News from the front. 11/14/2026

News from the fronts. 11/14/2026
Kostiantyn Mashovets

A number of Russian military analysts (from the more or less adequate category) in their latest reviews have drawn the audience’s attention to several sectors and directions of the front where Russian troops continue to have “certain difficulties” in the tactical zone. And although, let’s say, in a general sense they are right, it is still worth trying to examine these “difficulties” in more detail from our point of view. Since it is obvious that we should not rely solely on the opinions of Russian sources to get a more or less balanced picture of what is happening.

Therefore, today one of these sectors. We are talking about the junction of the operational zones of two Russian military groupings (UG) “Center” and “East”, specifically the Novopavlivsky and Velykonovosilkivsky directions.

The enemy (Russian troops) continues to conduct active defense in the strips of its 29th Combined Arms Army (CAA) UG “East” and the 90th Tank Division (td) UG “Center” to prevent further advancement of the leading Ukrainian units and formations in two operational-tactical directions Piddubne — Bohatyr and Voskresenka — Velyka Novosilka.

In addition, as part of the forces of UG “Center,” the enemy obviously continues attempts to reach the Novopavlivka area by operating in the directions Novoserhiivka — Novopavlivka and Kotliarivka — Novopavlivka.

As of yesterday evening, the Russian command had not been able to fully resolve both of these tasks. The Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) continue to advance in the tactical zone in the strip of the Russian 29th CAA and quite successfully defend in the area east of Novopavlivka.

1. In these directions, the enemy is acting with the following forces and means (approximately):

29th CAA:

– 36th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (omrbr);
– 39th omrbr from the 68th Army Corps (AC);
– Combined Tactical Group (TG) of the 18th Machine Gun-Artillery Division (mgad), also from the 68th AC;
– 200th Artillery Brigade (abr);
– 430th Motorized Rifle Regiment (mrr);
– Possible presence of units of the 90th Tank Division in the zone of this army (most likely, we can talk about units of its 6th Tank Regiment and 228th Motorized Rifle Regiment);
– On the left (southern) flank, it is also possible that units of the 120th Marine Division (md), a “reorganized” former 336th Separate Marine Brigade (smb) of the Baltic Fleet (BF), are operating.

90th td:

– The 6th, 80th, and 239th Tank Regiments (TR) are likely part of the forces of the 6th Tank Regiment, operating in the zone of the 29th Combined Arms Army (CAA);
– The 228th and 428th Motorized Rifle Regiments (MRR) — likely the 228th MRR was also regrouped with its main forces into the zone of the 29th CAA;
– The 400th Self-propelled Artillery Regiment (SAP);
– Probably, units of the 41st CAA of the Central Military District (CMD) are also operating in this division’s zone (for example, one of its three motorized rifle brigades — the 35th, 55th, or 74th MRB).

It appears that at the beginning or mid-autumn of this year, part of the 90th Tank Division’s zone was transferred to the 41st CAA of the CMD, allowing the Russian command to allocate part of the 90th Tank Division’s forces for use in the zone of the neighboring 29th CAA and on the right flank of the CMD towards Druzhkivka along the Kazennyi Torets River. Currently, units of the 90th Tank Division are recorded in both areas.

2. Current situation on both aforementioned operational directions is characterized by quite active actions of the sides in the tactical zone. This, in turn, has allowed them to achieve certain tactical results, including:

– In the direction of Novoserhiyivka — Novopavlivka, the enemy conducted a series of infiltration actions by assault groups from its forward units. However, they failed to achieve significant advancement towards Maryivka and Novopavlivka. Only by acting along both banks of the Solona River from Novoserhiyivka and Kotlyarivka in the area of the villages Novomykolayivka and Muravka were they able to achieve penetration by a few of their infantry groups. However, their further advancement was evidently blocked and halted in the area of the village of Bilakivka. Currently, the Ukrainian Armed Forces are likely attempting to clearly identify the hiding places of Russian infiltrators in the villages of Muravka and Novomyklayivka, as well as in areas to the north of them, across the Solena river, to subsequently “clear” them.

– Similar actions by the Russian command in the direction of Kotlyarivka — Novopavlivka did not yield even such modest success. Only one Russian assault group (up to 4-5 personnel) managed to proceed southwest from Kotlyarivka towards the west through one of the forest belts for 700-750 meters. After this, they were also stopped and blocked.

– In the area between the Vovcha and Solona rivers (i.e., towards Novopavlivka), the enemy occasionally continued attempts to improve the tactical position of its forward units.

In the direction of Orikhove — Novopavlivka, the Russian command regularly tries to “push back” forward Ukrainian units to the northwest and west of the village of Orikhove. This is quite understandable, as maintaining their positions there allows Ukrainian forces to create a considerable flanking threat not only to the Russian units directly operating in the village of Orikhove but also to those operating south in the area of the village of Dachne, given that Ukrainian positions are located quite deep in a tactical sense — behind their right flank (up to 9 km).

In turn, in the area of the village of Dachne, the Russian command is also quite active, periodically conducting counterattacks in the direction of Dachne — Novopavlivka along the namesake road. So far, with no fruitful results for them. The activity of the enemy in this area is also quite understandable. Forward Ukrainian units in the direction of Zaporizhzhia (village) — Dachne are already less than 2.5 km from the latter (although on the opposite bank of the Vovcha River), and in the direction of Novopavlivka — Dachne — less than 3.5 km.

Currently, the local tactical command of Russian forces stubbornly attempts to hold positions of several of their small infantry groups in the area of the village of Filiya (who are entrenched directly in the village itself and in the forest to the southwest of it). They can only be supplied and supported through two small ravines extending from the direction of Dachne village. If the Ukrainian Armed Forces continue advancing towards Dachne from the west and northwest (i.e., from the direction of Novopavlivka and the village of Zaporizhzhia), the situation for these “stubborn” groups will become quite precarious. The situation for the enemy in this section may further deteriorate if these actions by the Ukrainian Armed Forces are conducted synchronously.

Therefore, the Russian command is constantly trying to “push back” Ukrainian assault groups from Dachne towards the north in the direction of Novopavlivka. Since the Ukrainian units, previously advancing from the village of Zaporizhzhia, are separated from Dachne by the Vovcha River, which is quite wide in this area.

Currently, the village of Dachne is one of two villages in the Dnipropetrovsk region of Ukraine (along with Novomykolaivka in the Oleksandrivka direction) still under Russian control.

– However, the main events concerning these directions are clearly unfolding south of the N-15 Zaporizhzhia — Donetsk road, where Ukrainian forces continue to carry out successful tactical counteroffensive actions. In this regard, it’s worth noting that although the Russian command managed to stabilize the situation on the Piddubne — Bohatyr operational-tactical direction (north of this road), further south (towards Voskresenka — Velyka Novosilka), they are evidently facing “certain tactical difficulties.”

The Ukrainian Armed Forces continued to expand their bridgehead on the Mokri Yaly River, which already stretches from its confluence with the Vovcha River to the area east of the village of Vesele. During the reporting period, as a result of active assault actions, advanced Ukrainian units managed to drive the enemy out of the villages of Perebudova, Komar, and Fedorivka.

The enemy still holds several positions in the forest on the northeastern outskirts of the village of Komar, on a destroyed farm southeast of it, and in the area of a road intersection east of Perebudova. However, evidently, advanced Ukrainian assault groups continued to advance from north to south along both banks of the Mokri Yaly River. As a result, they managed not only to liberate the village of Fedorivka on the western bank of the river but also to advance along the eastern bank, reaching the area east of the village of Vesele.

Additionally, operating from the Voskresenka-Maliivka line in a southeastern direction, the Ukrainian Armed Forces simultaneously reached almost the southern outskirts of the village of Vesele (it is evident that the positions of the advanced Ukrainian assault groups are already less than 1 km away from it). In fact, Russian infantry groups confidently hold only the village of Vesele and a small section between it and Fedorivka, approximately 2.6 km by 600 meters, in this area on the western bank of the Mokri Yaly River.

– In the Shevchenko — Burlatske direction, the enemy has likely stabilized the situation as well. Advanced Ukrainian assault groups continued to fortify in the area of the village of Shevchenko after previously pushing the enemy back to the villages of Pryvilne, Vilne Pole, and Burlatske, and did not conduct active assault actions in this direction during the reporting period.

Moreover, it is likely that the enemy does not have enough forces on the section between the villages of Vesele and Burlatske to cover it, as earlier, Ukrainian assault groups advanced to within less than 3 km from the eastern outskirts of the village of Skudne and managed to secure a position there.

Thus, it is quite possible to assert that Ukrainian forces, operating on the operational-tactical direction Voskresenka – Velyka Novosilka, concentrating their main efforts precisely south of the Zaporizhzhia – Donetsk road along the Mokri Yaly River (on both its western and eastern banks) in a general north-to-south direction, were able to advance more than 8.5 km in depth over three weeks of active offensive battles.

As a result, the Armed Forces of Ukraine were able to liberate a fairly significant area of the Donetsk region of Ukraine (approximately Zelenyi Hai – village of Zaporizhzhia – Fedorivka – Shevchenko).

3. Regarding further development prospects along these directions, I recommend that my regular readers pay attention to one of the points in my previous review of these directions from 25.10.2026, in which I wrote that it is likely that the Ukrainian command, in the context of active offensive actions in the tactical zone over a fairly wide section of the front (which clearly exceeds their current combat capabilities in these directions), will be forced to narrow the direction of the application of their main efforts in one way or another. Especially when the enemy takes quite successful measures to slow down the Ukrainian offensive and minimize its pace on several sections simultaneously.

That’s exactly what happened. In fact, the offensive actions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in both these directions have condensed into a single section — the area of the villages of Perebudova, Komar, and Fedorivka. In other areas, the situation has evidently gradually stabilized.

During the reporting period, Ukrainian troops mainly focused on consolidating the achieved lines and positions, as well as “cleaning up” small infantry groups of the enemy that still remained in the battle formations of their forward units. Currently, such groups remain only in the area of the village of Filiya and to the northeast of Novopavlivka (near the villages of Novomykolaivka and Muravka), the rest have been eliminated.

However, in my opinion, this does not signify a complete and final cessation of active offensive actions by the Armed Forces of Ukraine at least in the Velyka Novosilka direction. For one simple reason. The General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is not staffed by idiots; they are well-versed in the basics of the simplest mathematical calculations, as well as the basics of operational art.

Moreover, to understand the overall operational-strategic significance of the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ offensive actions precisely at the junction of two Russian military groupings (UV “Vostok” and UV “Center”), it is enough to search and find answers to two simple operational art questions, namely:

– Indeed, what allows the Russian military grouping “Vostok” to continue advancing in the general direction of Hulyaipole – Orikhiv (i.e., on its LEFT flank), and UV “Center” to conduct similar actions towards Dobropillia (i.e., on its RIGHT flank)?

– And the other question, let’s say, is somewhat debatable. Can both these groupings continue their offensive operations on their respective left (UV “Vostok”) and right (UV “Center”) flanks if their OPPOSITE “junction” flanks begin to significantly (i.e., on an operational scale) stretch due to the continuation of the Ukrainian offensive?

The answer to the first question is obvious. Primarily, these Russian groups advance in the aforementioned directions (flanks) due to the CONCENTRATION of their own forces and resources there. This is mainly at the expense of other parts of their operational zones, including their JOINT flanks. Incidentally, this is why the Ukrainian counteroffensive was organized and carried out precisely in the part of the Russian “Vostok” operational zone that directly adjoins the left flank of the “Center” operational group.

The answer to the second question is not currently obvious. This is directly related to the assessment of the real capability of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, under current circumstances, to continue (i.e., deepen) their offensive actions to such an extent that it forces the command of the Russian “Vostok” operational group, to a greater extent, and the “Center” command, to a lesser extent, to consider the need to regroup additional forces and resources on their joint flanks. Particularly those from their own strike operational-tactical groups, concentrated and deployed exactly on the opposite flanks of their common junction.

So far, the Russian command seemingly handles these issues mainly by maneuvering its 90th Tank Division from the “Center” group and the 120th Marine Division from its strategic reserves. Moreover, they handle it so successfully that they even managed to allocate part of the 90th Tank Division for participation in the offensive on Druzhkivka. But this is only for now.

If the Armed Forces of Ukraine manage to approach close to Velyka Novosilka and also resume offensive actions north of the Zaporizhzhia-Donetsk road along the Vovcha River, the situation in this regard may change very radically.

* * *

Apparently, the Ukrainian command has decided to continue offensive actions in the Velyka Novosilka direction.

It is likely that Ukrainian advanced units have entered the village of Burlatske (6.5-6.7 km from Velyka Novosilka), cut the road between the villages of Fedorivka and Skudne, and pushed the enemy back from the village of Perebudova by 1.5-2 km to the east.

There are also news from the neighboring Oleksandrivka direction (more on this in subsequent reviews).

* * *

Indeed, Ukrainian forces have finally expelled Russian infantry groups from the village of Filiya and the forest southwest of it.

Their remnants withdrew towards the village of Dachne.

 

Photo: General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine

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