The Russian war is losing its way. Everyone sees this and acts accordingly.
Vladimir Putin’s foreign policy team will likely be nervous when reporting to their boss this week. Among the latest bad news: a double blow from the Chinese Communist Party to the Kremlin. The Chinese refuse to supply ship power plants necessary for the Arctic Northern Sea Route. Moreover, the planned “Power of Siberia-2” gas pipeline with a capacity of 50 billion cubic meters is essentially canceled due to China’s demands to set a gas price of $50 per thousand cubic meters—at the level of the price for Russian consumers. This is one-fifth of what the Kremlin demanded, even with a significant discount.
But the Chinese party-state system has other options. This gives them leverage. Russia, on the other hand, has neither time nor other clients: its remaining sales of pipeline gas to the European Union will cease next year. Moreover, due to Ukrainian strikes on Russian refineries, Russia now has to import petroleum products from China: thus, Beijing has even more aces.
Other countries too are sensing Russia’s weakness and acting accordingly. Kazakhstan has banned the import of Russian wheat. Azerbaijan’s leader Ilham Aliyev recently publicly supported Ukraine. Armenia is unilaterally working on restoring railway connections with Turkey and Azerbaijan, despite delays from Russia, which nominally controls this railway. Turkey hopes to sell the United Arab Emirates its surplus Russian-made S-400 air defense systems after a successful visit by President Donald Trump, which seemed to unlock the sale of American F-35 fighters. Thus, Recep Tayyip Erdogan made another step back from his long “flirtation” with the Kremlin.
The NATO summit in Ankara also dashed Russia’s hopes that Trump would pressure Ukraine—directly or indirectly through European alliance members. The US President loves winners, not losers. Trump also seems ready to sign a new sanctions bill against Russia, initiated by the late US Senator Lindsey Graham, called an “economic bomb.”
These diplomatic setbacks are not decisive, nor are Ukraine’s battlefield successes. Russia still has options: economic, political, and military, albeit all bad.
It is increasingly likely that mobilization will begin this fall. Even sooner, a provocation against NATO countries can be expected: possibly, a false-flag attack on Poland using “Ukrainian” drones.
The Kremlin is also increasing psychological operations against Western opinion leaders. Namely, seemingly authoritative cautionary warnings about how desperately Russia will behave and how much worse it will be if it loses: scenarios include anarchy, totalitarianism, North Korean-style dictatorship, or dependency on China.
Warnings of disaster alongside calls for prudence target the West’s greatest weaknesses: ambition, cowardice, discord, greed, and naivety. In this way, attention is diverted from what should be the main strategic priority—Ukraine’s victory. Instead, the main stakes become the architecture of European security for the coming decades. The task is to find the right “pragmatists” to take the forefront in the post-war, post-Putin era and start winning their favor. Begin thinking about a future “Grand Deal” (did someone say “reset”?), which will take into account Russia’s interests (did someone say “legitimate”?). Ignore the annoying, paranoid Eastern Europeans: this is a game for big countries. And consider how much money is at stake.
Such ideas may now be voiced only in whispers. But Russia hears them and encourages them: in word and deed.
Of course, the Kremlin makes no efforts on the Chinese side. It would be pointless to even try. The powers in Beijing look at the world sternly. If Russia acts recklessly—apply pressure. If Russia becomes weak—negotiate harder. Organize policy and personnel changes, especially negative ones. Such an approach should be in Europe too.
