Russian market. The increase in imports is associated with disruptions in the work of Russian refineries and logistical problems. Meanwhile, the possibilities for further supply increases are limited.
– Belarus is also increasing diesel fuel exports to Russia. In September, deliveries are estimated at 246 thousand tons. In June–August, they amounted to 361 thousand tons compared to 180 thousand tons in January–May.
– The increase in diesel supplies is related to the need to quickly replenish fuel reserves ahead of the seasonal transition to interseasonal diesel fuel.
2. Russia has restricted cash export, but Russian capital continues to go abroad.
– On September 29, Russia prohibited individuals from exporting more than 1 million rubles in cash to EAEU countries — Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Armenia, as well as to Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.
– For legal entities and individual entrepreneurs, the export of cash rubles is prohibited regardless of the amount. In the spring, the limit for citizens was the equivalent of $100,000, or about 8.4 million rubles at the current rate.
– Thus, over several months, it was reduced by more than eight times. At the same time, the restrictions apply specifically to cash export and do not stop the movement of Russian capital through banking operations and investments.
– In the first quarter of 2026, Russia became the largest direct investor in the economy of Kyrgyzstan: Russian investments amounted to $134 million. For comparison, throughout 2025, Russian companies invested $279.3 million in the country’s economy.
3. The tax price of Russian oil in September rose to a three-year high.
– The tax price of a barrel of Russian oil in September increased to 7,830 rubles — 44% above the initial budget benchmark for 2026 and the highest since October 2023. In dollar terms, the tax price was $92.08 per barrel with an average exchange rate of 85.0396 rubles per dollar.
– Meanwhile, Russia’s 2026 budget was initially calculated with a price of 5,440 rubles per barrel, and the adjusted forecast by the Ministry of Economic Development anticipates an even lower level — 4,809 rubles.
– Exceeding budget benchmarks could increase Russia’s oil and gas revenues as early as October when companies will pay the mineral extraction tax for September.
– However, higher oil prices do not guarantee a corresponding increase in budget revenue. The final outcome is also influenced by production volumes, export deliveries, and tax payments.
4. Russia reduces payments to oil companies, which may increase gasoline prices.
– From 2027, Russia plans to sharply reduce budget payments to oil companies under the fuel damper. The government proposes to change the compensation calculation formula by increasing the normative domestic prices for gasoline, diesel fuel, and aviation kerosene. As a result, budget payments are expected to decrease from 1.93 trillion rubles in 2026 to 1.18 trillion in 2027 and 801 billion rubles in 2028.
– Over two years, the volume of state support will more than halve. For oil companies, this will mean less compensation for supplying fuel to the domestic market.
– If export attractiveness is maintained, this could strengthen the incentive for producers to increase domestic prices, ultimately impacting gasoline costs for the population.
– Simultaneously, the reduction in budget support could deepen the fuel deficit in the domestic market. Russian refineries are already operating intermittently, and under such conditions, smaller compensations to producers create an additional risk of rising prices and fuel shortages.
– Russian authorities are trying to cut budget expenses on supporting the oil industry, shifting some of the burden onto producers and consumers at a time when the fuel market is already experiencing a deficit.
5. Fridman’s assets remain frozen despite the easing of EU sanctions.
– Removing Mikhail Fridman from the EU sanctions list may allow him to partially restore his shareholder rights in the European group LetterOne, but it does not mean quick access to funds.
– Before the imposition of sanctions in 2022, Fridman owned 37.9% of the shares of the Luxembourg companies LetterOne Holdings and LetterOne Investment Holdings.
– By the end of 2025, the net assets managed by the group amounted to $21.5 billion, with unpaid dividends due to shareholders under sanctions reaching nearly $500 million.
– Meanwhile, Fridman remains under sanctions from the US and the UK. This limits his ability to receive dividends and other economic benefits from the assets.
– European banks and financial institutions may also require special permits from the US and the UK due to the risk of secondary sanctions.
– LetterOne has significant operational and management infrastructure in the UK, where providing funds or economic resources to sanctioned individuals is prohibited.
– According to sources, he may attempt to transfer his due dividends from a bank in Luxembourg to Turkey or the UAE.
– However, banks may refuse to carry out such transactions due to sanction risks. According to Bloomberg Billionaires Index, Fridman’s wealth is estimated at $10.3 billion.
Illustration: Christiane Pfohlmann
