Information on current Russian losses due to sanctions as of 04.04.2026.
1. Revenues from oil and gas to the Russian federal budget continue to decline sharply, showing systemic decline for the fourth consecutive month.
– In March, oil and gas revenues decreased by 43% year-on-year — to 617 billion rubles. Key sources of income continue to slump.
– Revenues from the mineral extraction tax fell by 47% — to 442.9 billion rubles, and export duties decreased by 23%.
– The decline is prolonged: in December, oil and gas revenues were 44% lower year-on-year, in January — 50%, in February — 44%.
– The poor March results are explained by the low prices for Russian oil in February, when Urals was trading at around $44.6 per barrel.
– Although at the end of March quotes rose sharply amid geopolitical escalation and almost reached $96 per barrel, this effect will only be observed in April’s revenues. The current dynamic indicates high budget vulnerability to energy price fluctuations and income base instability.
2. Russia’s key oil terminals on the Baltic Sea — Ust-Luga and Primorsk — have been unable to fully receive and process cargo for the second week after a series of Ukrainian drone attacks.
– Port infrastructure was damaged, with at least five strikes on Ust-Luga over approximately 10 days, effectively paralyzing export operations.
– Since March 22, Primorsk has not been accepting diesel for shipment. Due to the blocking of Baltic routes, Russian companies are forced to urgently seek alternatives.
– Options include redirecting flows through Vysotsk in the Gulf of Finland or the port of Taman on the Black Sea. However, these routes have limited capacity or require significantly more expensive rail logistics.
– Export disruptions and parallel problems at refineries may lead to a reduction in oil production in Russia, as companies physically cannot export products in usual volumes.
3. The liquid part of the Russian National Welfare Fund decreased in March due to falling gold prices and ruble strengthening.
– The total volume of the NWF decreased to 13.4 trillion rubles (minus about 135 billion for the month), which corresponds to 5.7% of projected GDP. Liquid assets placed in Central Bank accounts fell to 3.89 trillion rubles or $47.84 billion compared to $51.8 billion in February. This is only 1.7% of GDP.
– In reserve structure, a decrease is also noted: funds in yuan fell to 185.2 billion from 188.1 billion, gold reserves — to 145.3 tons from 147.2 tons. Some rubles were additionally converted into yuan.
– In March, the Ministry of Finance sold gold and currency for 59.7 billion rubles to finance the budget deficit, directly affecting the decrease in the liquid part of the fund.
4. Russia’s largest truck manufacturer KamAZ is considering a return to a four-day work week from June 1 and reducing production due to a sharp drop in demand.
– According to the company, in January–February 2026, sales of heavy trucks in the Russian market fell by 40% year-on-year.
– Meanwhile, KamAZ itself reduced sales by 15% but increased its market share to 37%. The company acknowledges that weak market prospects and pressure from remaining imported Chinese machinery force them to revise production plans.
– This involves not only reducing production volumes but also possibly shortening the workweek by one day from the beginning of summer. This is essentially a signal of a deepening crisis in the freight segment: demand is falling faster than manufacturers can adapt, with even the market leader having to conserve resources and scale back production.
5. Around 20% of Russian developers risk being unable to manage debt loads due to a cash deficit, with about one-fifth of all housing under construction in Russia at risk.
– The main problem is the lack of funds in escrow accounts, which are the key source for repaying loans in project financing. Developers receive this money only after projects are completed, and they serve as collateral for bank loans.
– As of March 1, the average rate on such loans was 10.03%. The situation worsened sharply after the cancellation of mass preferential mortgages in July 2024: housing sales and lending slumped, and market mortgages effectively halted due to high rates.
– Meanwhile, debt obligations to banks remain, creating a liquidity gap, especially for low-margin, high-debt projects.
– Previously, the Russian government also estimated the bankruptcy risk at around 20% of developers, with a potential increase to over 30% if demand continues to fall.
– In February, one of Russia’s largest developers, Samolet, already sought state support but was refused.
