Vasyl Korotky, Berlin / Ukrinform
The full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia has been not only the greatest security challenge for Germany in recent decades but also a profound existential shock that struck at the very foundations of its post-war culture of memory. For decades, Berlin built a policy of “dialogue with Russia,” based on a special sense of historical responsibility towards Moscow – a responsibility that pushed out of sight those who suffered the most from Nazi aggression: Ukrainians, Poles, Belarusians. Today, this approach is undergoing a gradual revision – Berlin is forced to rethink its own vision of Eastern Europe, the role of Russia, and Ukraine’s place in European history.
On the eve of the Day of Remembrance and Victory over Nazism in World War II 1939–1945, the special correspondent of Ukrinform discussed these topics with the associate professor of the Department of History of Eastern and Central-Eastern Europe at Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich, Ms. Franziska Davies. For many years, the researcher has been addressing issues of memory politics, the history of Ukraine, Poland, and Russia. After 2022, she became one of the most notable and authoritative voices in the German public debate about Russia’s war against Ukraine.
The conversation covered key issues: why Germany ignored Ukraine for so long as one of the central theaters of the Nazi war of extermination and the Holocaust; how the Soviet narrative of the “Great Patriotic War” turned memory into a weapon, and why this went unnoticed for so long in Berlin; how the concepts of “fascism” and “denazification” in modern Russia have lost their historical meaning and turned into propaganda tools; whether Germany is capable of moving from a “culture of guilt” to a “culture of responsibility through action”; and what decolonization of memory means, particularly regarding Soviet memorials in the very heart of German cities.
According to the researcher, the historical “colonial complicity” between Berlin and Moscow at the expense of the peoples between them is not just a page of the past but also an important historical framework for understanding modern politics. And until Germany fully and definitively realizes that it is defending not a foreign country but its own security and values in Ukraine, its support will remain insufficiently decisive.
According to the researcher, Ukraine remained a “blind spot” for a significant part of German society and political class for years. Overcoming this is not only a matter of historical memory but also a matter of European security.
“COLONIAL COMPLICITY”: FOR CENTURIES, BERLIN AND MOSCOW MADE DEALS AT THE EXPENSE OF THEIR NEIGHBORS
– Ms. Davies, what meanings does May 8 hold for you, especially against the backdrop of the ongoing Russian war against Ukraine? Has your own perception of this date changed after February 24, 2022?
– I think that fundamentally, no. But I see changes very clearly, especially concerning Ukraine. Today, I understand even more clearly that Russia must be excluded from all memorial events in Germany. No official representative of the Russian embassy should be present. I feel this much more strongly now, though one could say it should have been this way since 2014.
It is now absolutely clear to me that any form of joint commemoration with Russia is currently impossible.
– Has this war changed the perception of Ukraine and Russia in the context of World War II memory in German society and politics?
– Certain changes have occurred in the sense that until February 24, 2022, Soviet victims of World War II were almost completely identified solely with Russia in the German perception.
Moreover, we had the absurd situation where it was common practice in both politics and society to justify refusing to supply weapons (before the full-scale invasion) by citing a special responsibility to Russia because of World War II. This is, of course, absurd.
Why do we justify the lack of solidarity with a state that was attacked, or with a state that was already obviously going to become a victim of even greater aggression? Legitimatizing this with World War II and responsibility to Russia is essentially reducing the lessons of World War II to absurdity.
This relates to what I have already mentioned: Ukraine, like Belarus, was long marginalized from the German perception as a central site of events and victims of World War II. Although these countries, which were part of the USSR then, were fully occupied, and the main events of both the occupation war and the Holocaust took place there.
In German culture of memory, this was strongly marginalized.
And this is not only related to World War II, but also to a longer historical line: the tradition of joint imperial actions by Germany and Russia at the expense of Central and Eastern European countries. So, it’s not just about naivety or an attempt to draw the “right” lessons from World War II, even if those lessons are then interpreted wrongly. There is also a certain form of imperial complicity. In science, we speak of “colonial complicity.”
This dimension has roots far back in the past — up to the partitions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth at the end of the 18th century. But one can also look at the bloody culmination of 1939-1941 — the Hitler-Stalin Pact. This joint imperial division of Eastern Europe still does not occupy a noticeable place in Germany’s public consciousness.
This shows how egocentric the German culture of memory still remains. For Poland, for example, the experience of occupation by two totalitarian regimes is central to understanding World War II. In Germany, this dimension continues to play a relatively insignificant role. It has become more noticeable, as well as the awareness that Ukraine was the main arena of events and a victim, certainly of Germany, but not only of Germany, but also of the Soviet Union. However, this old thinking has not yet disappeared.
THE MYTH OF “INVINCIBLE RUSSIA” AND NUCLEAR HYSTERIA: PSYCHOLOGICAL TRAPS OF GERMAN POLITICS
– You mentioned the special responsibility of Germany to Russia. Why was it so defining? And did it become an obstacle to the decisive support of Ukraine at the beginning of the war?
– Undoubtedly, it is one of the factors. But I do not think it was the only or necessarily the most important one. We are talking about the culture of memory, and that is important. But we also know that there were close ties between politics and business – suffice it to mention “Nord Stream-2”. In other words, there were also structurally problematic relations with Russia.
Another point. Many politicians found it difficult to acknowledge how detrimental their own policy towards Russia was before 2022. More decisive support for Ukraine would have required much deeper self-criticism. And there was no desire for that.
Moreover, many are still captive to old perceptions. Among them is the notion of an “invincible Russia”. As a historian, I can say that this is clearly a false assertion. In history, we have examples of Russian defeats, and there are quite a few.
The fear of nuclear escalation also played a significant role – a fear that Russia purposefully fueled and instrumentalized. Putin knows Germany very well and is aware of this deeply ingrained “nuclear fear”, some might even call it a sort of hysteria.
In general, it was a combination of a still problematic image of Russia, unwillingness to reflect on one’s own policy with all its consequences, including in the context of the culture of memory, and the belief that somehow, without decisive military support, as the situation demanded, it would be possible to reach some understanding with Russia. To avoid becoming too much of a party to the conflict, to not act too decisively.
DEMONIZATION OF UKRAINE AS “NAZI” – A STRATEGY PREPARED FOR YEARS
– Putin uses the symbolism of 1945 to justify the attack on Ukraine, portraying it as “Nazi”. How do you, as a historian, explain this phenomenon?
– The concepts of “fascism” and “Nazism” in Russia have largely become detached from their original political content.
Today, a “fascist” or “Nazi” is simply someone who is against Russia.
And here we have an obvious contradiction: Russia itself is a fascist-like society and at the same time accuses democracy of fascism. Therefore, it no longer has anything to do with the content of these terms.
These concepts are closely connected with the Soviet narrative of the “Great Patriotic War”, which was very successful, although the years 1939-1941 were systematically silenced. In this version, the war begins only in 1941. Over the last decades, these narratives have increasingly turned into political “combat terms” and have long been deliberately used against Ukraine.
There is also a certain historical continuity here. Even during Soviet times, Ukrainian dissidents were persecuted and prosecuted as “bourgeois nationalists”. Hence the logic that still applies today: whoever is against Moscow is a nationalist, a “Nazi”, a “fascist”.
This demonization of Ukraine – as supposedly a country of radical nationalists and anti-Semites – was especially actively used after the 2014 Maidan as part of a propaganda strategy. It aimed to spread disinformation, undermine solidarity with Ukraine, and distract attention from its own aggression – the annexation of Crimea and the capture of part of Donbas.
In parallel, there exists an old narrative in Russia: on one hand, it is claimed that Russia and Ukraine are “one people”. On the other hand, external enemies supposedly divide this “brotherhood”.
This is clearly seen in the text published under Putin’s name in June 2021. The thesis that external forces have allegedly destroyed this unity is constantly repeated there— in the 19th century, for example, Poles and Habsburgs, in the 20th century—Germany and allegedly “Ukrainian Nazis”.
Today, in this logic, the enemy is the “Kyiv regime”, supported by NATO, the USA, and the West. This narrative serves a clear function: it constructs a constant external enemy supposedly threatening the unity of this “single people”.
– The slogan “Never Again” has virtually turned into “We Can Repeat” in modern Russia. When, in your opinion, did this shift occur, and why did it remain unnoticed in the West, particularly in Germany, for so long?
– This instrumentalization of World War II—especially concerning Ukraine—began long before 2014. The 2014 attack was also prepared with propaganda methods.
The image of “Ukrainian Nazis” is an old label rooted in Soviet tradition. It was sharply reactivated in 2014, and in the months leading up to February 2022, it was further radicalized. However, I would say it is about radicalization rather than a fundamental shift. This instrumentalization of World War II themes has been observed in Russia for over a decade.
Why did it go unnoticed in Germany for so long? This is a valid question because it was indeed evident. One reason is a pronounced self-centeredness. People project their own beliefs, such as the notion that conflicts can be resolved through dialogue and diplomacy, onto others. This “ignorance of reality” was evident back in 2014.
A certain colonial superiority toward Ukraine also played a role. Additionally, many could not imagine that one state might attack another based on pseudo-historical, nationalistic-imperial ideology. It was beyond their imagination—even though everything was in plain sight.
Another important aspect is the tension within German culture between the principles of “Never again—to war” and “Never again—to genocide”. “Never again—to war” has often been interpreted as “Never more—arms”, and this even served as an argument against supporting a country under attack.
But in the situation with an aggressor, “Never again—to genocide” might mean that weapons need to be supplied to protect the victim. Otherwise, one becomes an accomplice.
The fact that it was difficult to accept for so long is also related to historical experience: Germany primarily knows the role of the aggressor, not the role of a victim threatened with annihilation. Countries like Poland have this experience, hence understanding there was much greater. This is why we had all these absurd open letters after the full-scale Russian invasion, whose authors opposed the delivery of weapons to Ukraine.
SUPPORT FOR UKRAINE—NOT GENEROSITY, BUT A MATTER OF GERMANY’S OWN SECURITY
– How can Germany make this transition from a “culture of guilt” to a “culture of responsibility through action” specifically in the context of supporting Ukraine?
– A certain shift has already occurred, although, in my opinion, it is insufficient and not decisive enough.
Until February 2022, there was a consensus among all parties against supplying weapons. Even a party like the “Greens,” which had long been very pro-Ukrainian, did not want to supply weapons. So, a real shift has occurred.
A part of society today has a clearer understanding of this responsibility, and support for Ukraine remains the position of the majority. However, I am not sure if it is fully realized that this is not about generosity or mere assistance, but about the security of Europe and, hence, Germany itself.
In Ukraine today, the European security order, based on the principle that no state has the right to change another’s borders by force, is being defended. If this order is not protected, all of Europe will become less secure.
I would like to see much clearer communication from German politicians and a higher level of understanding that there are things that need to be protected, including in Germany itself. Democracy and freedom are not to be taken for granted. I think this is something Germans need to learn.
– Do you see a readiness in current German politics to support Ukraine consistently and without reservation? Or do historical attitudes towards Russia still hinder this process?
– I believe the support is still not consistent enough. In the SPD – especially under Chancellor Scholz – it was clear how strongly old thought patterns still operated. This is evidenced by the current calls for negotiations with Russia on disarmament.
As for the CDU, it is harder for me to pinpoint the reasons. Support is present rhetorically, but some promises made after coming to power were not fulfilled. I assume that now the CDU prioritizes domestic political issues, particularly migration. This topic is irresponsibly fueled by the government.
Support for Ukraine, despite its strategic importance for Germany and Europe, risks being sidelined.
At the same time, populist and problematic narratives are being used in hopes of winning back voters from the “Alternative for Germany.” However, polls show that this strategy is not working.
Moreover, such focus leads to central challenges – supporting Ukraine and strengthening democracy – not receiving due attention.
OCCUPATION IS NOT PEACE. AND GERMANS POORLY UNDERSTAND THIS
– In Germany, there are voices that, appealing to lessons of history, demand “peace at any cost.” What can you counter to such arguments?
– Firstly, we are dealing with Russia, which does not want peace. And none of those making such demands in recent years could ever explain based on facts how exactly this peace is to be achieved. These were empty phrases, clichés that have little to do with reality.
What should Ukraine negotiate, if at the same time it is being threatened with destruction?
What would be the basis of such negotiations?
Secondly, occupation does not mean peace.
Occupation in Ukraine means the genocide of Ukrainians. This is not peace.
And this, again, is linked to historical experience. During World War II, Germans had practically no experience of living under occupation. They themselves were occupiers but did not experience what it means to live under a genocidal occupation regime that seeks to destroy language, culture, identity, and statehood.
Such experience is had by countries like Poland or Ukraine.
We know from research that in many of these countries during World War II, more people died under occupation than directly in combat. So the notion that the end of combat also ends the loss of life is incorrect.
Today, we can clearly see what is happening in Ukraine. It is no longer “just” about the loss of freedom but also about threats to life and physical integrity.
Another point: Russia considers itself at war with all of Europe, including Germany. Therefore, Ukraine is defending not only itself but also European security. This needs to be explained to people. I often try to say this: “It’s also about you – and your children.”
THE SOVIET UNION WAS A RUSSIAN COLONIAL EMPIRE
– In Ukraine, a process of decolonization has been underway for many years, including in the realm of memory culture. Is a similar, though different, process needed in Germany, for example, in dealing with Soviet monuments? Perhaps they should also be decolonized, as Russia uses them as a tool for propaganda and demonstration of power?
– Absolutely. But I think many people in Germany are not yet fully aware of this. The Soviet Union was a Russian colonial empire. For many Ukrainians today, this is obvious – in Germany, this awareness is largely absent.
This is also related to very successful Soviet propaganda: “colonial” has always referred to others – the West, the USA. The Soviet Union presented itself as an anti-colonial force, as a multinational state of “friendship of peoples.” But in reality, it was clearly hierarchically organized: power was in Moscow, the Russian language and culture were structurally privileged, and russification essentially meant Sovietization.
This understanding is often still lacking in Germany. Therefore, the fact that rethinking Soviet monuments is part of the decolonization process is not properly perceived. This also applies to science, by the way.
Even among historians, there is still resistance to classifying the Soviet Union as a Russian colonial empire.
There is still much analytical work to be done.
At the same time, at least on a political level, there has been some awareness that something needs to counter Russia’s instrumentalization of World War II themes.
– Can we say that this process has already begun? For example, with the renaming of the German-Russian Museum in Berlin-Karlshorst after February 24, 2022?
– Yes, I would say it has begun. Today, things that were hardly questioned before in science, politics, and society are being scrutinized and analyzed.
But such changes take time. Many people have built a certain image of Russia over the years. Questioning it also means acknowledging one’s own mistakes and “blind spots.”
This concerns myself as well. When I started studying Eastern European history, I first learned Russian and did not subject much to fundamental analysis. Today it is clear: to understand Russia in its historical and political dimensions, much more attention must be paid to the aspect of Russian colonialism. This process gained significant momentum around 2022 but is far from complete.
ATTRIBUTING VICTORY OVER NAZISM SOLELY TO RUSSIA DISTORTS HISTORICAL REALITY
– The red Victory flag long symbolized liberation from Nazism. Today, it is hoisted by Russian occupiers on seized Ukrainian buildings. How should we regard this?
– I think these symbols require broader contextualization. For instance, in Germany, it is often said that May 8, 1945, marks the beginning of freedom and democracy in Europe. However, this statement is not accurate for all of Europe. For many Central and Eastern European countries, this day marked the beginning of a new form of lack of freedom. Poland lost its sovereignty, as did the Baltic countries, and Ukraine, except for Western Ukraine, was under Soviet control even before World War II.
This ambivalence needs to be made more visible – in political communication as well as in museums and memorials. At the same time, it’s important to emphasize: for the Jewish population, the advance of the Red Army was indeed liberation from the Nazi extermination regime. And equally important to say: this rescue was not only the merit of Russians but also Ukrainians, Belarusians, Kazakhs, and many others. Today, this victory is often attributed solely to Russia – which distorts historical reality.
It is necessary to see two things simultaneously: gratitude for the victory over National Socialism and the awareness that for many countries, a new form of occupation began afterward. This ambivalence does not fit into simple political messages, but it needs to be articulated.
WITHOUT HOLDING RUSSIA ACCOUNTABLE FOR THE WAR AGAINST UKRAINE, A COMMON EUROPEAN MEMORY IS IMPOSSIBLE
– What could be the new European culture of memory after Russia’s war against Ukraine? And what role will Ukraine play in it?
– Ukraine must become visible in this culture of memory. It is about recognizing what happened in Ukraine – as the central arena of the Holocaust, a place of mass violence and forced labor. Many forced laborers in Germany were from Ukraine. This dimension needs to be more strongly integrated into European memory – socially, politically, and scientifically.
Russia can be involved in such common remembrance only when the war ends, all Russian troops leave Ukraine, and there is a clear acceptance of responsibility for the committed crimes.
Until then, a shared memory with Russia is impossible.
