David Cattler, CEPA / Translation by iPress
Senior Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis David Cattler believes that the familiar American strategic discourse dilemma—whether to focus on Europe or the Indo-Pacific region—is fundamentally flawed. He emphasizes that the adversaries of the US, namely Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, increasingly link the two theaters, while Washington continues to think in terms of separate regions. Russia’s war against Ukraine is the clearest evidence that these threats amplify each other rather than exist in isolation. Therefore, the US and NATO must integrate European and Indo-Pacific strategies, accelerate the integration of the defense industry, and enhance the focus on the political dimension of the confrontation with authoritarian states.
The False Premise of Strategic Choice
Over the past decade, American strategic discussions have revolved around one thesis: the United States supposedly has to decide which theater of operations to prioritize. China is named the main threat that defines the pace of defense planning, and therefore Washington should direct limited resources to the Indo-Pacific region. Europe, they say, remains important but can no longer be the center of gravity for American strategy.
This logic is understandable: China has the world’s second-largest economy and poses the most serious long-term challenge to the international order. However, this discussion rests on a false premise. Proponents of prioritizing the Asian theater argue that America must choose, but its adversaries do not make such a choice. They increasingly view both theaters as inseparable.
Russia’s War Against Ukraine as Evidence
It is Russia’s war against Ukraine that illustrated this thesis. Moscow’s defense-industrial base now largely depends on Iranian drones, North Korean munitions, and Chinese dual-purpose technologies. Beijing may not have crossed the line of direct military support, but Chinese companies supply crucial components that enable Russia to wage war. Additionally, Chinese military secretly participates in joint planning with Russia to weaken and destroy the Starlink satellite system. North Korea has used the conflict to deepen military cooperation with Moscow while testing new weapons systems and gaining additional leverage. Iran, in turn, has demonstrated how quickly technologies developed in one conflict can spread to another.
Mutual Reinforcement Without Formal Alliance
The strategic question is not whether Russia and China have formed a formal alliance. They have different interests and priorities. What matters is that their actions complement each other. Moscow distracts Western attention and military resources, Beijing provides economic and technological resources, and Iran and North Korea offer military support.
The consequences of this interaction extend far beyond Ukraine. China is closely observing the course of the war—not because Taiwan is Ukraine, but because the conflict provides insights into the cohesion of alliances, the effectiveness of sanctions, industrial mobilization, and the resilience of democracies. Russia, on the other hand, increasingly relies on connections that bolster China’s broader geopolitical positions. Ultimately, this forms an informal system of mutual reinforcement.
Outdated National Security Architecture
For decades, the American national security apparatus was organized geographically: unified combat commands, diplomatic bureaus, and alliances were formed to manage specific regions. This made sense when threats could mostly be contained within specific theaters. Today’s authoritarian rivals do not recognize these boundaries.
The challenge is not solely military. China and Russia collaborate in energy, critical minerals, space, cyber capabilities, and influence operations, while exploiting the vulnerabilities of democracies and shaping the international environment to favor authoritarian governance. Their strength lies not in centralized coordination, but in flexibility.
Prioritization Does Not Mean Neglecting Europe
This does not mean the US should abandon prioritization: strategic choices remain inevitable. Elbridge Colby from the Department of Defense and other experts are right in identifying China as the most serious long-term challenge to the international order. However, recognizing China as the primary threat guiding defense planning does not mean Europe automatically becomes a secondary theater with diminishing significance.
NATO serves as a useful reminder: the Alliance embodies a broader truth—the security of Europe, North America, and other regions is interconnected. This truth remains relevant.
The New Role of Europe
Europe’s role in the new strategic environment must change. European allies should assume greater responsibility for deterrence, accelerate defense production, and reduce critical dependencies. Merely increasing defense spending is not enough: Europe must develop the capability not only to defend itself but also to compete effectively.
At the same time, Washington should resist the temptation to present every strategic discussion as a rivalry between theaters. The choice between Europe and Asia is largely symptomatic of a deeper problem—the erosion of institutions capable of thinking across various regions and time frames.
Erosion of Strategic Thinking
At one time, the United States was able to combine military power, economic leverage, technological innovations, and alliance management into cohesive strategies. Today, too many political decisions are made situationally and fragmentarily, focusing on urgent crises. Governments struggle to cope with “meta-threats“ that transcend regions, domains, and bureaucratic structures. As a result, strategy is often reduced to false dichotomies: Europe or Asia, containment or competition, military strength or economic security.
The answer lies not in abandoning the definition of strategic priorities, but in organizing the power of democracies with an understanding of reality: these challenges increasingly reinforce one another.
Three Steps for Democracies
Firstly, the United States and NATO must reject the notion that strategic success requires choosing between Europe and Asia. They have sufficient economic resources, alliance networks, and military capabilities to counter multiple challenges simultaneously, provided they are well-organized. Policymakers should integrate European and Indo-Pacific strategies rather than viewing them as competing arenas. NATO’s cooperation with Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand reflects the reality that events in one theater increasingly determine outcomes in another.
Secondly, the transatlantic community should accelerate the integration of the defense industry. The wars and crises of the coming decades will be determined not only by the size of military arsenals but also by democracies’ ability to develop new technologies, set up production, and sustain joint actions over time.
Thirdly, democratic governments must pay more attention to the political dimension of strategic rivalry. Authoritarian states understand that their greatest opportunities often lie not in defeating Western armies but in exploiting divisions within alliances and undermining public trust in democratic institutions.
The main challenge of our time is not choosing between Europe and Asia. It lies in recognizing that America’s rivals have already integrated regions, technologies, and political systems, while democratic governments still view them individually.
The decisive advantage will go to those who can think and act across all theaters, not those who focus on one.
