“Eurobombs.” Nuclear Phantoms of Naryshkin

"Eurobombs." Nuclear Phantoms of Naryshkin
Socrates’ Sieve

The recent statement by the director of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service that the European Union is allegedly preparing to develop its own nuclear weapons seems like another chapter in the Kremlin’s extensive disinformation chronicle. Sergey Naryshkin, acting as a “soothsayer,” once again attempts to turn reality on its head. However, behind the loud statements lies not intelligence truth, but a primitive attempt to justify their own aggression.

Naryshkin’s main thesis relies on the classic gaslighting technique. By asserting that the EU is creating a nuclear arsenal to “counter the Russian threat,” the Foreign Intelligence Service deliberately ignores the root cause of all defensive discussions in Europe. The Russian threat is not a hypothetical construct of Western politicians but a tangible reality: from full-scale war in Ukraine to nuclear blackmail emanating from the Kremlin almost weekly.

Naryshkin manipulates the facts, refusing to acknowledge that it is Moscow’s actions that have destroyed the security architecture in Europe. Such Foreign Intelligence Service narratives are meant to legitimize Russian militarization in the eyes of the domestic audience. If the “enemy” is allegedly developing an atomic bomb, then Russia is “allowed everything.” It’s an attempt to portray Europe’s forced reaction to Russian expansionism as unprovoked aggression.

The second critical flaw in the statement by the chief Russian intelligence officer lies in ignoring the fact that Europe does not need to “develop” nuclear weapons from scratch. The EU already includes a nuclear power – France.
In his historic speech in March 2026 at the Île Longue base, President Emmanuel Macron clearly defined the concept of dissuasion avancée (“advanced deterrence”). France proposed giving its nuclear arsenal a “European dimension,” without violating national sovereignty.

This move, firstly, renders the creation of a separate “EU bomb” pointless. Secondly, the discussions in Germany, initiated by Manfred Weber of the EPP, about a “European nuclear shield” and Polish statements about “nuclear sharing” are exclusively about coordination and deployment, not independent production.

For the Foreign Intelligence Service to acknowledge France’s leadership in this matter would be tantamount to admitting that European unity is strengthening. Thus, it is more advantageous for Moscow to promote the myth of “Brussels’ secret laboratories.”

If given a sober assessment, the statements by the Foreign Intelligence Service about EU structures developing nuclear weapons lack technical and political grounding. It is well known that a legal barrier exists. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and Euratom agreements make the creation of a “pan-European bomb” legally impossible without dismantling the current system of international law.

Moreover, there is no clear consensus within the EU. While Poland and the Baltic countries advocate maximizing deterrence, a significant part of the political elite in Germany and Austria still adhere to anti-nuclear views.

Therefore, Naryshkin’s statements are far from reality, unrelated to risk analysis, and merely a tool of hybrid warfare. The Foreign Intelligence Service attempts to sow discord among allies, scaring pacifist-minded Europeans with “nuclear militarization,” while simultaneously setting the stage for further escalation from Russia. The truth is different: Europe is merely trying to find a way to survive next to an unpredictable neighbor, whose nuclear button has long been a leading argument in diplomacy.

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