Today — Dobropillia (Pokrovske) direction.
The enemy (Russian forces) continues the offensive in the operational zone of its troop grouping “Center”, in the strips of its 2nd and 51st combined arms armies (CAA), in order to reach the main forces near the approaches to Dobropillia from the south and southeast.
The advance rate of the enemy’s forward units and subdivisions in this direction has significantly slowed over the past two weeks, but its command continues to pull additional forces and means to the first echelon of both armies. In particular, the movement of several assault infantry units to the front line on the left flank of the 51st CAA (Biletske — Novotoretske — Chervonyi Lyman — Rodynske district) has been noted, as well as the establishment of additional positions and strong points in the strip of the 2nd CAA in the Hryshyne area and on the northwestern outskirts of Pokrovske.
The enemy is quite actively “tightening” its UAV groups into the battle orders of the forward units and subdivisions of both armies, diligently establishing additional communication and relay points in these zones, as well as positions for electronic warfare equipment.
1. Currently, the main forces of the 2nd and 51st CAA, as well as part of the forces of the 41st CAA, are taking part in the offensive on Dobropillia, in particular:
51st CAA:
– 1st Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (SMRB);
– 5th SMRB;
– 9th SMRB;
– 110th SMRB;
– 114th SMRB;
– 132nd SMRB;
– 14th Separate Artillery Brigade (SAB);
– and up to 6 separate rifle regiments (SRR) and up to 5 separate rifle battalions (SRB).
2nd CAA:
– 27th Motorized Rifle Division (MRD) – 433rd, 506th, and 589th Motorized Rifle Regiments (MRR);
– 15th and 30th SMRB.
41st CAA:
– 35th SMRB;
– 55th SMRB;
– 74th SMRB.
It is likely that several units from at least two of its brigades are involved in the offensive on Dobropillia in the 2nd CAA strip.
In addition, earlier in the 2nd CAA strip, the presence of several units of the 90th Tank Division (TD) was noted. However, recently they have not been recorded there. It is entirely possible that they were regrouped back to the Novopavlivka direction or to the 29th CAA strip of the “East” troop grouping, where the Ukrainian Armed Forces recently conducted a number of counter-attacking actions.
2. Current Situation in the Dobropil area is characterized by two main factors:
– The enemy’s preparation for the next stage of sharply increasing the intensity of their attacks/assaults in the tactical zone.
– Partial regrouping of their forces and resources in the operational-tactical zone, specifically, it seems that in the sector of their 51st Combined Arms Army, the enemy conducted a series of rotational actions, and in the sector of the 2nd Combined Arms Army, they continue to accumulate a significant amount of assault infantry in their forward units and subdivisions.
Meanwhile, the command of both Russian armies continues to attempt to break through the defense system of the Armed Forces of Ukraine on a tactical level, acting mainly by the “penetration” method of small infantry (assault) groups in several tactical directions and sectors, even despite its low effectiveness and accompanying significant losses of their assault infantry. Specifically:
– In the area of Sofiivka, the enemy tried to advance along the Kazennyi Torets River in a northeastern direction towards Toretsk. However, their assault group (up to 8-10 people) suddenly stumbled upon hidden positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, was forced into close combat, and as a result, suffering losses in killed and wounded, was forced to retreat to their initial positions.
– In the directions of Novoe Shakhove – Vilne and Shakhove – Kucheryv Yar, the enemy also made several attempts to carry out assault operations with several assault groups simultaneously (4-6 people each) but without success. Following clashes with advanced Ukrainian infantry groups (correspondingly south of Kucheryv Yar \ “Karyery” and in the area of the so-called “Dachas of Vilne”), suffering losses, they were forced to retreat to their initial positions.
To understand the situation, in the area north of Novoe Shakhove, a Russian assault group of 6 people was almost completely destroyed (up to 5 people killed), south of Kucheryv Yar of 5 Russian attackers on Ukrainian positions, 1 was killed immediately, three were seriously wounded (2 of them were likely later eliminated by drones).
– An attempt by the enemy to advance in the direction of Ivanivka — Novyi Donbas with two assault groups also ended in vain for them with additional losses — 4 Russian “stormtroopers” were destroyed in the area of Ivanivka, another was captured on the southern outskirts of Novyi Donbas, and 4 managed to escape to Dorozhne.
– In turn, the Ukrainian Armed Forces delivered a massive strike on Dorozhne itself with tactical drones (of 7 Russians identified at the positions, at least 4 were killed and another wounded).
In the same area, the enemy made another attempt to consolidate in Biletske. An assault group of four people, moving along the planting from Dorozhne, managed to penetrate the northeastern outskirts of Biletske (the area of East and Lipova streets) and even found shelter there. However, they were still discovered and blown up from the air (by drones) along with the shelter.
– The enemy is also making similar attempts in the directions of Rodynske — Shevchenko, and Sukhetske — Vodyanske, where quite active movement of small infantry (assault) groups of the enemy occurs, which in some cases manage to “penetrate” into the battle formations of forward Ukrainian units, although these groups are regularly attacked by Ukrainian tactical drones (in just one day in the area of the “Biletska” mine, on the outskirts of Rodynske, and in the area of the “Vodyanska” mine and its surroundings, the Ukrainian Armed Forces destroyed up to 7 Russian “infiltrators”).
However, some Russian groups and even individual soldiers managed to infiltrate and establish themselves between Biletsky and Krasnoyarsk, in the Svitlo area and southeast of Shevchenko.
Moreover, in the areas of Zapovitne, Toretsko-Mayak, Chervonyi Lyman, it is evident that the command of the enemy’s 51st Combined Arms Army continues to actively accumulate assault infantry and motorization means (ATVs, buggies, motorcycles, etc.). A very active movement of rather significant enemy infantry groups ranging from 10-11 to 30-45 people is observed there.
It is clear that the command of this Russian army is trying quite actively to bring fresh forces and means to the front line (for example, during the day, several Russian infantry groups with a total of 65-70 people moved north through just one Novoekonomichne). Also, the enemy is actively setting up new artillery positions.
– The same measures are likely being carried out by the command of the Russian 2nd Combined Arms Army on its right flank (in the direction of Pokrovsk — Hryshyne, where regular movement from Pokrovsk to the Hryshyne and Novooleksandrivka areas of enemy infantry groups of 10-12 people each has been observed for a week). However, their attempts to advance northward from Novooleksandrivka towards Dobropillia have so far been unsuccessful.
It is evident that in the near future, an increase in pressure from the Russian 2nd and 51st Combined Arms Armies on their adjacent flanks is expected, where they will jointly attempt to reach the Dobropillia — Vodyanske line with the main forces of their advanced units and subdivisions.
In this sense, maintaining the flank areas (Serhiyivka and Biletske) by Ukrainian Armed Forces can undoubtedly play a rather important tactical role. So far, the enemy has not been able to break through to the Serhiyivka area (in the 41st Combined Arms Army sector) or fully take control of the Biletske area (in the 51st Combined Arms Army sector). Therefore, the enemy is forced to concentrate its forces and means intended for the breakthrough to Dobropillia in a rather narrow “wedge” stretching from Pokrovsk to Novooleksandrivka, which is clearly being “punctured” by Ukrainian Armed Forces from both flanks.
However, the rather persistent attempts of the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army to break through from Rodynske towards Svitlo and Shevchenko, as well as the regular attacking actions of the 41st Combined Arms Army in the direction of Udachne — Serhiyivka, clearly indicate that the enemy’s command adequately assesses the tactical situation on its 2nd Combined Arms Army’s right flank and is trying to “turn” it to its advantage.
Therefore, in my subjective opinion, in the near future the advanced parts and subdivisions of the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army will try to become significantly more active, especially on their left flank, which borders the 2nd Combined Arms Army sector.
In this case, the significance of a hypothetical enemy breakthrough to Serhiyivka in the 41st Combined Arms Army sector may somewhat decrease, which may lead to some of its forces and means being reused by the “Center” operational grouping in the 2nd and 51st Combined Arms Armies sectors.
3. In operational terms, the desire of the Russian command to maintain and even intensify its actions towards Dobropillia is quite understandable and evident.
In the framework of the Russian hypothetical Sloviansk-Kramatorsk operational offensive operation, the possible advancement of the Russian “Center” operational grouping to the Dobropillia area signifies a rather significant increase in the depth of operational coverage of this agglomeration from the south. Especially in the context of the conclusion of the battles for Kostiantynivka.
In fact, this will significantly and substantially ease the upcoming battles for Druzhkivka for the neighboring Russian “South” operational grouping (8th Combined Arms Army and 3rd Army Corps), and in a broader sense, allow them to protect their left flank from potential counteroffensive actions by the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
If the “Center” operational grouping troops capture Dobropillia and reach the Dobropillia-Kramatorsk road (approximately in the area of Novotroyitske), then the issue of further capturing Druzhkivka by the “South” forces and their advance to the near approaches to Kramatorsk from the south and southeast will essentially become solely a “technical” problem.
However, the real problem for the enemy lies not in this, but in the fact that they are still unable to solve all these operational-tactical tasks in the operational zones of their two groupings (“South” and “Center”) more or less SIMULTANEOUSLY, which is likely anticipated by the plan (intention) of this Sloviansk-Kramatorsk offensive operation. They simply lack the forces for this (evident from the losses of Russian troops in the battles for Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad, Chasiv Yar and its outskirts, as well as south of Kostiantynivka, where it is obvious that both groupings burned a significant part of their operational reserves just in spring).
Therefore, they are forced to do all this “in turn” — first capture Kostiantynivka (and meanwhile, the battles for it are far from over), only then will they probably have to “cut” the tactical salient in the Chasiv Yar area (without which a successful advance to Kramatorsk is unlikely), then capture Druzhkivka (at which point the advance on Dobropillia will also be necessary), etc. It is quite possible that summer and fall may not be enough for the Russian command to accomplish all this. After all, I am not mentioning the assault and capture of Kramatorsk and Sloviansk themselves.
On the other hand, the offensive actions of Russian troops towards Dobropillia are not so “critical” in operation for the entire Sloviansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration. Since Dobropillia itself is still somewhat aside from the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk salient. Yes, increasing the depth of the coverage of Kramatorsk from the south is very desirable for the enemy, but obviously not entirely mandatory and without alternatives. Especially in the context of the actual availability of the necessary forces and means for such “large-scale” actions.
However, if the Russian command gets the idea of redistributing efforts from Dobropillia to offensives on both banks of the Kazenny Torets River towards Druzhkivka, the situation may change drastically. In other words, they may try to turn their 51st Combined Arms Army from the Dobropillia direction to Druzhkivka to significantly reduce the time needed to “creep” towards Kramatorsk from the south.
Although this may prove to be just a “formal” decision. Today, the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army is actively preparing for the next stage of its “breakthrough to Dobropillia” (to which it is much closer than to Druzhkivka), for which it ALREADY requires appropriate “pauses” in its active offensive actions for various rotations, regroupings, and accumulations. Moreover, the further it goes, the longer these “pauses” become, and the need for them arises more frequently. At the same time, the current pace of advancement (offensive) of this army, to put it mildly, cannot be called impressive.
In terms of organizational structure, the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army (CAA) appears to be one of the most powerful armies among the armed forces of the Russian Federation. Yes, this is the same former “Donetsk” 1st Army Corps of the DPR. The army inherited a very, very large number of infantry from it (I would even say an excessive amount of infantry), but very little modern heavy weaponry and military equipment. In fact, this army is a kind of “assault version (modification)” of a regular Russian combined arms army (it is no coincidence that the Russian command plans to deploy so-called “assault motorized rifle divisions” within it). It was through its “separate rifle regiments and battalions” that the Russian military command “processed” a significant (greater?) part of the male population of the occupied Donbas. Similarly, through the 3rd CAA (the former 2nd Army Corps of the LPR), where there are also a number of “meat processing plants” under the vague name “separate rifle regiments and battalions of the mobilization reserve.”
Currently, both armies (the 51st and 3rd CAA) are operating on the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk operational direction. One (3rd CAA) is advancing on Sloviansk, the second (51st CAA) is attempting to advance on Dobropillia. I quite assume that the military-political leadership of the Russian Federation, with its tendency towards symbolism, has ALREADY assigned them (as “Donbas-origin” armies) the main role in the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk offensive operation, aimed at the so-called “liberation” of the last Donbas agglomeration under the control of the “Kyiv regime.” Well, to use their forces to “hoist the flag” and do everything else that matters for propagandistic fervor.
The question is whether they will reach this “hoisting” in a more or less combat-ready state, as the way they are currently used by the Russian command cannot be deemed reasonable in either an operational or any other sense.
Based on all the above, the redirection of the 51st CAA from Dobropillia to Kramatorsk (and initially, most likely to Druzhkivka) is quite probable. And we need to be prepared for this.
Photo: 10th Separate Mountain Assault Brigade “Edelweiss”
