Sloviansk Direction
The enemy (Russian troops), using their 3rd Combined Arms Army (CAA) from the “South” troop group, is attempting to continue offensive actions in this direction as part of the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk operational-strategic offensive operation. They aim to reach the main forces of their forward units and formations to the near approaches to Sloviansk from the east and southeast, and with part of their forces — to Kramatorsk from the east (at least reaching the line Vasylivski Pustoshy — Vasyutynske).
They are primarily engaged on two operational-tactical directions — Siversk — Sloviansk (along the southern bank of the Siverskyi Donets River) and Bakhmut — Sloviansk (on both sides of the E-40 road on the Sloviansk — Bakhmut section), and also acting with part of their forces towards Minkivka — Kramatorsk.
1. During the reporting period, the enemy conducted a series of attacking/assault actions on some sections of these directions, but could not achieve significant success. Moreover, evidently, in at least two sections of the Sloviansk direction, the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) launched several counterattacks. Although this did not lead to a complete halt of the Russian troops’ advance in their 3rd CAA strip, it significantly slowed it down. In particular:
– In the directions Kryva Luka — Starodubivka, Kalenyky — Mykolaivka, and Rai-Oleksandrivka — Mykolaivka, the enemy demonstrated high activity in the tactical zone, trying to fully control Starodubivka and Piskunivka, as well as deploy the maximum number of their assault infantry towards the Sloviansk TPP and the northern part of Mykolaivka. Additionally, the enemy evidently attempted very persistent “penetrating” actions into Mykolaivka from both Rai-Oleksandrivka and Kalenyky.
However, as of last evening, the main forces of the enemy’s forward units continued to occupy positions along the line Kryva Luka — north-eastern outskirts of Rai-Oleksandrivka, although the Russian command managed to infiltrate at least three of their assault groups into the combat order of Ukrainian troops to a certain tactical depth in the general direction Rai-Oleksandrivka — Sloviansk TPP.
The most significant of these was recorded between Starodubivka and Piskunivka, as well as two smaller ones in Mykolaivka (one hiding in the eastern part between Mira Street and the garages, in the area of the Galenika pharmacy, the other, smaller, is located on the southern outskirts in the area of Kozatska Street).
Moreover, Russian small infantry (assault) groups are predominantly present in the territory of the “Chalk Flora” Nature Reserve, in the forested area southeast of Mykolaivka (which they use quite intensively for ongoing “penetrative raids” into Mykolaivka), as well as in the 4-kilometer strip between Yurkivka and Rai-Oleksandrivka.
However, in this context, it is worth noting that the forward Ukrainian units in this direction have managed to retain control over Mykolaivka itself, preventing the penetration of small enemy infantry groups into the area of the Slovyansk TPP. They also continue to hold positions in the area of Rai-Oleksandrivka and even south of Yurkivka (along the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas canal). It is worth noting that the forward positions of the Ukrainian forces in this area are also located even east of Lypivka (slightly northwest of Nikiforivka, along the Vasyukivka River).
This would be impossible if the enemy confidently controlled the territory south of Rai-Oleksandrivka. It is likely that the Russian small infantry groups still observed in Rai-Oleksandrivka and Yurkivka, for various reasons, simply cannot effectively control the surrounding areas from a firepower perspective.
Furthermore, the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) have evidently conducted a series of counterattacks in the tactical zone in the direction of Orikhivka — Rai-Oleksandrivka over the past few days. Although this did not lead to significant advances of Ukrainian units toward Rai-Oleksandrivka, it clearly helped push back Russian infantry groups from the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas canal to the western outskirts of Rai-Oleksandrivka, from pump station No. 2 to the area south of Orikhivka.
Additionally, considering that the AFU continue to hold several positions north and south of Rai-Oleksandrivka, this has clearly reduced the overall activity of the forward Russian units, which their command directed toward Mykolaivka and the Slovyansk TPP.
– Fierce battles also continue south of the E-40 road, where the AFU have apparently counterattacked in the directions of Pershomarivka — Malynivka and Vasyutynske — Tykhonivka. Although the number of Russian assault infantry located in these directions, west of the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas canal (along the Malynivka — Tykhonivka line), remains quite significant, the pace of their advance toward the eastern outskirts of Kramatorsk and especially toward the local airfield has clearly decreased significantly (if not become “zero”). For at least a week and a half, the enemy has not been able to advance from this side toward Vasyutynske, Pershomarivka, or Vasylivske Pustoshe.
The only section at the far left flank of the 3rd Army Corps where the enemy managed to advance to a depth of 1.5-2 km is the tactical direction from Markove toward the Bilokuzminivske Chalk Cliffs. However, the Russian assault forces did not reach the cliffs themselves and were blocked northeast of Fedorivka.
2. At first glance, the situation in the Slovyansk direction (and partly in the Kramatorsk direction) due to the advance of the Russian 3rd Army Corps looks, to put it mildly, challenging for the AFU. The forward assault groups of this army are already on average 10-12 km from Sloviansk and are directly attempting to capture Mykolaivka and reach the Slovyansk TPP (and they are even closer to Kramatorsk — up to 9-10 km away).
However, in reality, the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army (CAA) is currently unable to fulfill its main objective within the overall Slovyansk-Kramatorsk offensive operation—to reach the main forces of its forward units and formations directly to Slovyansk and Kramatorsk.
Moreover, the longer and more persistently it attempts to do so, the more it loses any prospect of eventually accomplishing this task. One of the reasons for this situation is the state of affairs on the Lyman axis. As of now, the formation of the northern flank of the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration, which involved the complete elimination of the Ukrainian Lyman bridgehead in the sectors of Russia’s 20th and 25th CAA of the “Zapad” Operational Group, has been disrupted.
However, it should be noted that this factor only indirectly affects the ability of the Russian 3rd CAA to continue advancing toward Slovyansk (its attack zone is separated from the 25th CAA’s zone by the Siverskyi Donets River). Moreover, so far, only the Russian 20th CAA is retreating from Lyman on its own, while the 25th CAA (which is directly aimed at Lyman and has an adjacent flank with the 3rd CAA) effectively continues to “hold” previously captured positions. This includes a kind of “launch pad” for the assault on Lyman—a long forested area between Yampil and Lyman.
A more significant reason for the POSSIBLE difficulties of the Russian 3rd CAA is undoubtedly another factor. Currently, the Ukrainian Armed Forces continue to successfully hold the line from Mykolaivka to Orihivka and the territory of the Slovyansk Thermal Power Plant (a key, I would even say, “connecting” area for the defense of the entire Slovyansk from the east), although this obviously does not happen without challenges for them. The same applies to the areas of Vasylivska Pustosh—Zapovidne—Vasyutynske—Pershomarivka and Semenivka—Bilokuzmynivka—Virolubivka—Kurtove in relation to Kramatorsk. All of this is still successfully held and defended by Ukrainian forces.
But if these two factors continue to combine for a more or less extended period, then the command of the Russian 3rd CAA may face not so much the prospect of breaking through to the immediate approaches to Slovyansk from the east and southeast, but rather the prospect of an overt need to hold positions along the southern bank of the Siverskyi Donets. The possibility of further participation of part of the 3rd CAA’s forces in offensive actions on Kramatorsk from the east might become even more illusory.
If, after the Russian 20th CAA begins its retreat across the Chorny Zherebets River and the 25th CAA follows (which is very likely, as Ukrainian units are already apparently operating in the Yampil area), then the Russian 3rd CAA will have to deploy significant forces and resources facing north (to hold the southern bank of the Siverskyi Donets at least on the stretch from Kryva Luka to Dronivka, which is about 11 km in a straight line). Moreover, this will likely occur regardless of whether the command of the 3rd CAA desires it or not. It will simply be forced to do so to reliably secure its right (northern) flank from Ukrainian counterattacks. Considering all the bends of the Siverskyi Donets River in this area, the command of the Russian 3rd CAA will need to “deploy” here, obviously, at least one full brigade, if not two. This, in turn, will inevitably impact its ability to persistently advance from the east to the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration itself.
At least he will have to use most (or almost all) of his operational reserves even before breaking through to her close approaches. Especially considering that at least one brigade of the 3rd ZVA (namely the 4th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade) is currently “preoccupied” on the Kostyantynivka direction.
Of course, you could also ask the “senior commander” (the Southern Group command and its own General Staff) to throw in “something” from their already clearly exhausted reserve “storerooms.” But in this case, it’s precisely this “something” that the Russian “commanders” for the needs of the 3rd ZVA will have to additionally pull out from somewhere, like a rabbit from a hat. However, they are far from being magicians.
Photo: General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
