Among the vast number of conclusions, momentous and not so much, that we need to draw from Mr. Trump’s Iranian adventure, there is one that is relatively rarely discussed, if at all. I’ll preemptively remark: a military operation against a state that calls your country the “great Satan” and is preparing to send an ICBM with a nuclear warhead your way seems entirely justified, with any grievances only surrounding the specific sequence of actions and their informational support, as style in such campaigns is important. This conclusion relates to the preamble of Ukraine’s Basic Law, as well as articles 85, 102, and 116. I’ll remind you in case, that this concerns the strategic course towards full-fledged membership in NATO (as in the EU, but that’s another conversation).
No, at the level of declarations and individual practical actions today, as far as we all know, Ukraine-NATO relations are very auxiliary at all levels, especially in terms of coordinating aid from alliance countries. However, regarding the potential magic wand that will automatically solve all our security problems, that “umbrella” under which we would hide as soon as we are admitted to the club of the chosen, it becomes evident that such hopes are futile and even somewhat harmful. This issue does not require purely military competencies but rather general political ones and allows judgment at the level of common sense.
God forbid, I am not calling for immediate amendments to the Constitution and relevant laws, but rather for an awareness of the further actual route. After all, the Iranian campaign confirmed the illusory nature of the previous supposed unity of the entire Western world — confirmed practically, because at the level of rhetoric Mr. Trump personally declared this quite a long time ago. No collective West came to the aid of our adventurer and demonstratively sabotaged measures that would have cost them nothing, some even forbade the use of their airfields for layovers and closed their airspace to the “ally.” There was no need to bully and threaten Denmark or Canada, no need to play with tariffs, no need to threaten to exit NATO, and finally, no need to put those whose support you counted on before a fait accompli, and then theatrically take offense. In short, the Euro-Atlantic alliance turned out to be, as it is now fashionable to say, a “paper tiger” (© D. Trump).
It is unfortunate but logical, especially because institutionally, the coalition was never a unified military force, despite having a common command and many beneficial entities. Let me clarify once again: the famous “Article Five” of the Treaty, which supposedly obligates member countries to act as a united front in the event of aggression against one of them, in reality… obligates no one to anything. It’s true that, formally, “an armed attack against one country is considered an attack against all,” but then specifics come into play: in such a case, each country must assist “through the immediate execution of such individual or collective action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force.” Do you understand? It will undoubtedly provide assistance, but only what it deems necessary. It may consider one way or another. By the way, this vague wording was pushed through by the United States during the drafting of the 1949 Treaty, as they wanted to keep their options open during anticipated conflicts with you-know-who. The same applies to our worn-out Budapest Memorandum, where seemingly clear obligations turned out to be merely good intentions at best and hypocrisy at worst. Trump accuses Europeans of maintaining their military bases for protection: around 40 airfields, ports, intelligence facilities, and approximately 200 sites in total, with about 100,000 troops. But this is nothing more than a legacy of decades of confrontation between the US and the USSR, which the extravagant president has already promised to nullify.
In that case, should we, without making drastic public moves, change our foreign policy philosophy? De facto, this is already happening, so it’s a matter of dotting the i’s, but let’s not rush. There are statements in the United States itself, from people known for being less frivolous than the current president, about forming an alternative military alliance that, besides America, would include Germany, Poland, Japan, Australia, and — ta-da! — Ukraine (the so-called “Kellogg Doctrine,” from the special envoy on Ukrainian issues, which was immediately supported by Mike Pompeo). However, it’s undeniable that the transatlantic superpower is no longer seen as a reliable partner in Ukraine; they’ve overplayed their hand. Scandals, mockeries, and disrespectful remarks, among other things towards us, prove that the former citadel of democracy has become too capricious and unpredictable to be considered the leader of the free world.
On the other side of the ocean, there are declarations from European heads of state and EU officials trying to outline possible forms of cooperation, “without calling a spade a spade.” They speak of a European Security Strategy (Ursula von der Leyen), strategic autonomy and common nuclear doctrine (Emmanuel Macron), joint rapid response forces (Olaf Scholz), an “iron dome” over Europe (Donald Tusk), and the concept of a “Coalition of the Willing,” where up to 35 countries are ready to join, and we will not be forgotten. Pan-European armed forces are a tempting model that has been circulating among Western politicians for a long time, well before the change in the White House. Ukraine is assigned a significant role in all these projects, and it’s not just a matter of goodwill and geography, but also strict pragmatism: our defense forces have accumulated such a wealth of know-how that their contributions and hard-earned experience should be recognized as more than substantial material contributions.
Thus, the creation of a European NATO 2.0 is timely. The specific forms and steps will depend on the decision-making speed of individual capitals and collective Brussels, which is sluggish, but could be accelerated in the event of expected manifestations of aggression from Moscow against Western neighbors, starting with the Baltics. It is already clear that such a hypothetical structure will be governed on different principles than the consensus-based EU, considering the possibility of sabotage by various renegade countries, both current and those that might become so with the victory of pro-Kremlin populists in upcoming elections, a possibility that exists almost everywhere. Moreover, the mutual guarantees of individual participants should be more clearly defined, taking into account unfortunate precedents.
All these issues are resolved at a high level beyond our influence and are hardly affected by our opinions, so everything stated above has a somewhat armchair nature. However, the perception of the issue within Ukraine matters, no matter what. For instance, before the war, the share of our citizens supporting NATO membership did not exceed 15%, while 60% were against it, and 20-25%, as they diplomatically say, were undecided; this ratio repeated year after year. Under those conditions, the advancement of the Euro-Atlantic agenda by certain political forces faced resistance, at times insurmountable. Today, 70-80% are steadily for Euro-Atlantic integration against 12-15%, as sociologists explain the fluctuations in public opinion precisely by the search for reasonable alternatives mentioned earlier. However, it is worth considering that the “for” or “against” factor will be a noticeable element of a distant yet inevitable election campaign, which all political forces are preparing for in one way or another.
Therefore, promoting the concept in society… no, God forbid, not “multi-vector” (thank you, we’ve had enough), but realism in finding friends and partners should become an important task. Especially since it does not change the essence of previous intentions; we are heading west, not east.
