Information on the current losses of Russia due to sanctions as of 12.04.2026.
1. The Russian space sector has effectively acknowledged the loss of its position among the world leaders.
– At the Russian space forum, it was stated that the country is no longer part of the group of leading space nations. According to industry representatives, there are no manned flights to deep space, including the Moon, planned for Russia in the next ten years.
– The only large project currently being realistically considered is the creation of a new Russian orbital station after the completion of participation in the ISS.
– It is also acknowledged that the country is lagging behind leading nations and is forced to seek unconventional solutions to partially bridge this gap. Launch statistics also indicate a significant decline in the position of the Russian space program.
– By the end of 2025, only 17 space rocket launches were conducted, the same number as the previous year. This is effectively the level of small space nations: approximately the same number of launches was conducted by New Zealand.
– For comparison, the number of launches in the USA increased from 145 to 181, and China increased them from 68 to 91. Thus, Russia is lagging behind the United States by more than ten times and behind China by more than five times.
– Excluding the pandemic period, the current level of Russian launches is the lowest since 1961, the time of the first human flight into space. This underscores the scale of the technological and industrial lag of the Russian space sector, which is gradually losing its status as one of the key players in the global space industry.
2. Russia continues to lose positions in the field of scientific research and development.
– According to recent estimates, the level of science funding in the country has fallen below the indicators of several states that previously lagged significantly in terms of economy size and technological development.
– Domestic expenditures on research and development in Russia amount to 0.97% of GDP. This is lower than in Malaysia (1.01% of GDP), Egypt (1.03% of GDP), and Lithuania (1.05% of GDP).
– Thus, the Russian economy spends a smaller share of resources on scientific and technological development than several countries that, just a few decades ago, were considered peripheral in the global scientific system.
– The gap with world leaders appears even more pronounced. The share of spending on science in Israel exceeds 6.3% of GDP, more than six times that of Russia. In South Korea, this figure is about 5% of GDP, in Taiwan — almost 4% of GDP. Developed countries in Europe, as well as the USA and Japan, spend approximately three to three and a half times more on research than Russia.
– The situation is worsened by a sharp reduction in government support for civil science. Budget expenditures on it have fallen to 0.36% of GDP, the lowest level in at least the last fifteen years. For comparison, in 2010, the state allocated 0.51% of GDP to scientific research, in 2013 — 0.58% of GDP.
– Even in 2021, before the full-scale war against Ukraine began, this figure was 0.47% of GDP, after which it decreased by about a quarter.
– Such a decline in science funding indicates structural degradation of the scientific and technological base of the Russian economy. Amidst increasing military spending and international isolation, the country is gradually losing opportunities for innovation development and increasingly lagging behind global technological centers.
3. Non-payments in the Russian economy have risen to the highest point since 2008.
– In Russia, business payment discipline is sharply deteriorating amid an economic slowdown and high interest rates. According to Rosstat, the share of overdue receivables has reached its highest level since the global financial crisis.
– The total volume of receivables in 2025 changed little, amounting to 123.8 trillion rubles (compared to 123 trillion the previous year). Meanwhile, overdue debt increased by a quarter — from 6.1 to 7.7 trillion rubles.
– As a result, the share of overdue payments rose to 10.3% from 8.5% in 2024. This is the highest figure since 2008 — the period of the global financial crisis, after which Russia’s GDP in 2009 fell by almost 8%.
– The worsening of the situation began in mid-2024 against the backdrop of an economic slowdown. Simultaneously, creditor debt is also increasing — debts to suppliers and contractors rose from 48.9 to 50.1 trillion rubles; the share of overdue amounts in them grew from 6.9% to 8.2%. The Central Bank notes a change in business behavior: companies are increasingly refusing payment deferrals and switching to prepayment due to non-payment risks.
– The key reason is the deterioration of financial conditions for enterprises. The total financial result of companies in 2025 decreased to 27.1 trillion rubles, which is 4% less in nominal terms and, taking inflation into account, almost 13%.
– The increase in non-payments indicates growing systemic problems in the Russian economy and raises the risks of chain insolvency crises in the corporate sector.
4. Russia strengthens control over foreign assets: CanPack business placed under “external management.”
– Russia has effectively nationalized the Russian business of the international aluminum can producer CanPack, despite its declared intent to improve relations with the USA.
– The company, owned by a Pennsylvania holding, had been operating in Russia for almost 30 years, capturing up to 40% of the market. The value of its Russian business is estimated at around $700 million.
– According to Putin’s decree dated December 31, 2025, the company’s assets were placed under state “external management,” which means a de facto loss of control over 100% of the shares.
– CanPack management claims they have been completely removed from operational control since mid-January. The company’s CEO, Peter Giorgi, noted that he currently remains only a nominal shareholder without any real influence on the business. Similar measures were applied to the Russian unit of the Danish insulation materials manufacturer, Rockwool.
– Experts view these steps as part of a broader Kremlin policy to redistribute foreign assets in favor of the state or affiliated structures.
– Moscow is trying to tighten control over profitable and strategic enterprises while signaling to foreign businesses the risks of operating in the Russian market. This is not an isolated case — dozens of companies could face similar pressure.
– Despite this, in some cases, US-related assets are treated more cautiously, due to the Kremlin’s desire to maintain potential dialogue with Washington. As of April 2026, control over the Russian assets of CanPack has not been returned to the company.
– Additionally, it is reported that the Russian division of the company may have financially supported structures involved in funding the war against Ukraine. The situation indicates further state intervention in Russia’s economy and increased risks for foreign investors.
5. Construction stores in Russia begin to close due to declining demand, rising costs, and worsening housing market conditions.
– One of the largest construction networks, “Construction Yard,” closed 98 outlets by the end of 2025, reducing the total number of stores by 23% to 322.
– The presence of other players has also decreased: the network of former OBI hypermarkets, now operating under the “Domlenta” brand, reduced the number of stores by 12% to 23. Overall, the home improvement market shows a decline: in 2025, total sales decreased by 2% to 1.15 trillion rubles. The largest player, “Leman Pro” (formerly “Leroy Merlin”), saw revenue drop by 6% to 550 billion rubles, while OBI structures saw a 10% drop to 25.2 billion rubles.
– Market participants explain the situation as a decline in customer activity, particularly from businesses and professional clients. The housing construction stagnation, rising construction material prices, and falling real incomes are simultaneously pressuring the sector.
– This indicates a further deterioration in the Russian construction sector, which is beginning to affect related industries.
6. It is becoming increasingly difficult for Russia to repair military transport aircraft.
– As of August 2025, approximately 368 aircraft of the “An” family (An-12, An-26, An-72) were operated in Russia by the Russian Ministry of Defense, Rosguard, and FSB aviation. Of these, 143 required repairs.
– The situation regarding the overhaul of these aircraft is considered complex. A key issue is the lack of production of necessary parts, assemblies, and components in Russia, complicating repair work within established timelines.
– This creates systemic risks for maintaining the airworthiness of a significant portion of the military transport aviation fleet and limits its full utilization capabilities.
7. American intelligence records China’s preparation for possible arms supplies to Iran amid a fragile Middle East truce.
– This includes, in particular, the transfer of portable anti-aircraft missile systems (MANPADS), which may be delivered “within the next few weeks.” According to sources, Beijing is attempting to disguise shipments by redirecting them through third countries to conceal their origin.
– These systems have already posed a serious threat to low-altitude aviation during the recent U.S.-Israeli operation and could be used by Iran if the truce breaks. Intelligence also indicates that Chinese companies continue to supply Iran with dual-use technologies, despite sanctions.
– This allows Tehran to increase its military potential and improve, among other things, navigation systems. China is not interested in open involvement in the conflict but aims to maintain its status as a key partner of Iran, on whose energy resources it heavily depends.
– At the same time, Beijing will likely position such supplies as “defensive” to minimize political risks.
– Meanwhile, according to intelligence, Iran may use the ceasefire to replenish arms supplies with the support of external partners, creating additional risks of escalation.
Photo: Occupier media
