In connection with the series of fires at Wildberries warehouses, Russian marketplaces have begun to be actively discussed online and on broadcasts. There is some insane flow of numbers, they conflict with each other right off the bat. It’s invariably about trillions of billions and the impending rapid collapse of the Russian economy.
At some point, I lost the thread of the discussion, so I decided to make a memo for myself on what Wildberries is at the moment, how they compare to OZON, and what all this might mean.
1. Credit where it’s due: Wildberries, despite all the grumbling from users, is a very convenient service and a profitable platform for all (sellers-buyers). This is precisely why the Wildberries group has gathered a client base of 80+ million (!) active counterparts. Essentially, this is the lion’s share of Russia’s economically active population.
However, Wildberries’ infrastructure began to be widely used to supply Russian occupying forces.
Much has already been written about this with pictures: for a long period, Wildberries generated and serviced a flow of goods directly involved in the killing of Ukrainians. The most straightforward examples are drones, all their components, fiber optics, devices for drops, and so on. As a result, the company instantly became a legitimate military target.
Wrecking Wildberries just for this is right in all respects. Period. Even without additional explanations that it is an important subject for the aggressor’s economy.
Nevertheless, it’s interesting to look at what this socio-economic and political phenomenon represents.
2. A cursory examination indicates: two aspects of Wildberries exist in parallel – the marketing one (living in press releases) and the formal-bureaucratic one (living in accounting records and databases of legal entities).
The marketing aspect of the Wildberries group reports for 2025:
• Turnover (GMV) increased by 49% compared to 2024 and reached 6.1 trillion rubles.
• Net profit – 175 billion rubles (104 billion rubles in 2024).
• More than 310 billion rubles invested in logistics, IT infrastructure, and new projects, twice as much as in 2024 (150 billion rubles).
• Logistic infrastructure exceeded 200 facilities with a total area of 5.2 million sq. m (2.8 million sq. m at the end of 2024).
• 80+ million active users.
• 15K own order pickup points and more than 94K with partners (doubled in 2025).
For comparison OZON:
• Turnover by the end of 2025 was 4.16 trillion rubles (a 45% increase compared to 2024);
• Revenue increased by 63%, reaching 998 billion rubles.
• The net loss by the end of 2025 amounted to 938 million rubles, which can be considered nearly break-even, as the loss in 2024 was 59.4 billion rubles. The first half of 2026 already showed a net profit, and the year was also planned to end with a net profit.
• The area of logistics infrastructure amounted to almost 5 million square meters.
• 64.5 million active users.
• 50 fulfillment centers, nearly 200 sorting centers, over 80,000 pickup points (also doubled in 2025).
The essential difference: Wildberries is a private company, while Ozon is public.
Ozon regularly generates transparent reports and conducted an IPO on the NASDAQ in 2020, with shares traded on the Moscow Exchange. Therefore, we already have data for the first 6 months of 2026.
Wildberries maintains strategic uncertainty. In particular, the Wildberries group does not disclose revenue data according to international financial reporting standards (IFRS). Therefore, the figure of 1.19 trillion rubles is often used in broadcasts. But this is the revenue of not the entire group, but only one legal entity – LLC “RVB”.
And this is where the entrance to the rabbit hole and the abyss of curiosity lies.
3. Legend has it that the company Wildberries was created in 2004 by Tatyana Kim (then Bakalchuk) while on maternity leave. She was born in Grozny to a family of Soviet Koreans, studied in Kolomna to become a foreign language teacher, worked in a school as an English teacher, and at some point, she and her husband started a business. She launched a website for selling clothes and shoes, developed the company, which eventually made her the richest woman in Russia (her personal fortune was recently estimated at $6-8 billion).
Everyone can read the company’s history if they wish. I will only note that in 2021 Wildberries bought a bank to support its operations (now Weidberriz Bank, LLC “VB Bank”).
The COVID crisis further spurred online trading, and the business press reported that in 2021, the Wildberries group was at its peak of stability. Then difficulties began, which Tatyana Bakalchuk tried to solve in 2024 through a merger with the advertising conglomerate Russ Outdoor. LLC “RVB” emerged.
Industry experts called this deal extremely strange because the advertisers received 35% in the combined company (considered disproportionately much), leaving Wildberries owners with 65%. This was accompanied by a conflict and a divorce in the Bakalchuks’ family, with the husband claiming a hostile takeover of the business and enlisting Kadyrov’s protection.
Dondon Kadyrov publicly promised to return his wife to the family and stop the unholy merger. During the discussion, a shooting with two fatalities occurred in central Moscow, Kadyrov accused the billionaire senator from Dagestan, Suleyman Kerimov, and two State Duma deputies from the Caucasus of plotting his murder, speaking of blood revenge. Then it settled down. The merger took place. The former spouses settled matters in court and parted ways, with Tatyana Bakalchuk returning to the surname Kim.
Information spread in the background that Kerimov has an interest in Russ Outdoor, on this basis, he introduced Tatyana Kim to the head of the Presidential Administration of Russia Anton Vaino and his first deputy Alexey Gromov. Allegedly, there was then a meeting with Putin, where he blessed the merger, and other legends. Vaino and Gromov are also named as co-owners of Wildberries.
This is certainly interesting, but fundamentally here’s the point.
4. In essence, Wildberries’ business model is akin to a pyramid. The key to a pyramid’s success is expansion and the ability to service debt. The crucial factor in managing someone else’s money (debt) is trust.
Until 2021/22, Wildberries developed at a pace that allowed it to service its debt. But at some point, growth rates began to decline, leading to a plateau that required a certain leap to receive a different level of financial support.
This is why some experts explain the somewhat dubious merger with Russ Outdoor: besides some advertising infrastructure, the package obviously included a set of informal connections, lobbying capabilities, and administrative resources.
Here, it’s worth mentioning another distinction between major Russian marketplaces.
If Wildberries grew from a clothing and shoe store, then player No. 2 – OZON – scaled from a bookstore, being in the orbit of the financial and industrial group AFK Sistema (main owner – billionaire Vladimir Yevtushenkov). OZON had support from a diverse business that provided a safety net during its growth phase. Formally, since 2022, AFK Sistema is not related to OZON at the corporate level. But not everyone believes this, for some reason…
OZON was deeply unprofitable for several years, growing and building a client base. As a result, 2026 was planned to be the first year when OZON would turn a profit while continuing to scale.
Structure No. 3 – Yandex.Market – grew on the foundation of the diverse Yandex corporation and relies on its resources.
In 2021, Sberbank acquired 85% of the marketplace Goods….ru from the M.Video-Eldorado group, which has been operating under the name Megamarket since 2023, becoming the No. 4 player in Russia and gaining weight.
In summary: a few years ago, giants began jostling in the Russian marketplace market, and only Wildberries lacked an obvious parent structure behind it. To ensure expansion (meaning huge loans), significant support was needed, forming the ground for alliances. This is how it appears.
5. The Wildberries group’s structure has peculiarities that can be seen through the lens of financial statements.
Formally, a head organization LLC “RVB” exists. As already noted, it generated 1.19 trillion in revenue. The main income comes from agency fees and advertising services. Actual trading is a secondary activity for Wildberries.
However, “RVB” generated only 55.3 billion rubles in net profit over the year. But the group publicly mentions 175+ billion. The rest is generated by a belt of related structures, numbering over a hundred. One of them is the aforementioned “WB Bank” (profit in 2025 was 60 billion rubles, 72.2 billion in the first 6 months of 2026).
The logic of the group’s structure is typical for such formations: the head organization takes on debt, working capital, and part of investment projects in progress, etc. And in the “asteroid belt,” monetization takes place, capital accumulates, and money is drawn.
And here is where the magic begins.
According to the financial statements, Wildberries, represented by LLC “RVB,” carries a debt of 830 billion rubles. Meanwhile, the company’s own capital is only 2.44 billion.
Even if all assets, account funds, and so on are scraped together, there remains more than 700 billion rubles of completely unsecured debt. LLC “RVB” has various obligations totaling 1.3 trillion rubles, of which 96.5% are short-term (a year or less).
In 2025, LLC “RVB” received 1.47 trillion (!) in loans, repaid 737 billion, paid dividends, and made other payments.
By the end of the year, LLC “RVB” had 452 billion rubles in loans at “key rate +10%” and 330 billion rubles at “key rate +5%”. Market experts claim these are expensive funds, as typically, such large companies deal with rates of 1-3% above the key rate.
But apparently, banks charge for risk. After all, there’s no collateral for these loans. Depending on the key rate, the loan mass generates 170-200 billion rubles just in interest!
Such interest can only be covered by a colossal turnover. Thus, Wildberries is expanding its customer base, building massive logistics centers, and boosting cash flow in every way.
6. In addition to collecting agency fees and advertising payments within the system, one of the cornerstones of this business is the goods and money of sellers temporarily under the control of the marketplace.
Consumers paid for the goods, and Wildberries holds the money in its bank for over 3 weeks before transferring it to the sellers. On the Wildberries platform, there are more than 476 thousand sellers in the top 500 categories, of which only 14% are active, about 67 thousand. In total, they generated an interest-free “credit” of about 350 billion rubles for the marketplace.
And here we return to the topic of trust.
Wildberries, in some miraculous way, has secured the support of external creditors who loaned nearly 1.5 trillion rubles to the company, fully aware that there is no collateral other than the cash-generating business. If the flow stops – the money vanishes.
For some reason, creditors operating in trillions trusted Wildberries. Moreover, Wildberries admits in its reports that it violated some covenants. These are additional terms of creditors, which, if breached, allow creditors to demand early repayment. But the creditors, for some reason, do not demand it, trusting the company so much. Non-economic circumstances are evident.
The sellers also trusted similarly. Tens of thousands of people, de facto, invested in the company, including taking loans to boost their business.
The key question: how will a series of disruptions affect this trust?..
It is worth mentioning another factor. The marketplace sector generates about 13 trillion rubles in turnover and about 3 trillion rubles in revenue, which accounts for 1.5-1.6% of Russia’s nominal GDP. Any hiccups in the marketplaces will negatively impact Russia’s economic indicators – officially pushing it into the red.
Given real inflation and other factors, the Central Bank, which is currently reluctantly lowering the key rate in small steps, may return to raising it. Remember the loan interest formula – increasing the key rate generates tens of billions of rubles in additional interest payments for Wildberries, and the debt grows.
In summary, if:
1) sellers start to waver, go bankrupt, or leave for other reasons;
2) creditors become less loyal;
3) the key rate rises,
Wildberries, technically, cannot manage its obligations, including bank loans… Serious assistance will be needed.
7. And here we dive into the next level of gloom.
Who is the main holder of Wildberries’ risky debts?
This information is opaque, but it is believed that the main donor is VTB Bank, to which Wildberries might owe up to 500 billion rubles.
Just three weeks before the outbreaks, VTB began preparing for a deal to purchase a 5% share in “WB Bank.” This move seemed quite logical because VTB has 30 million clients, while “WB Bank” operates with a base of over 80 million, upon which the parties agreed to develop VTB’s retail business.
On July 17 (right before the drones visited Elektrostal and Kotovsk!), the Bank of Russia registered an additional share issue for VTB (with a maximum of 547.5 billion rubles, and VTB plans to raise 314 billion), with placement planned for August. The goal is to buy the mentioned 5% of “WB Bank” and invest in business development.
The nuance is that the deal’s configuration remains opaque, and what will be ultimately achieved is unclear. There is a hypothesis that VTB began entering “WB Bank’s” capital to better control its debtor’s real metrics and protect its interests if necessary.
Real numbers matter because, for example, the marketing statement of 310 billion investments is reflected in the financial statements only as 119 billion investments in new logistics complexes and other assets. The rest are financial-bureaucratic maneuvers within the system.
When Wildberries warehouses started burning, VTB leadership, maintaining a poker face, stated that they would support new partners with loans if necessary. The required support volume is unknown. Since the ultimate damage is unclear, it is difficult to estimate from the outside because the nominal area of the burned warehouses might differ from the operational ones, as some complexes were being completed and put into operation. Half or a third of the nominal could have burned.
According to available information, by July 31, around 1 million square meters of Wildberries’ logistics center areas were destroyed or damaged. Out of 5.2 million, which they declared by the end of the year. They have built some more this year. So, 15-20% of the company’s logistics space has been destroyed. At the current pace, it could be 40-50% by fall.
The turnover is plunging into the abyss, sellers are fleeing, debts are becoming toxic…
8. Considering that VTB is a systemically important state bank, there is no doubt that the Russian government will find a way to formally inject it with money, including for supporting Wildberries.
However, firstly, this would be a bad signal for Russia’s remaining partners, primarily China and India.
Secondly, frictions may begin within Russia.
For instance, not long ago, the extremely influential head of “Rostec,” Sergey Chemezov, complained to Putin that defense enterprises lack investments. And “Rostec” has no money. There is no opportunity to develop and increase production, including weapons.
If suddenly the need arises to conjure a conditional trillion for VTB to solve the situation with Wildberries, Chemezov might say: hold on! Why conjure a trillion to save the trade in Chinese goods rather than for the production of military equipment? Who is more valuable to the motherland?
Among other things, VTB is burdened with financing a number of large infrastructure projects with questionable economics. For example, the construction of a new cyclopean shipyard in the Far East. The same stern uncle Patrushev will not understand if initiatives in his area of responsibility fail.
Thirdly, VTB is periodically tasked with buying out OFZs and other measures to prop up Putin. It could crack.
In summary.
Apart from the obvious threats like the collapse of small and medium-sized businesses, job cuts, and the negative impact on Russia’s macroeconomic indicators, the Wildberries stall could create additional problems for VTB and other creditors, which will consequently lead to additional costs in the form of failed important programs, and generate conflicts within the elite. Moreover, for 80 million users, there will be a certain impulse: the authorities failed.
Therefore, for us, what’s more important is not so much the volume of burnt warehouses, as the outflow of active sellers and the drop in turnover. It will be interesting to follow the news on how and with what Wildberries will try to maintain its framework.
9. What other differences are there between Wildberries and “Ozon”?
In the structure of the Ozon group, there is a bank that came under EU sanctions in July 2026 (“VB Bank” as well). Formally, the marketplace is now unprofitable, but the bank already generates profit. Ozon’s bank is 4 times larger in assets than Wildberries’ bank.
But the main thing is not even this: Ozon’s bank operates exactly like a bank, earning from banking products. Meanwhile, “VB Bank” is more like a marketplace’s cash register, accepting and storing money. Therefore, it has an uncharacteristically (many times greater) bank profitability.
In the context of fires.
Wildberries owns the premises through the parent LLC “RVB” or subsidiary regional companies. So, in case of a fire, the company’s asset, built with an expensive loan, gets destroyed.
Ozon directs its main investments into the equipment of logistics centers and warehouses (equipment, computers, etc.). The buildings themselves are usually rented or leased. So in the event of a fire, there will be damage, but of a different nature. Over 10 years, Ozon has increased the used space by about 70 times! The downside is clear – looming rental payments.
Wildberries’ debt consists of unsecured bank loans, while Ozon’s is secured by stock lease agreements.
In conclusion. Both businesses are operational. Wildberries appears more vulnerable to kinetic sanctions. The total number of large logistics facilities for both companies is about 500, with around 400 within reach.
Both companies will be torn to shreds by the end of the year if Putin decides to go to war in the winter…
