The prolonged war, degrading economy, and ideological deadlock are forming a new consensus in the weary Russian society. Analyses and evaluations from Western publications and experts agree: a fundamental shift has matured and is already taking place in Russia. President Putin and his entire rule over Russia are now perceived not as a guarantor of security but as a heavy burden for Russians and Russia.
For a long time, the system of Putinism was upheld by a fairly stable social contract. In 2022, by invading Ukraine, this compromise was reformatted: citizens were offered to live removed from the war, without opposing it. To those who accepted the terms out of despair or indifference, the regime promised a pre-war lifestyle. But by the fifth year of the meaningless slaughter, the contract was broken.
Now, the repressive mechanism strikes those who tried to abstain. The restrictions have caused despondency among loyalists and optimistic entrepreneurs in Russia. People agreed to ignore the war just to avoid becoming targets, and now they feel betrayed.
The change in mood is inextricably linked to the decline of economic optimism. Instead of reports of wartime growth, which no longer translates into increased income for ordinary Russians, a harsh reality has arrived.
Everyday jingoistic patriotism has ceased to glorify development; it has been reduced to survival – people are grateful just to be alive. A telling moment was Putin’s meeting on economic issues on April 15. Government economic officials discovered what it’s like to be a general in a “special military operation”: judging by the gloomy tone of the commander-in-chief, the negative growth of the first months of 2026 is tantamount to a real retreat.
The fundamental factor in the transformation of public mood was the realization that victory in the war is impossible, and the bloodshed has minimized the country’s advantages. The real culprits behind the change in mood were not the secret services or rebellious influencers. The key role was played by the Ukrainian armed forces’ ability to deliver devastating strikes on oil refineries and storage facilities across almost all of Russia.
A vivid indicator of weakness was the preparation for the May 9 parade. If the military parade is held secretly, without rehearsals and with muted internet to avoid attack by combat drones, it only broadcasts fear. Stalin, as Russian oppositionists write, said: “Winners are not judged.” But those who do not win can be judged, and society is starting to judge Putin.
The entire state apparatus, government, parliament, media, and church are still trying to conceal the catastrophic mistake of 2022, but they succeed less and less. The elites, forced to unite for survival, anxiously watch as the uncertainty of the war’s outcome causes cracks in the regime’s foundation, and the whole structure collapses. Putin is losing his magic.
Researchers studying the decline of political periods unmistakably recognize this hard-to-convey feeling of fading. Putin’s power has not yet disappeared, but it is no longer seen as legitimate. It has turned into a historical burden and simply must give way to the dawn of a new era.
