
Orikhovo-Zaporizhzhia Direction
The enemy (Russian forces) in the sector of its 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA) group of troops “Dnepr,” operating in this direction, continues to tackle two tasks that are opposite in nature. On the left flank of this army, Russian forces are conducting active defense, trying to prevent further advancement of the forward units of the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) along the Dnipro towards Kamianske to the Yanchekrak River. Simultaneously, on the right flank, they are attempting to encircle the Orikhiv Defense District of the UAF from the flanks (from the west and east) to carry out its subsequent assault and capture.
It appears that the 58th CAA is carrying out this second task in close cooperation with the forces of the 5th and 35th CAA Groups “Vostok,” which are acting in the Hulyaipole direction, trying to jointly reach the area of Svoboda — Yehorivka — Chervona Krynytsia — Omelnyk. The first task, evidently, the command of the 58th CAA is trying to solve with its own forces and the means attached to it.
At the moment, it is clear that the Russian command has not fully succeeded in solving either of these tasks, although it has achieved certain results in their execution.
1. For operations in this direction, the enemy has concentrated and deployed a sufficiently powerful group of forces, primarily based on the troops (forces) of the 58th army, along with a range of reinforcing forces and means. Specifically:
The 58th CAA operates in this direction with its main forces:
– 19th Motorized Rifle Division (MRD) — 392nd, 429th, and 503rd Motorized Rifle Regiments (MRR) — operating on the left flank and partially in the center of the 58th CAA’s sector;
– 42nd MRD — 70th, 71st, and 291st MRR + 270th MRR “Akhmat-Kavkaz,” possibly with units from the 78th Separate Motorized Regiment (“Sever-Akhmat”) — operating in the center and on the right flank of the 58th CAA;
– 136th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (SMRB), probably part of the forces entering the operational reserve of the 58th CAA;
– 100th Separate Reconnaissance Brigade (SRB), possibly operating in this direction with only part of its forces;
– 49th Separate Airborne Assault Brigade (SAAB), more “assault” than “airborne,” not part of the “classic” airborne forces (ABF), likely operating in this direction with its main forces;
– 291st Artillery Brigade (AB) — operating with its main forces;
– Combined regimental tactical group (RTG) of the 4th Military Base (MB) of Russian troops in South Ossetia (Tskhinvali).
Reinforcing means:
– The 18th ZVA operates in this direction with its 47th “mobilization” MSD (1152nd, 1153rd, and 1154th MSP), formed on the territory of the occupied Crimean peninsula. Units from at least two of its regiments are present in this direction;
– Airborne Troops (VDV). Detachments of the 108th and 247th Air Assault Regiments (AAR) of the 7th Air Assault Division (AAD), several units of the 76th Air Assault Division, as well as the 45th Separate Special Purpose Brigade (SSPB) of the VDV have been recorded. There may also be separate units of the 104th AAD and the 98th Airborne Division (AD).
It is likely that the command of the UV “Dnepr” has recently regrouped part of its forces and assets from the Prydniprovske direction to the Orikhiv-Zaporizhia area to further strengthen the 58th ZVA. This likely involved elements of the 47th MSD and the 104th AAD, which may have been concentrated in its sector. There might also be separate units from the 49th ZVA GV “Dnepr” present here.
2. Current situation in this direction is characterized by three main factors:
– almost complete cessation of the main forces’ advance of the forward units and formations of the 58th ZVA in its sector;
– forced transition of the enemy to active defense in several sections and directions (this mostly concerns 19th Motorized Rifle Division’s sector);
– resumption of offensive/assault actions, though not very effective, by the forward units of this army in the Orikhiv direction.
In particular:
– In the direction of Stepnohirsk — Plavni, it seems forward infantry groups of the Armed Forces managed to advance south into the village of Plavni, along Zaliznychna and Stepova streets, possibly reaching the area of the “Plavni” railway station. Additionally, they advanced south along the E-105 road from Stepnohirsk towards Kamianske (approximately 2 km).
– In the area of Stepnohirsk and Prymorske, the enemy attempted to counterattack to “unblock” several of its small “residual” infantry groups in the area of Agrarna Street, as well as east of Stepnohirsk (between it and Luk’yanivske). Moreover, Russian units tried to hold the “Vysotka” area in Stepnohirsk and several blocks along Pokrovska Street in Prymorske, occasionally counterattacking from the south.
However, they have not yet succeeded in unblocking their “residual” small infantry groups. The Armed Forces have almost completely pushed the enemy out of Prymorske, forcing some infantry groups to retreat into the former Kakhovka Reservoir channel, continued holding the “Ring” area (road junction between Stepnohirsk and Prymorske) and gradually “finishing off” enemy’s small infantry groups both in Stepnohirsk and south of Luk’yanivske and Pavlivka.
However, the enemy has so far managed to hold the “Vysotka” area in Stepnohirsk and several blocks on the southern outskirts of Prymorske (along Pokrovska Street). But it is becoming increasingly difficult for them due to the apparent gradual growing infiltration of the Armed Forces towards Plavni.
– From the eastern outskirts of Kamianske (the area of Gagarina Street), the enemy attempted several assault actions in the northeast direction, likely to bypass the positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, which they continue to hold north of the village of Lobkove. In this regard, they only partially managed to penetrate in the indicated direction with several infantry groups, whose movement was blocked at a distance of 1 km from their main positions.
Apparently, the presence of Ukrainian units east of Kamianske continues to “unnerve” the local Russian command, especially in the context of the simultaneous advancement of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the Plavni area, and specifically towards Kamianske. Therefore, from time to time, they try to force the forward Ukrainian units to withdraw from Lobkove to the north.
– Along the Stepoe – Mali Shcherbaky line, the enemy continues persistent and regular attempts to “break through” with assault groups both towards Pavlivka and Novandriivka, reinforcing these actions from the area northwest of Nesteryanka.
It is evident that the main goal of such actions is the Russian command’s desire to reach heights in the Novandriivka area, which are located west of Orikhiv, and to establish a foothold there. This would allow them to organize effective fire impact from there on the main rear communication of the Orikhiv defense district of the Ukrainian Armed Forces (Orikhiv — Komyshuvakha road), as well as create a flank threat for Ukrainian units operating east and southeast of Stepnohorsk.
Currently, the enemy managed to break through with several separate assault groups towards Novandriivka — from Shcherbaky along the road (up to 3 km) and from the side of Nesteryanka (up to 2.5 km). However, they have not been able to reach Novandriivka.
Similarly, the enemy has not reached Pavlivka. Several small enemy infantry groups were blocked either south of Pavlivka or even in the area of Shcherbaky and Mali Shcherbaky.
This situation has persisted in this area for over 2 weeks. It is evident that the enemy cannot substantially increase their efforts in these directions, and numerous infiltration infantry groups, which previously managed to penetrate the battle formations of forward Ukrainian units, are blocked and unable to advance in these directions.
– In the directions of Robotyne — Novodanylivka and Novopokrovka — Mala Tokmachka, evidently, the Armed Forces of Ukraine have almost completely “cleared” small enemy infantry groups, which previously infiltrated their forward units’ battle formations, particularly having “cleared” most of the Uspenivska Balka and Mala Tokmachka (likely, only in the local correctional facility there are a few “remaining” Russian “bodies” still “lurking” in the basements).
However, the enemy is trying to bypass Mala Tokmachka from the northeast, acting in the direction of Luhivske — Bilohir’ia. However, so far not very successfully. Several of their assault groups managed to advance north of Lenin Street along the Konka River (1.5–1.7 km), but the Ukrainian Armed Forces continue to confidently hold Bilohir’ia and positions they previously reclaimed in the area south and northwest of it.
Thus, it can be stated that the Russian 58th Combined Arms Army, with its attached forces and means, cannot yet resume active and large-scale offensive actions towards Zaporizhzhia, evidently focusing mainly on limited-scale attempts to isolate the Orikhiv defense district of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. As I predicted in several of my previous reviews.
3. Regarding the future operational-tactical prospects of the situation development across the Orikhiv-Zaporizhzhia direction, I’ve shared my opinion on them in my previous review (dated 07/05/2026). So, let me briefly remind you of their essence:
– The Russian command in this direction will likely continue to focus its main efforts on the Orikhiv defense area of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, i.e., in the center and on the right flank of the 58th Combined Arms Army’s operational structure.
– A large-scale offensive across the entire 58th Combined Arms Army line, to approach the outskirts of Zaporizhzhia from the south and southeast with its main forces, is unlikely for several reasons (see review from 07/05/2026).
It is most likely that regarding the entire Southern strategic operational zone, the main efforts of the Russian command in this respect will be concentrated in the lanes of its 5th and 35th Combined Arms Armies of Group “Vostok”, while the 58th Combined Arms Army likely has quite limited goals and objectives at this stage.
From a tactical point of view, in my opinion, this can be implemented in the following ways:
– In the lane of the 19th Motorized Rifle Division, the enemy, reinforcing it with units from the 47th Motorized Rifle Division and the 7th Air Assault Division, will focus on holding the area north of the Yanchekrak River (Plavni — Stepnohirsk — Lobkove — Kamianske), attempting to completely push Ukrainian forces north and northeast from the Stepnohirsk — Mali Shcherbaky line. Therefore, limited counterattacking actions by the enemy in the directions of Kamianske – Lukyanivske and Stepove – Lukyanivske are likely to continue. At the same time, the enemy will try to maintain its positions in the Plavni and Stepnohirsk areas.
– In the lane of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division, it is most likely that the command of the 58th Combined Arms Army, having previously reinforced it with additional forces and means, will try to develop its tactical success in the general direction of Nesteryanka — Novoandriivka, as well as Mali Shcherbaky — Novoandriivka. Meanwhile, attacks towards Pavlivka are also quite likely.
In the event of further development of its still quite limited success southwest and west of Orikhiv, the command of the 58th Combined Arms Army will be able to significantly complicate the situation for the Armed Forces of Ukraine in their entire Orikhiv defense area. It is obvious that the command of the Russian 58th Combined Arms Army sees and understands this, which is why it is persistently trying to constantly “infiltrate” its assault infantry towards Novoandriivka and Novopavlivka. And, evidently, in the near future, it will try to sharply intensify this process.
– In turn, to the east and southeast of Orikhiv, the actions of the Russian 42nd Motorized Rifle Division of the 58th Combined Arms Army will likely depend on the effectiveness of the units of the 5th and 35th Combined Arms Armies of Group “Vostok”, which are trying to advance towards Huliaipole — Novoselivka and south of Huliaipilske. If they manage to reach the Novoselivka — Huliaipilske — Charivne — Chervona Krynytsia area with their MAIN forces, the resumption of Russian attacks from Novopokrovka towards Mala Tokmachka and from Luhivske along the north bank of the Konka to the west will become very likely, as this would reinforce the overall efforts of the Russian command to achieve close approaches to Orikhiv from the east and northeast.
However, the Russian command might take a different approach — in order to save resources, they may exclude the main forces of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division “from this equation” and focus them solely on active operations to the west and southwest of Orikhiv to increase the chances of a “guaranteed” breakthrough to the heights west of Orikhiv. In turn, the task of breaking through to Orikhiv from the east and southeast could be entrusted solely to the 5th and 35th Guards Combined Arms Army “Vostok,” which are ALREADY advancing there, albeit very, very slowly.
And finally, there is another nuance related to the Zaporizhzhia direction. It is obvious that the Russian 58th Combined Arms Army west of Orikhiv will “cling to every meter” for another important reason.
Currently, the distance from the advanced Russian positions in this sector of the 58th Combined Arms Army to the outskirts of the city of Zaporizhzhia is approximately 22-23 km, which allows the enemy to strike the city and its surroundings with a fairly wide range of weapons, including KABs, long-range artillery, missile weapons, and a whole array of relevant strike drones.
Therefore, every kilometer the Ukrainian Armed Forces can hypothetically push the Russian forces southward on the Zaporizhzhia direction from Orikhiv to the former Kakhovka Reservoir’s channel may complicate this process for them and gradually “exclude” from this list one or another of their means of attack. It is quite possible that by the time this complication is mitigated by the “natural” leveling of the front line, the Ukrainian Armed Forces can add another 13-14 km to this distance.
Cover photo: 148th Separate Artillery Zhytomyr Brigade of the Air Assault Forces
