
Information on Russia’s current losses due to sanctions as of 15.11.2026.
1. In Nizhnekamsk, Tatarstan, Ukrainian drones attacked the Nizhnekamskneftekhim petrochemical complex of the SIBUR group.
– Local residents are posting videos of the fire and reporting explosions. Nizhnekamskneftekhim is one of the largest petrochemical complexes in Europe, producing synthetic rubbers, plastics, and ethylene.
– The enterprise ranks among the top ten largest global producers of synthetic rubber and belongs to SIBUR. In 2025, the plant produced a record 3 million tons of commercial products. An important part of its facilities is the new EP-600 complex, capable of producing up to 600 thousand tons of ethylene per year. Its launch was one of the largest investment projects in the Russian petrochemical industry.
– Damage to such a facility can create problems not only for the production of synthetic materials but also for related productions in the Russian petrochemical cluster.
2. Russia’s oil revenues reached a five-month high amid rising crude oil prices.
– Russia’s revenues from the export of oil and oil products in October rose to their highest level in five months—almost $21.2 billion, which is 65% more than a year ago. The increase was driven by high global oil prices due to the war with Iran.
– The cost of Russian Urals and ESPO grades in October exceeded $100 per barrel, which supported demand from China and India. More than 80% of Russia’s export earnings were ensured by crude oil: oil products supply suffers from Ukrainian attacks on refineries.
– At the same time, the increase in oil revenues does not mean a proportional improvement in the state of the Russian budget. Net revenues from oil taxes in October amounted to about $10 billion, as a significant portion of the funds was directed by the state towards subsidies and compensations for refiners to support the domestic fuel market.
– According to government estimates, the federal budget deficit this year may reach 3.2% of GDP. In October, crude oil exports remained at the level of 5.33 million barrels per day, while exports of oil products were 1.49 million barrels per day—about a third less than last year.
– The resumption of Ukrainian attacks on key Russian refineries may further limit processing and force Russian companies to increase crude oil exports if the strikes do not affect export terminals.
3. Russia is preparing new tax incentives for Gazprom after failed negotiations with China on the Power of Siberia-2 gas pipeline.
– The Russian Ministry of Finance proposes to increase the tax discount for a Gazprom subsidiary that extracts gas in Yamal. Thanks to this benefit, the company can reduce the amount of mineral extraction tax (MET) it pays to the budget.
– From November 2026, the deduction amount will be 2.444 billion rubles per month, from August 2027 — 3.5 billion, and from August 2028 — 5.5 billion rubles. Now, the Ministry of Finance proposes from August 1, 2029, to increase it to 8 billion rubles monthly. The total amount of the benefit for the first period is about 64 billion rubles.
– At the same time, the government plans to increase the tax burden on independent gas producers: the special mark-up to the extraction tax is proposed to be increased from 11% to 14%.
– Thus, Gazprom will have the opportunity to pay fewer taxes, while other gas extraction companies will pay more. The increase of the benefit to 8 billion rubles is currently a proposal by the Ministry of Finance, not an existing regulation.
– Additional state support is needed by Gazprom due to the loss of most of the European market. Before the full-scale invasion, Russia exported about 200 billion cubic meters of gas annually to distant foreign countries, but in 2023 deliveries fell to 69 billion cubic meters — the lowest level since 1985. In 2024, exports amounted to 81 billion cubic meters, and in 2025 — 78 billion.
– It has also been unsuccessful in compensating for the loss of European customers through China. Negotiations on the construction of the “Power of Siberia — 2” pipeline, which was supposed to provide an additional 50 billion cubic meters of gas annually to China, have reached an impasse due to price disagreements. Beijing demands significantly cheaper gas, and a new contract has yet to be concluded.
– The situation will also be complicated by the EU ban on the import of Russian gas, which will come into effect in 2027. Gazprom risks losing its last European buyers — Hungary and Slovakia. Therefore, after losing the main sales market and failing to secure new large-scale supplies to China, the company increasingly needs tax concessions from the state.
4. The rise in Russian oil prices is starting to work against its exporters: Asian refineries are increasingly switching to raw materials from Africa and Brazil, which are becoming cheaper to deliver to China.
– Russian ESPO, traditionally in demand among Chinese refineries, is being sold with high premiums, making it lose price attractiveness. As a result, Russian suppliers find it increasingly difficult to compete for buyers in the main market.
– Freight rates for oil tankers have decreased by about 50% from October’s peak values. This has reduced the cost of delivering African and Brazilian oil to China by $5–10 per barrel. After the October shortage of vessels, more available tonnage appeared on the market, strengthening buyers’ positions in negotiations and weakening the advantages of Russian oil, which previously competed due to a shorter supply route.
– China’s Unipec, the trading arm of Sinopec, has already purchased two cargoes of Congolese Djeno oil at a discount of about $22 per barrel to Dated Brent on FOB terms, excluding delivery. South Korean SK Energy is preparing to purchase oil from Gabon, and independent Chinese refineries are increasing imports of African crude.
– Russia risks losing part of the Chinese market not only due to sanctions and logistical issues but also due to price competition. If alternative suppliers offer more favorable conditions, Russian companies will have to lower prices and reduce margins to retain buyers against competitors.
5. Iran and Russia deepen cooperation amid Tehran’s confrontation with the US and Israel.
– Diplomatic contacts between the countries have increased, and the Caspian Sea is becoming an important channel for their trade and military-technical cooperation. On October 27, the President of Iran, Masoud Pezeshkian, attended a gas forum in Moscow, and on November 5, the Kremlin hosted a member of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, Mohsen Rezaee.
– The Caspian route allows both countries to enhance the exchange of goods, bypassing increased US control. Iranian ports receive Russian grain, corn, sunflower oil, and feed. From January to August, grain imports from Russia increased by 70% year-on-year, making Iran the third-largest buyer of Russian grain.
– Moscow also considers the Caspian as an alternative route for wheat exports due to risks to Black Sea ports. The Caspian is also used for transporting military equipment, drones, missiles, and ammunition. Western intelligence has previously reported on the role of the Russian ship Port-Olya-2 in transporting arms between Iran and Russia.
– In July, Ukrainian Defense Forces attacked two ships of Russia’s shadow fleet in the Caspian Sea—Port-Olya-2 and “Behey,” which were carrying Iranian equipment to Russia. Cooperation also includes the exchange of intelligence data, satellite images, military technologies, and experience in using missiles and drones.
– Meanwhile, Moscow’s ability to provide Iran with extensive military assistance is limited due to its own weapon needs and reluctance to worsen relations with the Gulf countries and Israel. According to Le Monde’s sources, Tehran expected more support, including the supply of air defense systems and missiles, but Moscow is not ready to transfer some of the weaponry it needs for its own war against Ukraine.
– A separate focus remains on nuclear energy: “Rosatom” plans to increase the number of Russian personnel at the Bushehr nuclear power plant to 200 people in November and later to 700. Thus, despite the limitation of direct military assistance, Russia supports Iran with intelligence data, technologies, equipment, and logistics, using the partnership as an instrument of influence on the US.
