Hungary, long considered a “safe haven” for right-wing populism in Europe, is entering a zone of unprecedented political turbulence. After almost a decade and a half of Viktor Orbán’s domination and his Fidesz party, the foundation of his power has begun to show deep cracks. A combination of factors, from a toxic friendship with the Kremlin to internal decay of the party elite, makes the likelihood of Orbán losing in the upcoming elections not just a hypothesis but the most probable scenario of events.
The course toward an “illiberal democracy” declared by Orbán has reached its logical limit. The creation of the “Office for Sovereignty Protection” (Szuverenitásvédelmi Hivatal) and the systematic destruction of independent media (through the KESMA holding) have turned Hungary into a country with a “hybrid regime of electoral autocracy,” as officially classified by the European Parliament.
However, this concentration of power has become a trap. Over-centralization has deprived the system of flexibility. Orbán no longer receives objective information, surrounded by loyalists afraid to report on the real state of affairs. This has led to a series of catastrophic mistakes: from inadequate assessment of inflation (the highest in the EU) to failed communication on the pardon of an accomplice to a pedophile, which brought hundreds of thousands of protesters to the streets in 2024.
Orbán’s foreign policy, oriented towards Moscow, has turned from “pragmatic balancing” into an existential threat to the country’s future. Hungary finds itself in complete isolation within the EU and NATO.
Constantly blocking aid to Ukraine and demonstrative visits to Moscow, such as the “peace mission,” perceived in Europe as an act of betrayal, have cost Orbán allies even in Poland and the “Visegrád Four.”
The economic price for loyalty to Putin is enormous: billions of euros from EU funds remain frozen due to rule of law issues. For the average Hungarian, “friendship with the Kremlin” today is associated not with cheap gas but with a lack of European investments and rising prices.
The most dangerous symptom for the regime is the distancing of part of the party elite and technocrats from the leader. The phenomenon of Peter Magyar and his party TISZA has clearly shown that within the “NER” system, the so-called National Cooperation System, a powerful demand for change has matured. Magyar was flesh of Fidesz, and his success indicates that the moderate wing of the party and business circles no longer want to associate with the radicalizing and “bronzing” leader.
Aware of the real threat of losing, Orbán’s apparatus increasingly resorts to manipulation. This involves not only classic “gerrymandering” but also the direct use of administrative resources. According to OSCE reports and investigations by Hungarian human rights defenders, the latest elections recorded: mass voter bribery in poor rural areas; use of state body databases for targeted Fidesz propaganda; creation of “fictitious addresses” for voting, or “electoral tourism” from border regions.
However, as the experience of other countries in the region shows, when a protest wave reaches a critical mass, even a well-tuned machine of falsifications stops working.
Finally, the psychological aspect cannot be ignored. Observers note a serious personal transformation in Orbán. His loss of adequacy alienates the urban middle class, which wants to see a modern European leader at the head of the country, not an outdated autocrat stuck in the geopolitical battles of the past century.
The likelihood of Viktor Orbán’s defeat today is higher than it has been in the past 14 years. A combination of internal division, foreign policy toxicity, and economic incompetence makes his regime extremely vulnerable. Hungary stands on the brink of change, and no falsifications can hide the fact that Orbán’s time has run out.
