Volodymyr Zelensky wrote a letter to Donald Trump. After another Russian strike on Kyiv — again targeting markets, shopping centers, and residential areas — the President of Ukraine reached out to his American counterpart, requesting help to strengthen air defense.
So far, the response has been indirect — from U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth. Its essence boils down to something simple: we’ll help as much as we can. However, the capabilities seem to be limited right now. After the Middle Eastern crisis, American missile reserves are depleted, and time is needed to replenish them.
This logic is understandable. Theoretically.
But people in Kyiv cannot wait for the Pentagon to restock. They are living — or not surviving — under Russian attacks right now. We know well that Putin is not going to stop these attacks. Air terror has become one of his main tools in this war. Moreover, the Russian president is trying to turn a territorial war into a demographic one. He continues to hope that with each strike, Ukraine’s population will diminish, and large Ukrainian cities will cease to feel safe even for those who have not yet left their homes.
And here arises a question with an uncomfortable answer.
How did it happen that the most powerful army in the world, after several months of limited conflict in the Middle East, can no longer provide an ally with a sufficient number of air defense systems? If one theater of operations depletes resources so much, what will happen in the case of several simultaneous crises? And what will remain of the perception of American military might?
But alright. Let’s assume it’s like this.
What should Ukraine do then?
The answer exists, and it’s not new. I just have to repeat it over and over again.
Firstly, Europe. IRIS-T, SAMP/T, European-made Patriots — all these exist. The problem is not that these systems aren’t available. The problem is whether European countries are ready to transfer them to Ukraine quickly and in sufficient quantity. Sometimes there is such readiness. More often, it has to be fought for after each new strike on Ukrainian cities.
Secondly, domestic production. Ukraine is already creating drones and missiles under wartime conditions. This will not replace the Patriot, but it is a reality that needs to be scaled up. This requires technology, components, investments, and production cooperation with allies. Not just words of support.
And finally, the most important thing.
The best defense of Ukrainian cities is to destroy Russian capabilities to launch strikes. Factories, depots, logistical hubs, launch sites. Ukraine has been asking its partners about such capabilities for years. And this is what many in the West still fear due to concerns that with each new strike on Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odessa, or Dnipro become less convincing.
The paradox of this war is simple and brutal. The West provides Ukraine with a shield — and not always in sufficient quantity — but at the same time often restricts the ability to strike at the attacker. And then wonders why these attacks do not cease.
Zelensky’s letter was entirely logical. Hegseth’s response — predictable. But letters and responses are conversations, not a strategy.
Strategy begins where, after the next attempt to strike Kyiv, there is the possibility to thwart it.
And preferably before missiles fly towards Ukrainian cities again.
