Russia attacks Europe

Russia attacks Europe

Vitaliy Portnikov / Hromada

The main—and perhaps somewhat unexpected—outcome of the negotiation process in Abu Dhabi and subsequent meetings of American intermediaries with the presidents of Russia and Ukraine was the shift of emphasis in negotiations from the very topic of ending the Russian-Ukrainian war to the topic of “global security architecture” in Europe. Yes, the Russians agreed to discuss “global issues” even before the negotiations began, but when the Russian delegation, having arrived in Abu Dhabi, announced that they generally had no mandate to talk about the war, it seemed like outright mockery.

And, of course, the reasons for such mockery can be explained simply—Putin is stalling for time so that, on one hand, he does not quarrel with the American counterpart and does not fall under new sanctions, and on the other hand, he has the opportunity to continue the war. However, shifting the focus specifically to European security issues may have other goals.

The Kremlin may have expected that after Donald Trump’s victory in the 2024 presidential elections and a significant reduction in aid to Ukraine, Ukraine would soon capitulate, or at least the possibility of occupying new Ukrainian territories would arise. But this did not happen chiefly thanks to increased European financial and military support. The year 2026 was not the year of Ukraine’s capitulation but the year when intensive strikes on the oil refining enterprises of the Russian Federation began. And this is definitely not what they expected in Moscow.

Therefore, Russia primarily decided to intensify pressure on Europe—to force it to refuse aid to Ukraine. Conversations about the architecture of European security are more a warning of danger: if you do not meet our demands, we will attack you. So you should think not about Ukraine but your own prospects. Think about how long you will live in peace.

To intimidate Europeans, the Kremlin, as usual, uses a wide variety of tools. The very fact of negotiations with Americans about European security without the participation of the Europeans themselves and reproaches from both Russian officials and Jared Kushner that Europe cannot present its own representative at such negotiations (although Russians decisively deny Europeans a place at the negotiating table) is a demonstration of Europeans’ weakness. Allegedly, Putin can agree on their fate with Trump without their participation. “Separate” offers to European countries—to sign non-aggression agreements with Russia—is another tool of division and, by the way, intimidation. Because when there is an idea of a non-aggression agreement, there might appear the prospect of aggression.

And, of course, working with right-wing populists and left-wing populists on the continent. Let’s recall the whole series of diversions in the eastern lands of Germany just on the eve of the elections where the infamous “Alternative for Germany” triumphed. The Russians seemed to be convincing the voter—vote for those who want to agree with us, because you see how tensions are rising. And it can be imagined with what impatience the Kremlin is waiting for the presidential elections in France and the possible victory of Marine Le Pen—because they might hope that an experienced politician from the far-right camp in relations with Russia will play the role of a “French Trump.”

So it is only at first glance that in the very approach to discussing security issues before there is a prospect of ending the Russian-Ukrainian war, there is no logic. Logic arises precisely when we realize that the Kremlin is not interested in peace or security—but is focused solely on continuing the war.

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Illustration: fragment of the cover of The Economist magazine, 22.02.2025

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