Information regarding current losses of Russia due to sanctions as of 04/03/2026.
1. The Russian oil terminal Primorsk lost 40% of its storage due to attacks by Ukrainian drones.
– Ukrainian drones have dealt serious damage to Russia’s oil infrastructure in the Baltic region. Several days of attacks have damaged a significant portion of the storage tanks at Russia’s largest export port, Primorsk.
– Satellite images from the American company Vantor, specializing in space intelligence, have recorded damage to at least eight storage tanks for oil and oil products. Each of them has a capacity of about 50,000 cubic meters.
– In total, the port has 14 oil tanks and four for diesel fuel. Industry sources reported that two of the damaged tanks were used specifically for storing diesel.
– Total losses are estimated at more than 40% of storage capacity at this port hub. According to traders’ estimates, this may force Russia to consequently cut shipment volumes.
– The Port of Primorsk is a key export hub for Russian oil and can send about 1 million barrels per day to external markets, which accounts for almost 1% of global consumption. Damage to the infrastructure creates additional pressure on Russian oil exports and supply logistics.
2. Russian oil companies are preparing to cut production due to severe disruptions in export infrastructure in the Baltic.
– As a result of drone strikes on port terminals, pipelines, and refineries, Russia lost about 20% of its export capacity, which corresponds to approximately 1 million barrels of oil per day.
– Previous losses reached nearly 40%, but some infrastructure has been restored. Even the current level of damage forces producers to cut production due to the inability to export the necessary volumes of raw materials.
– Logistics overloads create an additional problem. Due to strikes on export hubs and refineries, the pipeline system began to quickly fill up, and storage tanks are overflowing.
– According to sources, the company Transneft, through whose system about 80% of Russian oil is transported, informed exporters about disruptions with shipments through the port of Ust-Luga. The port cannot conduct oil loading according to the initial schedule, and the pipeline system is unable to accommodate all the volumes from producers who planned to send oil through this direction.
– As a result, even short-term oil price increases do not lead to increased Russian production: logistics constraints effectively block exports and force companies to reduce production.
3. Even a sharp rise in oil prices cannot significantly improve the state of the Russian economy.
– Analysts from the Kremlin-affiliated Center for Macroeconomic Analysis and Short-Term Forecasting (CMASF) warn about this. The Russian government has started to rely on a prolonged increase in oil prices. The Russian Ministry of Finance has refused to revise the budget and cut spending after the drop in oil and gas revenues at the beginning of the year.
– CMASF has already revised its macroeconomic forecast based on the significantly higher cost of Russian oil. The center’s baseline scenario suggests that the active phase of the conflict in the Middle East may last until about October, supporting high prices in the commodity markets.
– As a result, the forecast for the average export price of Russian Urals oil in 2026 has been raised from $55.6 to $81.6 per barrel. It is expected that this will provide an additional influx of foreign exchange earnings and strengthen the ruble to 70–73 rubles per dollar by the end of the year.
– At the same time, the positive effect on the economy remains limited. The inflation forecast has been raised to 5.8–6.1% instead of the previous 4.8–5.1%, and GDP growth rates have increased only slightly — from 0.5–0.8% to 0.9–1.3%. The increase in raw material revenues may only exacerbate structural imbalances.
– This refers to the risk of the so-called “Dutch disease,” where the benefits of favorable price conditions are concentrated in a narrow circle of raw material industries and hardly spread to other sectors of the economy.
4. The services sector in Russia contracted in March for the first time in half a year.
– S&P Global data record a decline in business activity amid weakening demand and rising costs. The PMI index in the services sector fell to 49.5 points from 51.3 in February, dropping below the key 50 mark, which separates growth from contraction. This indicates the sector’s transition to contraction.
– The main reason for the negative dynamics was the decline in demand. Some companies report an increase in customers, but more businesses point to a decrease in their purchasing power.
– Additional pressure is created by the sharp rise in the cost of raw materials and supplies. The worsening situation is already affecting the labor market: employment in the sector is decreasing for the second consecutive month, and the rate of reduction has become the highest since the beginning of 2023.
– Companies are cutting staff due to declining sales and the need to save money. Simultaneously, there is a general reduction in the consumer sector. According to 2GIS estimates, the number of restaurants in cities with millions of inhabitants decreased by 5%, cafes by 6%, and bars by 11% over the year. The fast food segment also contracted, as did the number of cafeterias.
– The situation in the sector remains tense: at the beginning of 2026, the restaurant business is experiencing its worst period in a quarter-century, with attendance at certain establishments dropping to 40%.
– At the same time, for the first time in 25 years, the total number of stores in the country has begun to decrease, indicating a broader decline in consumer activity.
– An additional indicator of problems is the financial result of retail: the Magnit chain recorded its first annual loss in its history — 22 billion rubles, explaining this by rising costs and high interest rates.
– These factors indicate a deepening crisis of domestic demand in Russia, which increasingly pressures the services sector, trade, and employment.
5. The volumes of Russia’s non-raw material and non-energy exports remain significantly below pre-war levels, despite government claims of “economic diversification.”
– By the end of 2025, exports in this category amounted to $163.6 billion. Year-on-year, the figure increased by 11% or $16.7 billion, but this is insufficient to restore previous volumes.
– Compared to 2021, non-raw material exports decreased by $30.6 billion, or about 16%. In 2024, the decline was even deeper — about 25%, with the figure dropping to a seven-year low — around $145 billion.
– The high-tech segment suffered the most. Exports in the “machines and equipment” category in 2025 amounted to $29.6 billion versus $40.6 billion in 2021, which represents a drop of almost a third.
– Despite claims of reducing dependence on raw materials, the export structure has not significantly changed. It is estimated that more than half of Russian exports — 53.9% — still consist of raw materials.
– Thus, even partial recovery in 2025 does not offset previous years’ losses, and the Russian economy remains critically dependent on resource exports, showing weak results in high-value-added segments.
6. The European Union sharply increased imports of Russian liquefied natural gas in March.
– Supply volumes rose by 38% year-on-year — to approximately 2.5 billion cubic meters. This is the highest figure in the history of Russian LNG exports to the EU. In the first quarter, imports amounted to 6.8 billion cubic meters, which is 20% more than the same period last year.
– The increase coincided with a general rise in LNG purchases by European countries. Companies are actively stockpiling, trying to secure supply volumes in advance. The main factor was the sharp destabilization of energy markets due to the escalation of the situation in the Middle East.
– Shipping restrictions in the Strait of Hormuz, through which a significant portion of global energy flows pass, pushed prices up and forced importers to act preemptively. As a result, European buyers, despite the policy of reducing dependence on Russian energy, are increasing LNG purchases from Russia as one of the few available and prompt sources of supply.
– The situation indicates the persistence of the structural dependence of the European market on Russian gas amid instability in global energy chains.
7. Russia is preparing a new oil shipment to Cuba, testing the effectiveness of US restrictions on energy supplies to the island.
– Moscow is loading a second Russian oil tanker for dispatch to Cuba, which is experiencing an acute energy crisis. At the end of March, the tanker “Anatoly Kolodkin,” carrying about 100,000 tons of crude oil, arrived at the Cuban port of Matanzas.
– The administration of U.S. President Donald Trump had previously blocked large oil shipments to the island for over three months. At the same time, Washington explained the permission for the Russian tanker to arrive on March 30 as based on humanitarian considerations.
– The White House emphasized that this step does not signal a retreat from the policy of maximum pressure on the Cuban regime. It is believed that the U.S. response to the new shipment may be limited. Brett Erickson, head of Obsidian Risk Advisors, notes that global energy markets remain unstable due to the conflict surrounding Iran, and Washington’s attention is largely focused on other crises.
– Under such conditions, the United States is unlikely to resort to a sharp escalation of confrontation with Russia and Cuba by attempting to block the new tanker.
– At the same time, the situation itself shows that Moscow is trying to exploit the crisis in energy markets to expand its presence even in regions where strict U.S. restrictions apply.
8. Russian state energy companies may have been involved in the removal of Ukrainian children, according to a Yale University investigation.
– According to the researchers’ findings, “Rosneft” and “Gazprom” provided support to a network of camps where at least 2,158 Ukrainian children were taken between 2022 and 2025. This includes both financing and organizing transportation.
– The report states that children were placed both in occupied territories of Ukraine and in Russia, with the aim of pro-Russian ideological influence.
– The authors of the study call this data the first “definitive public proof” of the involvement of large state companies in a systematic campaign of child removal and re-education. The publication has already sparked a political reaction in the U.S.
– A group of American lawmakers has urged the administration to reinstate sanctions against “Rosneft” and “Gazprom,” which were previously temporarily eased. The appeal to the State Department and the Treasury also suggests imposing restrictions on 35 other organizations mentioned in the report.
– According to legislators, even short-term easing of sanctions could bring Russian energy companies around $12 billion in revenue.
– The published data intensifies pressure on the Russian energy sector, which is already under sanctions, and may form the basis for further tightening.
