Information on current Russian losses due to sanctions as of 10/09/2026.
1. Ukrainian drones once again attacked Russia’s largest oil refinery in Omsk.
– On October 8, the Omsk region of Russia was attacked by Ukrainian drones. Residents of Omsk reported several explosions near the oil refinery and smoke over the facility.
– The Omsk refinery belongs to “Gazprom Neft” and is the largest oil processing facility in Russia. Its capacity reaches up to 22 million tons of oil per year. According to the company, the plant produces about one-sixth of Russia’s gasoline and diesel fuel of the fifth environmental class.
– Ukrainian drones already attacked the facility on July 6, 2026. At that time, primary oil processing installations were damaged, causing the plant to halt processing.
2. Ukrainian drones attacked a rocket fuel plant in the Tver region and an oil depot near Belgorod.
– On the night of October 9, drones attacked the Redkinsky Research Plant in the Tver region of Russia. Following the strike, a fire broke out at the facility.
– The Redkinsky Plant is a large chemical enterprise that produces fuel components for the Kh-55 and Kh-101 cruise missiles, as well as additives for diesel fuel and aviation kerosene. Damage to such a facility can complicate the supply of specialized chemical products to the Russian military-industrial complex. The plant was already under attack by drones in February 2026.
– A fire was also reported at an oil depot north of Belgorod following an attack in the Belgorod district. The fire was detected by NASA FIRMS satellites.
– The oil depot supplies fuel to industrial and agricultural enterprises in the region, as well as gas stations.
3. Ukrainian drones attacked a refinery in Komi and a “Yandex” data center in Kaluga.
– On October 9, drones attacked the Ukhta oil refinery in the Komi Republic and a “Yandex” data center in Kaluga. A fire broke out on the refinery premises, and several modules in the data center were completely disabled.
– The Ukhta refinery is part of “LUKOIL” and is capable of processing about 4.2 million tons of oil per year. The enterprise produces automotive gasoline, diesel fuel, fuel oil, and vacuum gas oil. The extent of the damage and the potential impact on the plant’s operations are being clarified.
– The “Yandex” data center in Kaluga is part of the company’s digital infrastructure. According to Russian media, several of its modules were so damaged that their operation was completely disrupted.
– Both incidents concern significant Russian facilities — oil refining and digital infrastructure.
4. Ukraine attacked four Russian oil processing enterprises in a week.
– Ukrainian forces have attacked a fourth Russian oil refinery this week. This time, the target was the Ukhta Refinery in the Komi Republic, owned by LUKOIL. The plant is located about 1,500 km northeast of Moscow and has a design capacity of about 80,000 barrels of oil per day. The last attack on the facility was in February.
– Earlier this week, Ukrainian drones attacked Gazprom facilities—the Salavat plant in the Urals and the Astrakhan gas processing plant near the Caspian Sea.
– It is estimated that the combined design capacity of the four refineries attacked over the week totals about 720,000 barrels of crude oil per day. The gas processing capacity reaches 12 billion cubic meters per year.
– Not all capacities will necessarily be disabled due to the strikes, but the series of attacks may reduce the overall productivity of Russian refineries in the coming weeks.
5. Russians are massively switching to cash due to blocked bank operations and increased taxes.
– In Russia, cash has become more popular than bank accounts for the first time in many years as a means of saving. In September, 38% of respondents preferred cash—6 percentage points more than a year earlier.
– Meanwhile, the share of those who keep money in bank accounts decreased from 43% to 37%. One reason for the shift to cash is the increased banking control: financial institutions are more frequently blocking individual transactions and accounts for checks.
– Additional problems include internet disruptions, causing people to lose access to cashless payments and their own funds.
– The switch to cash complicates the monitoring of financial transactions and creates conditions for concealing some transactions from taxation.
6. Russia has expanded its shadow fleet to 1,300 tankers to bypass sanctions and maintain oil revenues.
– Russia’s shadow fleet has grown approximately sevenfold since the start of the full-scale war against Ukraine, now numbering over 1,300 oil tankers.
– Moscow is creating a parallel system of transportation, insurance, and settlements to continue oil exports circumventing Western restrictions. This model increases trade opacity and the risks of maritime accidents.
– Before the full-scale invasion, the shadow fleet numbered about 200 tankers. Now, it involves roughly one in five oil tankers worldwide. These vessels transport not only Russian oil but also raw materials from Iran and Venezuela, which are also under Western sanctions.
– To reduce dependence on Western services, Russia is developing its own maritime insurance and alternative payment channels. In 2024, insurance premiums of Russian companies increased by more than 40%. That year, every third tanker passing through the Baltic Sea was insured by a Russian company.
– The shadow fleet has transformed from a tool for bypassing restrictions into a separate oil trading system, but its existence will continue to depend on the demand for Russian oil and the willingness of partners to cooperate with Moscow.
7. India reduces purchases of Russian oil to a minimum since the start of the war.
– Russia is losing its price advantage in the Indian oil market: with the rising cost of Urals, local refineries are reducing their crude oil purchases for November delivery. Additional pressure comes from China, which is actively buying Russian oil and is willing to pay more for it.
– The increase in prices weakens the main advantage of Russian oil — the discount, due to which India became one of its biggest buyers after the start of the full-scale war. Now Indian refineries may more often choose Middle Eastern oil, where supplies are recovering.
– In July, India’s purchases of Russian oil reached 2.44 million barrels per day, or 56% of the country’s total oil imports. By September, Russia’s share had fallen to 35%. In the four weeks leading up to October 4, average daily deliveries dropped to 310,000 barrels — the lowest level since March 2022.
– The reduction in purchases threatens Russia with losing part of its oil export revenues. To retain Indian buyers, Russian companies may have to increase discounts again or sacrifice margins.
– Competition with China and the return of alternative suppliers weaken Moscow’s positions in one of its key sales markets.
8. MEPs demand the closure of “Russian houses” in 15 EU countries.
– 71 Members of the European Parliament have called on the EU leadership to develop a common approach to closing “Russian houses,” which continue to operate in 15 EU countries. The authors of the appeal consider these establishments as centers of Russian intelligence services and channels for spreading Kremlin propaganda.
– The appeal states that “Russian houses” are used for intelligence activities, informational interference, and operations against the European Union.
– The letter also emphasizes that “Rossotrudnichestvo,” which coordinates the network of these institutions, is under EU sanctions and is considered a tool for spreading Kremlin influence, the concept of “Russkiy Mir,” and propagandist narratives.
– “Russian houses” continue to operate in Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Slovakia, and Spain. Recently, Germany closed the “Russian house” in Berlin (pictured).
– However, similar institutions continue to operate in other countries, including in Brussels. Despite EU sanctions against “Rossotrudnichestvo,” the agency also reported the opening of 11 more institutions abroad: eight in Africa, two in Armenia, and one in Thailand.
– This indicates Moscow’s intention to further expand its network of foreign establishments, which are tools of its cultural and informational influence.
9. Germany allowed the production of nuclear fuel under a Russian license for European nuclear power plants.
– In Lingen, Germany, preparations are being made to produce Russian-type nuclear fuel for nuclear power plants with Soviet VVER reactors. On October 5, the French company Framatome’s subsidiary, Advanced Nuclear Fuels (ANF), received the final approval for production.
– The enterprise plans to use the license of the Russian company TVEL, which is part of the state corporation Rosatom. Fuel assemblies are expected to begin delivery in 2027. Potential customers include nuclear power plants in Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, and Finland.
– The project has been criticized for cooperating with the Russian nuclear sector. The Minister of Environment of Lower Saxony, Christian Meyer, opposes such cooperation. He stated that he is irritated and surprised by the German federal government’s willingness to continue cooperation with the Russian nuclear company during the war against Ukraine.
– Environmental organizations BUND and “ausgestrahlt” are challenging the project in court and demanding the suspension of the permit.
– Supporters of the production explain its necessity by the need to diversify fuel supplies for European nuclear power plants. At the same time, using the Russian TVEL license and technologies may maintain European nuclear energy’s dependence on the Russian sector.
– Berlin acknowledges the political problems of cooperation with Rosatom, but notes that, while complying with existing legislation, the authorities could not refuse the permit.
– One possible tool to halt such cooperation is the introduction of EU-wide sanctions against the Russian nuclear sector.
