Analysis of the Combined Attack on Ukraine on March 7, 2026

Analysis of the Combined Attack on Ukraine on March 7, 2026
Serhii Misiura

A brief analysis of today’s combined strike on Ukraine. And it’s more of a response rather than an incomplete attack.

The targets today were mainly energy-related again, but I emphasize once again that the adversaries are moving to spring-summer targets. Therefore, today there were also hydro targets in Cherkasy and Chernivtsi.

Initially, there were many ballistic attacks on Kyiv and two Zircons west of Kyiv. Possibly targeting the largest Kyiv Substation near Nalyvaikivka, 750 kV, which serves as a bridge from western NPPs and European electricity imports. We shot down 8 out of 13, which is a very good result. The Zircons were also not shot down (especially for conspiracy theorists) as there were no Patriot batteries. When the Zircons flew south of Kyiv, we shot them down because we had the means to do so. Once again, we see a “naval battle,” where we need to guess where to place the PAC-3 battery and where the adversaries will strike. There aren’t enough batteries to cover all options. Look at the example of the UAE, where apart from Patriots there are even TWO THAAD BATTERIES, and there were still misses πŸ™.

Now, why do I consider this a “response.” I can even see in my mind how it happened πŸ™‚.

The commander of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation, Vice Admiral Sergei Pinchuk, when he saw a few missiles missed on his Caliber carriers near Novorossiysk:

– Hello, commander of the Air Forces, I understand that a rocket strike by strategists is currently impractical, your aircraft resources are limited, and the factory hasn’t delivered missiles yet, but! When possible, with about 500 Shaheds and a few missiles from the Sukhois in Kharkiv (for Belgorod!!), can I also send out my ships and give the Ukrainians a hard time?

– Sergei, on Saturday we gathered a bit, the commander agreed, will you fire the Zircons? You didn’t give us Calibers in previous attacks due to the weather at sea, but now can you?

– Yes, I’ll even bring Essen and Makarov! I’ll give a whole salvo of 16 Calibers! But there are few Zircons, a maximum of two from one launcher. And yes, the ships will go to repair immediately because drones slightly damaged the bridges. We’ll launch the missiles manually somehow, but the response will be harsh. The eagles will fly to Chernivtsi so they remember the year 2022!

And so we saw Calibers through Moldova, right along the border, flying to the Dniester Pumped Storage Power Station, the largest in Europe. And 3 out of 14 missiles reached. We shot down 11, but the question is – where are the other 2 missiles? Couldn’t launch full salvos from both vessels?

That’s why it was their response. Calibers, which were very rare visitors all winter, were a response to our messages that the ships were put out of action. They showed, they launched.

Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia – a response for Belgorod and the rest of the shelling on swamp territory.

The rest – planned, already spring-summer targets. But due to the Black Sea Fleet’s haste (for Essen!) and the lack of X-101 missiles straight from the conveyor – they fired with whatever they could. Ground forces provided Shaheds (we shot down 453 out of 480!), the Black Sea Fleet – two Caliber carriers (we shot down 11 out of 14) and even one hypersonic Zircon launcher (and we remember they fired twice with 4 missiles) with two missiles. Ballistics on Kyiv were also from ground forces (either Iskanders, or air defenses added a couple of S-400s in a ground-to-ground launch). And we shot down 8 out of 13, which is also a strong result against ballistic missiles.

Yes, we have grown from a country that said in 2022 “close the sky over us” to a Ukraine to which the adversaries respond with whatever they can, and America asks for means against Shaheds.

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