Kostiantyn Yelisieiev / Mirror Weekly
The opening of the first negotiation cluster “Foundations” signaled the official start of real negotiations regarding Ukraine’s accession to the European Union. But this is just the beginning of our European integration marathon, not the finish line. Everything is just starting.
From the stage of political declarations and technical preparation, Ukraine and the EU are transitioning to a systematic work phase to meet the criteria and standards of membership. It’s not just about whether Ukraine enacts the right laws that comply with the spirit and letter of EU standards and criteria. The main question will be: how effectively and efficiently these laws are implemented, how institutions function, whether there is sustainability in state policy, and whether the state can operate according to EU rules both in wartime and peacetime.
After the opening of Cluster 1, the further logic of the process is as follows: Ukraine must fulfill roadmaps and interim indicators in areas such as the rule of law, democratic institutions, public administration, the judicial system, anti-corruption policy, public procurement, financial control, and statistics. These interim indicators have been officially handed over to the Ukrainian side, and Ukraine’s progress will be measured by their fulfillment not only in the “Foundations” cluster but in all other negotiation clusters.
The peculiarity of the first, conditionally speaking, “democratic” cluster is that it opens first and closes last. The essence of this approach is that the candidate country must demonstrate effective adherence to democratic standards throughout the negotiation process. Since negotiations traditionally last more than one electoral cycle in the candidate country, this is also a test of the continuity of the democratic system. In other words, the EU will check whether the commitment to the European goal depends on the personality of a specific president or a specific parliamentary majority, or whether it is truly a nationwide platform.
It is expected that in the near future, possibly as early as July, the remaining five negotiation clusters—internal market, competitiveness, green transformation, resources and agriculture, as well as external relations—could be opened.
The pace of negotiations will primarily depend on Ukraine’s progress in implementing reforms both in legislation and execution. The key criterion will be implementation, not just the adoption of laws. An example is the Lviv Declaration of Kachka—Kos, approved in December 2025, which outlined ten priority reforms in the area of the rule of law and democratic institutions. In over half a year, Ukraine managed to fulfill only a limited portion of these commitments — and even those with considerable political leniency from partners. Instead of fulfilling the necessary tasks and moving forward, the Ukrainian side often loudly demanded membership as of January 1, 2027, justifying this by the war. However, political and psychological blackmail is a flawed strategy on the path to EU membership. This approach reflects a dangerous misunderstanding of the essence of negotiations: we perceive them as fulfilling the EU’s wishes, rather than as a program of necessary transformations in Ukrainian society, economy, and politics.
Ukraine’s membership in the EU is primarily about reforms in Ukraine, not just about political decisions of European capitals. The reforms themselves do not guarantee an automatic political decision, but a political decision cannot substitute for reforms or even emerge without them. Therefore, this process is interconnected and interdependent: Ukraine must demonstrate the quality of its changes, while the EU must show political readiness to respond to this progress.
The accession negotiation process must be based on several principles. The first is “merit-based progress,” meaning that the pace of negotiations should depend on Ukraine’s actual achievements in meeting the indicators. The second is inclusiveness. European integration is not a project of a single party or government but a national transformation platform that should involve all political forces, civil society, business, experts, local government, and citizens. The third is the EU’s own readiness to accept new member states. Therefore, alongside Ukrainian reforms, discussions on reforming the European Union should also be intensified.
The main risks to Ukraine’s advancement toward membership can be conditionally divided into internal and external. On the Ukrainian side, one of the main risks is a lack of internal political unity, which can undermine the effectiveness of legislative work and the implementation of European standards. Eurointegration legislation must be maximally protected from political manipulation. It should stand above internal political competition and cannot become an instrument of political struggle. Another serious risk is a lack of integrity regarding the eurointegration process itself. If decisions that actually contradict European principles are pushed under European slogans, it will quickly destroy partner trust. The EU will evaluate not only formal compliance with laws but also the political context of their adoption, the quality of procedures, inclusiveness, and their real impact on institutions.
A separate challenge is the inadequate informational and explanatory work with Ukrainian business and civil society. European integration cannot be a closed bureaucratic process. People and businesses need to understand what exactly is changing, what advantages it offers, what risks arise, and how to make the most efficient use of new opportunities. Without such communication, even the right reforms may encounter misunderstanding, resistance, or fatigue.
The destructive consequences of the war cannot be ignored either. They will require significant financial, administrative, and time resources to bring infrastructure, economy, social systems, and state administration to an acceptable membership level. However, the war cannot be a universal explanation for not implementing reforms. On the contrary, it makes quality institutions even more necessary.
From the EU’s side, the main risk is the lack of reform within the Union itself. Ukraine is a large country in terms of territory, population, agricultural potential, and security significance. Its entry will inevitably affect the EU budget, agricultural policy, cohesion funds, voting balance, institutional architecture, and mechanisms for protecting against democratic backsliding of new members. If the EU does not advance in its own reform, this could become an objective obstacle to Ukraine’s accession.
The second external risk is the veto right of individual member states. The enlargement process remains politically sensitive, and individual countries may use negotiations to advance their own interests in bilateral relations. This may pertain to agriculture, national minorities, economic competition, historical issues or the domestic political agenda within EU countries themselves. Changes in governments in key member states can also affect the pace and atmosphere of negotiations.
There is another risk that should not be ignored: the potential change in Russia’s position regarding Ukraine’s EU membership. For a long time, Moscow focused on blocking Ukraine’s NATO membership, but given Ukraine’s strategic rapprochement with the EU, it cannot be excluded that Russia may attempt to politically attack the European path as well. The problem is not that Russia will have a formal veto right, as it does not. The problem is that some European political forces remain sensitive to Russia’s position and may use it as an argument to slow down Ukraine’s accession.
One should be very cautious about any specific dates for Ukraine’s accession to the European Union. Signing the Accession Treaty is not just documentary confirmation that Ukraine has met the necessary criteria and standards. It is a much more complex political and legal process. In fact, the Accession Treaty is a kind of summary of many years of negotiations. It records not only the candidate country’s readiness for membership and its compliance with criteria. It also defines transition periods, special conditions, possible exceptions, and reservations that individual member states may insist on. In other words, it is not only the formalization of success but also the formalization of compromises reached with all partners in the European Union.
After the negotiations are concluded, consent from the European Parliament, a unanimous decision by the EU Council, the signing of the treaty, and ratification by all member states and Ukraine are required. This stage alone might add another one and a half to two years. Therefore, the realistic window for signing and ratification of the Accession Treaty is approximately 2030–2032. Achieving this sooner is possible only with very strong EU political decisions and extremely high-quality reforms in Ukraine.
A separate risk is the interim format of integration without full membership. Various models of phased integration are already being discussed within the EU: participation in EU programs and policies, observer status, early access to specific sectors, involvement in security and defense policy without voting rights. These ideas themselves are not negative. On the contrary, they might provide Ukraine with practical benefits even before accession.
In this context, it is essential to note the impetus that German Chancellor Friedrich Merz has given to discussions in the EU regarding expansion and Ukraine’s future membership. It is important that Germany clearly states the ultimate goal — Ukraine’s full EU membership — and confirms its readiness to work towards achieving it. However, the problem arises when the interim format begins to turn into a replacement for accession rather than an acceleration tool. Therefore, Ukraine’s position must be very clear: not “associate membership” instead of accession, but accelerated pre-accession integration on the path to full membership. Any interim format must be legally linked to full membership, have clear criteria for transition to the next stage, real rights, resources, and reform commitments. It cannot become a political “ceiling” for Ukraine.
Ukraine must negotiate on two levels simultaneously. Technically — to meet the criteria as quickly and efficiently as possible. Politically — not to allow the EU to replace the prospect of full membership with a comfortable interim structure and to build complex multilayered compromises with European capitals.
Overall, today we must think not only about when we will cross the finish line and whether we will get stuck halfway. We must think about how to overcome each next kilometer of this path efficiently without losing Ukraine’s long-term interests. Then joining the EU will be a true historic victory for Ukraine.
