Information on current losses of the Russian Federation due to sanctions as of 15.06.2026.
1. Ukrainian drones attacked a missile industry enterprise in the Moscow region.
– On the night of June 15, Ukrainian drones attacked Reutov in the Moscow region. Local residents reported several explosions in the city, followed by thick smoke rising over the area.
– According to monitoring channels, the target of the attack was “NPO Mashinostroeniya” — one of the leading enterprises of the Russian defense-industrial complex.
– The enterprise specializes in the development and production of cruise, ballistic, and anti-ship missiles. “NPO Mashinostroeniya” is an important element of Russian missile production and participates in the creation of weapons used in the war against Ukraine.
2. Ukrainian forces are increasing strikes on the logistical routes of the Russian army in the occupied territories of southern Ukraine.
– The main target was the “Novorossiya” route, which connects the Rostov region with the temporarily occupied Crimea through Mariupol and Melitopol. Since May, the Armed Forces of Ukraine have delivered at least 375 confirmed strikes on trucks, fuel tankers, and other transport in the occupied territories. According to the French OSINT analyst Clément Moulène, more than half of these attacks targeted the so-called “land bridge” to Crimea.
– The Commander of the Ukrainian Drone Systems Forces, Robert Brovdi, previously announced an intention to “isolate Crimea” in the near future. For this purpose, Ukrainian drones systematically attack supply routes for fuel, weapons, and military equipment for Russian troops. The intensity of the strikes continues to grow.
– If about 125 trucks were damaged on the route during the four weeks of May, in June, one of the main targets turned to be the crossings between the Kherson region and occupied Crimea.
– Satellite images dated June 12 recorded that part of the cargo transport in the Chongar area is already using a pontoon crossing next to the permanent bridge. This may indicate attempts by the Russian side to adapt logistics to the growing threat of strikes on key transport hubs.
– The systematic targeting of cargo transport and fuel tanks complicates the supply of Russian troops in the southern direction and increases the load on the logistics system of the occupying forces.
3. In Russia, a diesel fuel shortage is worsening ahead of the harvest season.
– Farmers from several regions complain not only about the sharp increase in prices but also about difficulties in obtaining the necessary volumes of diesel. Since February, diesel has nearly doubled in price, exceeding 100,000 rubles/ton, but even at this price, timely supply is not guaranteed.
– Agricultural business representatives confirm the worsening situation. One Russian agricultural holding noted that there is simultaneously a shortage of diesel and an increase in its wholesale price in the market.
– If the trend continues, some farms may face problems during the full-scale harvesting campaign. One reason for the shortage is reduced production of oil products following attacks on Russian refineries. In May alone, 16 refineries were hit.
– Estimates suggest that the production volumes of oil products have decreased by 15–20%. Rosstat data for April also recorded an almost 10% drop in production.
4. The discount on Russian Urals oil exceeded $20 per barrel.
– The average price of Russian Urals oil in May 2026 decreased to $84.1 per barrel (from $95.6 in April), and the discount to Brent reduced from $25.8 to $23.7 per barrel.
– Despite the reduction, the discount on Russian oil remains high—$23.7 per barrel compared to $14.6 in 2024 and about $15 in 2025. Last year it was mainly $12–14 per barrel. The increase in the discount resulted from intensified sanctions pressure on the Russian oil sector, including US restrictions on the largest oil companies and ships of the “shadow fleet.”
– Due to sanctions risks, buyers continue to demand substantial discounts on Russian oil. The high discount directly impacts Russian budget revenues.
– Even with relatively high global oil prices, Moscow is forced to sell its raw materials significantly cheaper than global quotes, losing billions of dollars in potential revenue.
5. Russia increasingly relies on the “shadow fleet” for oil exports.
– Russia continues to increase the use of the “shadow fleet” for maritime oil exports, gradually reducing dependence on Western logistical infrastructure. However, completely abandoning services of ships linked to G7 countries and their partners remains unsuccessful for Moscow.
– In May 2026, 48% of Russia’s maritime oil exports were carried by sanctioned tankers of the “shadow fleet.” Another 44% of shipments were conducted by tankers linked to G7+ jurisdictions, and the rest were handled by unsanctioned “shadow fleet” vessels.
– The dependence on alternative logistics is particularly noticeable in the crude oil segment. In May, 62% of crude oil exports were carried by sanctioned “shadow fleet” tankers, 31% by G7+ vessels, and another 7% by unsanctioned tankers.
– This indicates that Russia is actively forming its own maritime transportation system to bypass Western sanctions. Meanwhile, the situation is different in the segment of petroleum products. Here, dependence on Western infrastructure is significantly higher: about 70% of shipments in May were provided by tankers linked to G7+ countries.
– This means that petroleum exports remain one of the most vulnerable sectors of Russia’s oil trade. Despite significant efforts by the Kremlin to create an alternative export system, full independence from Western ships, insurance, and financial services has not yet been achieved.
– Therefore, strengthening sanctions against shipping companies, insurance structures, and the “shadow fleet” remains one of the most effective tools to pressure Russia’s oil revenues.
– Although Moscow is gradually adapting to sanction restrictions, the export structure shows that the Russian oil industry still maintains a substantial dependence on the international logistics system, control over which largely remains with Western countries.
6. The EU continues to finance Russia’s gas industry through LNG imports.
– Despite sanctions against Russia and support for Ukraine, European Union countries remain major purchasers of Russian liquefied natural gas.
– From January to May 2026, 8.37 million tons of LNG from the “Yamal LNG” project were delivered to European ports, 17.9% more than during the same period last year.
– In fact, EU countries accounted for 96.7% of all “Yamal LNG” exports in the first five months of the year. In May alone, 23 out of 25 gas carriers of the project arrived at European ports, constituting 92% of all exports and exceeding last year’s figure by more than 20%.
– Despite numerous sanctions, Russia continues to receive significant revenues from gas sales to European consumers. EU restrictions on short-term contracts have only partially taken effect, whereas the ban on long-term contracts will not be effective until 2027.
– This situation allows Moscow to continue receiving foreign currency earnings to finance the war against Ukraine. At the same time, the absence of a complete ban on Russian LNG imports demonstrates the reluctance of some European countries to abandon affordable Russian energy resources.
– An additional risk factor remains the situation in the global gas market. In particular, potential supply issues through the Strait of Hormuz could further push European importers to purchase Russian gas before new restrictions take effect.
7. Turkey has reduced its purchases of Russian oil and sharply increased imports from the USA.
– In May, Turkey sent a signal to the Russian oil market: maritime imports of crude oil rose by 28% from April, but purchases of Russian oil fell by 22%.
– Ankara also sharply increased oil imports from the USA: it bought more in a month than in the previous two years combined. These changes do not mean a complete rejection of Russian oil, but rather a diversification of supply due to sanction risks, logistical problems, and export instability.
– For Moscow, this is another signal that even partner countries are increasingly guided by economic gain rather than political loyalty. Russian oil remains on the market, but competition for buyers is intensifying.
– This process may become particularly noticeable if the USA further increases its exports, using changes in the global energy market to strengthen its positions in regions where Russian suppliers previously felt much more confident.
8. In May, India remained one of the key sources of income for the Russian energy sector, second only to China.
– According to CREA, purchases of Russian energy resources amounted to €5.8 billion. The main part was crude oil — €4.8 billion, or 83% of the total volume. Another €550 million accounted for petroleum products and €429 million for coal. Importantly, the demand for Russian oil in India not only persists but also grows.
– The country’s overall crude oil imports in May increased by 8% compared to April, while purchases from Russia jumped by 21%. This growth is also evident at the level of India’s largest refineries. The volumes of Russian oil unloading at the Vadinar plant increased by 36%, and at Jamnagar by 14%.
– It was also noteworthy that the state refineries New Mangalore and Visakhapatnam, which ceased Russian oil purchases at the end of November 2025, resumed them in March 2026. In May, imports at these enterprises increased by 13% and 42%, respectively.
– An additional signal was that the Paradip refinery in May received the largest volume of Russian oil in the past two years. This indicates that despite sanction pressure and Western attempts to limit the Kremlin’s oil revenue, India continues to be one of the most important buyers of Russian raw materials.
9. The largest bank in Portugal, Caixa Geral de Depósitos, has begun the mass closure of accounts of Russian citizens who do not have a valid residence permit in the country.
– Notifications about service termination began arriving in early June, with the final account closures scheduled for mid-August.
– Clients have been asked to return bank cards and other banking instruments, and to collect remaining funds at bank branches. Restrictions primarily affect holders of Russian passports without a valid residence permit in Portugal or those who did not update their personal information.
– Meanwhile, individual account closure notifications have also been received by Russian citizens who have residence permits and work in Portuguese or other European companies.
– The increased scrutiny by European financial institutions reflects the growing risks of dealing with Russian clients following the implementation of extensive sanctions against Russia.
– EU banks are increasingly adopting a stricter approach to citizens of the aggressor state to minimize sanction and reputational risks.
