Jakub Loginov / Dzerkalo Tyzhnia
Amidst the deepening Polish-Ukrainian crisis, the noticeable improvement in Ukraine’s relations with Slovakia seems quite unexpected. Until recently, Robert Fico’s government was considered one of Kyiv’s most problematic partners in the European Union. Today, however, the relations between official Kyiv and Bratislava are much more pragmatic, opening up new avenues for mutually beneficial cooperation.
Recently, Slovakia made almost sensational news: it quietly joined the “coalition of the willing” that coordinates enhanced support for Ukraine. The portal euBrief, citing the French embassy in Bratislava, reported that Slovakia participated in the coalition meeting on July 13 in Paris and supported the joint statement of its co-chairs.
Robert Fico categorically denied this. He stated that Slovakia “was not, is not, and will not be” a member of the coalition. Slovak Foreign Minister Juraj Blanár also explained that the Slovak ambassador to France was present at the meeting only as an observer.
But amidst the loud controversy, a more important fact was lost: Fico’s government accepted the French invitation and sent its representative to the meeting of a structure that the prime minister publicly demonizes. Observer status, of course, does not signal readiness for Slovakia to deploy troops in Ukraine or take on military commitments. However, it is yet another sign that Bratislava’s real policy towards Kyiv is changing.
Amid the Polish-Ukrainian conflict, a series of surprisingly pro-Ukrainian statements emerged from official Bratislava. Slovakia and Ukraine agreed to hold the fourth joint government meeting in Lviv. The meeting place was agreed upon by Robert Fico and then-Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Svyrydenko, and at the end of June, this agreement was confirmed by Foreign Ministers Juraj Blanár and Andriy Sybiha. Following the change in the Ukrainian government, the meeting date will likely need to be agreed upon with the new Prime Minister, Serhiy Koretsky, but intergovernmental consultation preparations continue. They are also discussing a possible visit of Volodymyr Zelenskyy to Bratislava. Notably, Poland and Ukraine do not use such cooperation formats as joint government meetings. In this regard, Slovakia, even under Fico, appears more inclined to cooperate with Ukraine than Poland under Tusk and Nawrocki.
An even more explicit signal was Juraj Blanár’s visit to Vinnytsia in June. The Slovak Foreign Minister began by honoring the memory of fallen Ukrainian soldiers, expressed solidarity with the Ukrainian people, and stated that peace must be based on international law and respect for Ukraine’s territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders. He also emphasized that Slovakia is interested in having a peaceful, stable, and prosperous Ukraine as its neighbor and supports its accession to the EU after fulfilling the necessary conditions. Additionally, Juraj Blanár brought humanitarian aid.
The talks in Vinnytsia extended beyond diplomatic formulas and humanitarian issues. The parties discussed the opening of negotiation clusters in the process of Ukraine’s accession to the EU, cooperation between defense enterprises, demining, construction of school shelters, delivery of generators and medical equipment. They also talked about expanding border crossings, developing railway connections, and new transport and energy projects between the two countries. The Ukrainian side specifically emphasized that Slovakia supported all twenty EU sanction packages against Russia.
The Slovak opposition is pro-Ukrainian, Fico is just a flexible populist
Where does this change come from? And was there any change at all? Saying that Fico radically changed his position on Ukraine would be inappropriate. Robert Fico is an experienced political player and a populist who first became prime minister back in 2006 and has been active in politics since the nineties. Relations with Ukraine and Russia for him are just a means of maintaining or regaining power, not a firm ideological position.
This is not at all the case with the Slovak opposition, which is pro-Ukrainian for firm ideological reasons. Therefore, the possible victory of pro-Western forces in the fall of 2027 and the potential coalition of the parties “Progressive Slovakia” (PS) — “Democrats” (Demokrati) — “Freedom and Solidarity” (SaS) — “Christian Democratic Movement” (KDH) would definitely be beneficial for Kyiv. For now, Fico remains as prime minister for over a year and continues his usual tactics on the Ukrainian issue: one day he’ll publicly say something sharp against Ukraine and positive for Putin, and the next day, in the quiet of offices, he makes quite concrete pro-Ukrainian decisions.
The Ukrainian issue has lost its relevance
There is a year and a few months left until the parliamentary elections in Slovakia. Local elections are ahead, scheduled for the fall. The campaign is already underway, but unlike the local elections in Poland in April 2024, the Ukrainian topic is practically unused in the Slovak campaign.
The situation somewhat resembles the normalization of Slovak-Hungarian relations, which remained tense until 2015–2016. Then the old animosity quietly disappeared, and even Slovak nationalists stopped using the Hungarian issue. A similar process is happening with Ukraine now.
Three years of Robert Fico’s rule have shown that even pro-Russian voters are not opposed to implementing infrastructure projects, such as expanding checkpoints, railway connections with Ukraine, or the Kosice—Uzhhorod highway. The essence of the pro-Russian stance of some Slovaks is most likely pacifism and the mistaken belief that Volodymyr Zelensky is “unnecessarily prolonging the war” instead of “somehow reaching an agreement with Putin.” Therefore, the pro-Russian part of Slovak voters probably supports all civil cooperation with Ukraine but does not support military aid and Ukraine’s NATO membership. This is why Fico and Foreign Minister Juraj Blanar always emphasize that they want to develop economic, transport, or political cooperation and support Ukraine’s rapid EU membership, but will not provide weapons for free or send troops.
Another nuance is Hungary. Robert Fico was a political ally of Viktor Orban and made sharp anti-Ukrainian (and pro-Russian) statements at times when Orban was the most anti-Ukrainian leader in the EU. However, Fico always tried to be softer than his Hungarian counterpart. Now, as Orban has left, he very much does not want to become the “new Orban,” and this is one of the reasons for the noticeable improvement in relations with Kyiv.
Slovakia is developing its defense sector
In 2023, Robert Fico sharply criticized the then pro-Ukrainian government of Eduard Heger and President Zuzana Čaputová for the free supply of weapons to Ukraine. He promised that after a change in power, Slovakia would not transfer any ammunition to Ukraine.
The Slovak opposition notes an obvious paradox. Fico stopped the free transfer of weapons from state reserves but allowed commercial supply, including to Ukraine. In 2024, the export of Slovak weapons and ammunition amounted to about 1.1 billion euros, almost twice as much as the previous year. In 2025, it again more than doubled to a record 2.39 billion euros, or 2.2% of all Slovak exports. A significant portion of this growth was driven by the demand caused by the war in Ukraine, primarily for 155-millimeter ammunition. Moreover, the state owns half of the shares of one of the main producers — ZVS Holding.
This has special significance for the Slovak economy. The country is generally experiencing stagnation, while defense companies receive new orders, open production lines, and create jobs. Therefore, the change in the political climate around Ukraine is not accidental: Fico’s government is increasingly interested in ensuring that our country and its allies remain clients of Slovak factories.
Given Slovakia’s small size, it will not replace Poland for Ukraine. However, amid Polish-Ukrainian conflicts, it can become an interesting and reliable alternative. The potential for Ukrainian-Slovak cooperation in the defense industry, transportation, energy, and border infrastructure is very large and currently only partially utilized.
