Today — Novooleksandrivsk and Huliaipilsk directions.
1. The Russian Vostok military group continues to address the task of encircling the Orikhiv district of the Armed Forces of Ukraine from the east and southeast in the sectors of its 5th and 35th Combined Arms Armies (CAA) in the Huliaipilsk direction, as well as repelling counterattacks of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the sectors of the 36th and 29th CAA in the Novooleksandrivsk direction.
In these directions, the Vostok group operates approximately in the following composition:
– The 5th CAA operates as part of the 127th Motorized Rifle Division (MRD) — 114th, 143rd and 394th Motorized Rifle Regiments (MRR), 218th Tank Regiment (TR), as well as the 57th and 60th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigades (SMRB).
– The 29th CAA operates through its 36th SMRB, 430th MRR, possibly also part of the forces of the 68th Army Corps (AC) in the form of a composite tactical group of the 18th Machine Gun Artillery Division (MGAD), as well as forces and means attached to it to reinforce the forces and means of the 90th Tank Division (TD), possibly in the form of the 228th MRR.
– The 36th CAA operates with the forces of the 37th SMRB and the 5th Separate Tank Brigade (STB), also, apparently, in its sector the enemy used part of the forces of the 120th Naval Infantry Division (NID), a former 336th Separate Marine Brigade (SMB) of the Baltic Fleet (BF).
– The 35th CAA, with part of its forces, was apparently included in the operational reserve of the Vostok group, which its command has already been quite actively using in both the 5th CAA sector (38th SMRB) and the 36th CAA sector (69th Separate Coverage Brigade), as well as still partially holding the 64th SMRB.
It should also be noted that to strengthen efforts in the Huliaipilsk direction and stabilize the situation in Novooleksandrivsk, the enemy command regrouped several forces and means from the 120th NID of the BF and the 40th SMB from the Pacific Fleet (PF) to this operational zone of the Vostok group a little earlier.
In addition to the above-mentioned forces and assets, the Russian command in these areas has several formations at its disposal at the “motorized rifle/rifle regiment” (MRR/RR) level of its Territorial Troops (TT) and “mobilization reserve” (MR). They are either part of the “state” units and formations already deployed and operating here, or they are subordinated to them for operational command as a means of reinforcement. There are about 5-6 of them.
Numerous reports that appeared last week (both in foreign and Ukrainian sources) about the movement of significant enemy reserves through Mariupol and its surroundings at the rear of the operational zone of OGV “East” likely indicate a further buildup by the Russian command of both its groups (OGV “East” and the 58th CAA OGV “Dnipro”), which operate on the so-called “big” Zaporizhzhia direction—Novooleksandrivsky, Hulyaipilsky, and the actual Zaporizhzhia directions.
It is likely about part of the strategic reserves that the Russian command is concentrating and deploying both in the operational zone of OGV “East” and on the right flank of OGV “Dnipro” (the sector of the 58th CAA) ahead of the summer campaign in 2026. Although these could also be demonstrative actions.
In general, both “strike” armies of OGV “East” and “Dnipro” (the 5th and 58th CAAs, respectively) currently objectively require fairly serious replenishment and reinforcement due to significant losses in the spring battles for Hulyaipole and Stepnohirsk. Thus, it is quite possible that part of these forces may “surface” specifically in the sectors of the 5th and 36th CAAs of OGV “East”.
2. Current Situation
The current situation is largely determined by the nature of the tasks that the parties are solving at the operational-tactical level, specifically at present:
– The command of the Russian OGV “East” is trying to restore a relatively fast pace of offensive in the sector of its 5th CAA to the west and northwest of Hulyaipole (its obvious immediate task is to move the main forces to the line Verkhnya Tersa — Hulyaipil’ske), as well as to restore the positions of its troops that existed before the start of active counterattacking actions of the AFU on the Novooleksandrivsky direction, i.e., to stabilize the situation in the sector of the 36th CAA and on the flanks adjacent to the 5th and 29th CAAs.
– In turn, the Ukrainian command seeks to prevent further advancement of the enemy’s forward units and subdivisions in the directions of Zalezhny — Hulyaipil’ske, Zeleny — Verkhnya Tersa, and Zeleny — Pryluky. It is also making certain efforts to further consolidate on the lines of Ternove-Novomykolaivka, Dobropillia-Pershotravneve, achieved in the previous period, while sometimes attempting to counterattack in certain areas and directions.
For example, the AFU apparently counterattacked quite intensively last week in the direction of Novoselivka — Sichneve (on the joint flank of the 36th and 29th CAAs of the enemy), conducted active meeting battles in the area of Novohryhorivka, east of Dobropillia, and in the area of Solodke.
The operational-tactical significance of the AFU’s actions in the sector of the Russian 36th CAA is evident. They clearly aim to reach the Hulyaipole — Velyka Novosilka road on the Uspeivka — Temyrivka section, creating flanking difficulties for the Russian 5th CAA with its advance in the Hulyaipole area.
In practice (at the tactical level), this looked as follows:
– It is apparent that part of the forces of the 120th dmp, regrouped at the “junction” of the 29th and 36th CAAs, was used by the Russian command to participate in counterattacks in the directions of Myrne — Oleksandrohrad and Maliivka — Sichneve, as well as to hold Voskresenka. This did not bring particular dividends to the Russian command, but it apparently managed to prolong the battles for Voskresenka and Sichneve in time.
– The advanced units of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, which reached the area of Ternove and Novomykolaivka, likely had to repel several significant attempts by the enemy to push them northward, conducted from Novohryhorivka and Zaporizhzhia over the previous and current weeks. It seems that these attempts by the enemy have been unsuccessful so far. Moreover, it is apparent that the presence of Russian infantry groups near the village of Berezove, which posed a tactical threat mainly to the flanks of Ukrainian units, has been “significantly minimized.” However, I am not aware of any further advancement of the Ukrainian Armed Forces towards Novomykolaivka–Temyrivka or Ternove–Zaporizhzhia.
– Ukrainian units that reached the area of Pershotravneve–Novohryhorivka–Rybne–Solodke were also actively engaged in counter-battles during the reporting period. The enemy (Russian troops from the 36th Army) likely focused on holding the line Solodke–Pryvilne to prevent the further advance of the Ukrainian Armed Forces towards Uspenivka along the western bank of the Yanchur River.
The problem for the Russian command in this area is that the Ukrainian Armed Forces are quite active not only on the western bank of the Yanchur River but also on its eastern bank towards Novohryhorivka–Novoivanivka. If, as a result of these battles, Ukrainian troops manage to reach and secure the line Solodke–Novohryhorivka, holding the Uspenivka area will become quite problematic for the Russian forces.
– In the sector of the 5th Army, the Russian command continued to attempt breakthroughs along the Haichur River northward towards Dobropil, conducting quite active offensive actions towards Zelene–Varvarivka and in the area of the village Priluky from the east. In addition, the enemy likely attempted several times to push back the advanced infantry groups of the Ukrainian Armed Forces east of Dobropil itself.
So far, the Russian troops have not been able to fully restore the situation in this area, as the Ukrainian Armed Forces continue to conduct quite successful defensive battles in this “triangle” of Priluky–Varvarivka–Olenokostiantynivka, preventing the enemy from advancing north along the western bank of the Haichur River. Moreover, from time to time, they themselves counterattack on the opposite bank east of Dobropil.
– But further south, where the Russian 5th Army command is evidently concentrating its main efforts, they managed to achieve certain tactical results, advancing with numerous assault groups from their forward units — moving towards Zelene–Staropetrivka, reaching the line Horke–Staroukrainka, and starting battles for Krynychne and Tsvitkove. In other words, reaching the approaches to the defense “node” of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in Verkhnotersa.
– Further south, the forward units of the Russian 5th Army, apparently supported by part of the forces of the 35th Army and units of the 40th Marine Brigade, actively attempted to advance along the directions of Zalyzne–Hulyaypilske along the road to Orikhiv, also from Dorozhnianka in the same direction, and attempted to fully capture the area of the village of Mirne, advancing from Zahiryne.
The situation here is quite challenging for the Ukrainian Armed Forces. On one hand, Russian troops have tactically infiltrated their forward assault groups deeply in these directions. On the other hand, the Ukrainian Armed Forces continue to hold several positions on their flanks both in the area of Zaliznychne and to the south of it. Essentially, in the area 8-10 km west and southwest of Huliaipole, the front represents a continuous strip of “mixed” combat orders of the forward units and subdivisions of both sides, where fighting by separate infantry groups and units in encirclement or semi-encirclement is more the norm than the exception.
However, it should be noted that for at least a week, the forward parts and formations of the 5th Russian Combined Arms Army have not made significant advances even on a tactical level in their offensive on the Orikhiv Defense Area of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. It is evident that they need significant reinforcement, primarily in their assault groups and subdivisions, whose forces are actually conducting the operations.
3. Prospects
Currently, it can be confidently stated that between performing two important operational-tactical tasks in their operational zone (Novooleksandrivsk and Huliaipole directions), namely stabilizing the situation in the areas of the 36th and 29th Combined Arms Armies and conducting (continuing) the offensive in the area of the 5th Combined Arms Army, the command of the Russian Vostok Operational Group is evidently prioritizing the latter.
They are confident that the counterattacks by the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the area of their 36th Combined Arms Army and on its flanks, adjacent to the 5th and 29th Combined Arms Armies, are limited and do not pose a significant threat operational-tactically. Moreover, they are sure that they can solve this problem with the forces already deployed in this direction, possibly with only “targeted” use of additional forces and resources.
This is clearly confirmed by the allocation of reserves and strengthening resources among their armies. Most of them are allocated to the area of the 5th Combined Arms Army (40th Naval Infantry Brigade, 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 68th Army Corps, 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 35th Combined Arms Army, etc.), while the 36th and 29th Combined Arms Armies received only part of the forces of the 120th Missile Brigade and several units of the 69th Separate Motorized Brigade of the 35th Combined Arms Army.
Therefore, in my opinion, it is worth remembering that the command of the Russian Vostok Operational Group is unlikely to abandon further attempts to break through from the east and southeast to the immediate approaches to the Orikhiv Defense Area of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the near future.
However, this does not mean that the situation in the Huliaipole and Novooleksandrivsk directions cannot change, and significantly so. Of course, this could happen on one condition — if the counterattacking actions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the areas of the enemy’s 36th and 29th Combined Arms Armies further develop.
The hypothetical exit (breakthrough) of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the area of Uspenivka and Temyrivka, which would force the command of the Russian 5th Combined Arms Army to deploy part of its forces and resources facing north to support and stabilize its “elbow” flank connection with the forces of the 36th Combined Arms Army, could significantly affect its ability to continue the offensive from the east toward Orikhiv.
The problem is that the Ukrainian Armed Forces currently clearly do not have enough forces and resources in the Novooleksandrivsk direction to accomplish this task. The Russian command is well aware of this. This is precisely where their confidence stems from that their 5th Combined Arms Army will not need to “reorient” its right (northern) flank in any way, and its offensive in this area can and should continue.
It can be assumed that his confidence is also bolstered by the likely decision of the Russian military command at a strategic level to strengthen the entire Southern operational zone with a portion of its strategic reserves. For now, we cannot speak with certainty about this as a fait accompli, but it is likely that there is quite active “hustle” with the regrouping of a certain number of Russian troops in the operational rear of their “Vostok” and “Dnepr” units.
To summarize.
Currently, for the Ukrainian command itself, the main dilemma in planning, organizing, and further conducting combat operations precisely in the Novooleksandrivka and Huliaipole directions is choosing the area (direction) of concentration of its main efforts.
In other words, it must decide with maximum realism and sobriety one key question — whether it will be able soon to break through the strip of the Russian 36th Combined Arms Army to the rear of the 5th Combined Arms Army, enough to halt its advance towards Orikhiv, or whether it should cease counterattacks in the Novooleksandrivka direction and focus on defense in Huliaipole.
In this regard, the most harmful decision would obviously be the desire to “manage both here and there,” that is, to attempt SIMULTANEOUS resolution of both tasks, which would inevitably lead to further dispersion of already not very significant forces and means of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in these directions.
In this choice, a decisive factor will clearly be the realistic assessment of the ACTUAL level of combat capability of both its own troops and the enemy troops, as well as the assessment of the parties’ similar capabilities to increase it.
Photo: General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
