We return to the format “briefly from different directions.”
1. Kupiansk direction
Troops of the Russian 1st Tank Army (TA) from the group of forces (GF) “West” along with forces and means attached from the GF “North”, continue their attempts to eliminate the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) Kupiansk bridgehead on the eastern bank of the Oskil River.
The main efforts of the Russian command are focused on the Pishchane — Kupiansk Vuzlovyy direction, aiming to “split” the bridgehead into two parts (northern and southern) and subsequently eliminate them in sequence, starting with the northern part (this is the eastern part of Kupiansk “Zaoskillia”).
As of now, the enemy, after 2 months of fierce fighting in the offensive zone of its 47th Tank Division (td), has managed to secure the village of Kurylivka (including occupying several positions in the “military town” area), on the northeastern outskirts of the village of Kivsharivka, and have reached the eastern outskirts of Kupiansk-Vuzlovyy by their advanced small infantry (assault) groups, mainly operating along the northern bank of the Lozovatka River.
Additionally, advanced units of the 27th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (omsbr) of the 1st TA (likely supported by several units and subunits of the 6th General Army (ZA) and 11th Army Corps (AC) GF “North”) managed to advance in the northern part of the bridgehead towards Petropavlivka and the eastern part of Kupiansk (“Zaoskillia”).
Effectively, the command of the Russian GF “West” during the past and current weeks has significantly resumed active attacking/assault actions of their advanced units and subunits in most areas of the UAF Kupiansk bridgehead (mainly in the central and northern parts).
2. Lyman direction
Active fighting also continues in the tactical zone in the Lyman direction, north of the Siverskyi Donets River. The command of the Russian 20th and 25th ZA continues fairly active attempts to “infiltrate” their numerous small infantry groups into the city of Lyman, using forest areas both east and southeast of the city, as well as acting from the north in the Derilove — Drobysheve directions, and Kolodiazi — Stavky (20th ZA zone).
Currently, it is evident that the enemy has managed to establish a foothold with several small infantry groups on the southeastern outskirts of Lyman (from Partizanska Street to Lisnyi Lane) and in the village of Dibrova within the area of its 25th CAA’s advance. Additionally, the enemy still apparently controls the forest between Lyman and Yampil, using it as a staging area for its assault infantry to “penetrate” further towards Lyman.
Meanwhile, it should be noted that the enemy’s attempts to completely block the Lyman defense area of the Ukrainian Armed Forces from the northwest, by taking control of the village of Drobysheve and the area of Oleksandrivka — Novoselivka — Yarova — Sosnove, have apparently not yet succeeded.
The enemy has several small infantry groups (mainly 3-4 soldiers) that have successfully “infiltrated” in this direction, but they are apparently blocked and do not ensure stable and comprehensive Russian control over this territory.
For their part, the Ukrainian Armed Forces occasionally conduct counterattacks and search-raid actions in this direction to block and prevent further advancement of the small enemy infantry (assault) groups. Not all of these actions end successfully, but they still allow the Ukrainian command to minimize the enemy’s activity on several sections and directions north and northeast of the city with fewer forces than the enemy.
This is particularly true for the bridgehead of the Russian 20th CAA on the Chornyi Zherebets River, from which units of its 144th Motorized Rifle Division (MRD) and attached units of the 2nd Motorized Rifle Division of the 1st GA attempt to operate towards Lyman, as well as the area northeast of the city, where the Ukrainian Armed Forces continue to hold several positions around the villages of Zarichne, Myrne, and Stavky. This, in turn, significantly complicates the ability of the Russian 25th CAA’s forward units to conduct active operations east of the city.
In the near future, a significant increase in enemy activity is expected in the zone of its 25th CAA (east and southeast of Lyman), where it has managed to achieve certain tactical results and where its command is clearly eager to break through with forward units towards the villages of Staryi Karavan and Brusivka, to further and more densely “isolate” the entire Lyman defense area of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
3. Vovchansk (Kharkiv) direction
In this direction, the command of the Russian operational-tactical group (OTG) “Belgorod/Kharkiv” of the Northern Military District (likely part of the forces and assets of the 6th CAA, 11th and 44th AC) continues quite active offensive actions in the border zone on the territory of the Kharkiv region of Ukraine east of Vovchansk (on the section between the state border and the Vovcha River), seemingly trying to “stretch” the forces and means of the Ukrainian troop group along the front as widely as possible.
Russian forces, acting together with their forward assault groups east of Vovchansk, have already managed to penetrate Ukrainian territory in the directions of Maryine — Zybine, Chervone — Volokhivka, and Dightyarne — Budarky. Moreover, at least in two sections (in the area of Zybine and Volokhivka), separate small enemy infantry groups have likely managed to cross the Vovcha River southwards.
However, on the main direction of Vovchansk — Bilyi Kolodiaz, the enemy has apparently not yet achieved significant results. Fierce battles continue in the Synelnykove — Tsehline — Vilcha — Lyman area, as well as on the southeastern outskirts of Vovchansk. This effectively hinders the Russian command from advancing its success on its key direction — towards Bilyi Kolodiaz and Velykyi Burluk.
The Russian forces have not yet advanced either towards Bilyi Kolodiaz along the Vovchansk-Bilyi Kolodiaz road, or south of the Graf’ske-Syminivka line, to secure this advance from the flank. Small enemy infantry groups that previously broke through to Graf’ske and Syminivka have been virtually blocked. The enemy finds it quite difficult to supply them through Lyman and Prylipka, where the Ukrainian Armed Forces still hold several positions. Moreover, it is challenging for them to amass the required number of assault infantry for further advancement to the south.
To summarize
I believe that these aforementioned circumstances have prompted the Russian command to conduct numerous small-scale tactical intrusions into the border area of the Kharkiv region of Ukraine on the general direction towards Velykyi Burluk. To these can be added another relatively “fresh” thrust on the Artilne — Shevyakivka section, in the direction of Ustynivka (where Russian “infiltration” groups managed to penetrate approximately 6 km into Ukrainian territory). This is north of the village of Milove.
Thus, it is clear that the command of the Russian operational-tactical group “Belgorod/Kharkiv” is trying to deprive the Ukrainian command of the ability to parry its further offensive actions on its main direction (towards Velykyi Burluk), forcing it to use most reserves to block all these numerous “side intrusions.”
The problem for the Russian command is “only” that its main operational-tactical design (plan) on the Kharkiv direction has long been obvious and understandable not only to the Ukrainian Armed Forces command but also to all external interested “observers.”
The command of the Russian Northern Group clearly aims to “cut off” the entire northeastern “corner” of the Kharkiv region of Ukraine, located east of the Siverskyi Donets, along the conditional line Vovchansk — Kupyansk, moving towards Velykyi Burluk along directions that converge near it (from Vovchansk, from Kupyansk, and from the northeast, possibly through Vilkhovatka). And the fact that the Russian command has currently decided to accomplish this task in parts, “cutting off” the Ukrainian border zone “piece by piece,” is unlikely to radically change this understanding.
In this context, it may be worth recalling some “measurements” regarding the depth to which Russian forces must advance to achieve their plans. To Velykyi Burluk, it is roughly over 40 km from Vovchansk, over 30 km from Kupyansk, and over 18 km from Russian intrusions to the east and northeast of Velykyi Burluk.
As far as I understand, the Russian command has currently decided to use a kind of methodology of numerous small “border cuts” within this task, hoping that at least one such “cut” (preferably two or even three) will eventually have a “critical impact” on the stability of the entire Ukrainian defense on the Kharkiv direction, at least east of the Siverskyi Donets.
Photo: General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
