Today – Kostiantynivka direction. The situation is developing quite dynamically there.
1. The enemy (Russian forces) with the tactical groups (TG) “Bakhmut” and “Dzerzhinsk” from the “South” grouping of troops continues active offensive actions to capture the cities of Kostiantynivka, Druzhkivka, and surrounding areas, and subsequently to approach the outskirts of Kramatorsk from the south and southeast.
The basis of these TGs is a number of units and formations of the 8th Combined Arms Army (CAA) and the 3rd Army Corps (AC) of the “South”. They are also reinforced with individual forces and means from the armies of the “Center” (51st CAA) and “Dnepr” (58th and 18th CAA). Specifically:
TG “Dzerzhinsk”
– 4th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (SMRB) – 3rd CAA of “South”;
– 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (MRR) of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division (MRD) – 8th CAA of “South”;
– 10th Tank Regiment (TR) of the 20th MRD – 8th CAA of “South”;
– 78th Specialized Motorized Regiment (SMR) “Sever – Akhmat”, 42nd MRD – 58th CAA of “Dnepr”;
– 54th MRR of the 6th MRD – 3rd AC of “South”;
– 1194th MRR – 3rd CAA of “South”;
– 1219th, 1436th, and 1465th MRR – 51st CAA of “Center”;
– 20th and 155th “Composite” MRR – Naval Fleet (NF) of RF;
– part of the forces of the 77th Separate Motorized Rifle Regiment (SMRR) of the 7th Military Base (MB) of RF in Abkhazia (Guda), — 49th CAA of “Dnepr”.
TG “Bakhmut”
In fact, these are the main forces of the 3rd Army Corps of “South”, specifically:
– 72nd SMRB – 3rd Army Corps of “South”;
– 1008th, 1307th, and 1442nd MRR of the 6th MRD – 3rd Army Corps of “South”;
– 89th TR of the 6th MRD – also 3rd Army Corps of “South”.
In addition to the aforementioned enemy forces and means in the Kostiantynivka direction, the main forces of the 70th MRD (18th CAA of “Dnepr”) — 24th, 26th, and 28th MRR, as well as the 17th TR, are also operating in the Chasiv Yar area in the general direction of Druzhkivka. On the opposite flank in the directions of Sofiivka – Rainske and Rusyn Yar – Druzhkivka, parts and units of the 150th and 20th MRD of the 8th CAA of “South” operate.
2. Current situation
During the past and current weeks, the Russian command (“South” — 8th CAA and 3rd AC) has intensified its offensive actions in the Kostiantynivka area, likely to accelerate the pace of capturing this defense area of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, as during the previous period (February-March), it likely fell significantly behind the schedule for implementing the complex of measures in preparation for the Kramatorsk-Sloviansk offensive operation.
The enemy has not yet succeeded (as of April 15, 2026) in capturing Kostyantynivka and Druzhkivka. Moreover, its main forces have not reached the approaches to Kramatorsk from the south and southeast. It is very likely that this circumstance prompted the Russian command to take more decisive actions against the Kostyantynivka defense area of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
Judging by the distribution of enemy forces and assets, the Russian command is currently concentrating its main efforts on the right flank of the 8th Combined Arms Army’s offensive strip, at both ends of the Kleban-Byk reservoir, in the directions of Berestok — Kostyantynivka and Pleshchiyivka — Kostyantynivka.
In turn, the Russian 3rd Army Corps has concentrated its main efforts on the flank adjacent to the 8th Combined Arms Army’s strip, operating from the line of Stupochki — Predtechyne towards the eastern part of Kostyantynivka and through the “Dacha” area towards Oleksandro-Shultyne-Kostyantynivka. Specifically:
– Russian forward units (likely from the 4th Mechanized Brigade and possibly from the 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division) have apparently been engaged in fierce battles for over two weeks in the direction of Yablunivka — Stepanivka, attempting to fully occupy Stepanivka and advance further to Dovha Balka. For now, they have managed to secure only the southern part of Stepanivka.
– The enemy’s forward assault groups, advancing through an overgrown ravine from the interchange on the T-0504 road, located southwest of Berestok, have reached the southwestern outskirts of Illinivka (the area of Naberezhna Street and the local cemetery).
– The enemy also continues to entrench in the Berestok area, amassing assault infantry there, apparently preparing for a large-scale “penetration” directly into Kostyantynivka on both sides of the T-0504 road through the “Leader” gas station, the greenhouse facility (between Dorozhna and Heroyiv Pratsi Streets), and towards the Kostyantynivka Technical School of the Luhansk National Agrarian University.
Apparently, to secure these actions from the flank, forward units of the Russian Tactical Group “Dzerzhinsk” (likely from the 10th Tank Regiment, as well as “combined” 20th and 155th Motorized Rifle Regiments) are persistently trying to attack the forward positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the area of Ivanopillya and Pleshchiyivka, attempting to push back the Ukrainian infantry groups holding them, to the north.
So far, all these enemy actions in the 8th Combined Arms Army’s strip, after its units captured Berestok a few weeks ago and “penetrated” some assault groups into Illinivka, have not yielded the result it was apparently hoping for — Russian troops have been unable to break through to the western (central) part of Kostyantynivka, despite consciously and persistently preparing for this over the past month. Moreover, the enemy still hasn’t managed to completely dislodge the forward units of the Ukrainian Armed Forces from the Ivanopillya and Pleshchiyivka area.
However, in the 3rd Army Corps zone, the Russian command has managed to achieve a number of tactical successes, specifically:
– Likely, forward units of the Russian 72nd Mechanized Brigade, operating from the Stupochki — Predtechyne line, have been able to advance to the “Shanghai Pond” and reach the eastern outskirts of Kostyantynivka, south of Novodmytrivka, in the area of the city cemetery.
– The forward units of the 6th Mechanized Division of this corps apparently managed to increase their presence in the southeastern part of the city, operating through the “Dacha” district, although intense urban fighting continues in this area, and it is considered a “gray” (disputed) zone. Here, battles are ongoing in the area of the railway station, Kyiv, and Odesa streets.
The main problem for the forward units of the Russian 3rd Army Corps advancing toward Kostiantynivka from Predtechyne and Stupochky is that the Ukrainian Armed Forces continue to hold their positions in the Chasiv Yar area (South – Shevchenko – Workshop No. 2 – Zemlianky) within the neighboring 70th Mechanized Division’s zone. Their recent attempts to break through to Viroliubivka and reach the Stinky – Mykolaivka – Chervone – Podilske area, advancing along the railway from Chasiv Yar, ended in vain. Therefore, the risk of flank counterattacks by the Ukrainian Armed Forces against the Russian 3rd Army Corps units that have broken through to Kostiantynivka from the south remains unchanged. Consequently, the Russian command of the Tactical Group “Bakhmut” is seemingly forced to redirect part of its forces from Stupky northward instead, rather than deploying them directly towards Kostiantynivka.
3. Prospects
Operationally, since April, every additional day spent by the Russian command in the assault on Kostiantynivka “works against them.” The longer they are “stuck” in the Kostiantynivka and Druzhkivka area, the more likely that the time required for them to reach the southern and southeastern outskirts of Kramatorsk will dramatically, almost geometrically increase, possibly even indefinitely. In other words, it will be very, very difficult for the Russian command to achieve one of the key prerequisites for launching an offensive operation on Sloviansk-Kramatorsk (effectively one of the main planned stages of the entire Russian summer-autumn campaign of 2026).
Incidentally, this is very true for the Lyman direction as well. As long as the Ukrainian Armed Forces hold the Lyman bridgehead, it is likely that the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army will be forced this summer to exclusively “by itself” and mainly from the east (i.e., “head-on”) assault the Ukrainian fortified areas in front of Sloviansk and Kramatorsk.
Now, numerous Russian “experts” can speculate with satisfaction on what would have happened if the Russian troops had managed to break through, so to speak, in a “large circle” to Druzhkivka in the winter and spring of this year (through Chasiv Yar and along the Kazennyi Torets and, in fact, encircle the entire “problematic” Kostiantynivka defense area of the Ukrainian Armed Forces).
However, war, like all history, does not tolerate conditional assumptions in the past tense. The “reckless” attacks by Russian marines near Volodymyrivka this winter vividly illustrate that the Russian command indeed had such plans. But they remained just “an interesting idea,” no more, as the Russian marines never broke through to either Kostiantynivka or Druzhkivka.
Therefore, the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army and the 3rd Army Corps now literally have to bite through the Ukrainian defense to Kostiantynivka in a “small circle” almost “head-on,” covering the southern and southeastern approaches to it with the bodies of their assault infantry. This is all long, tedious, and most importantly, very bloody and costly.
In other words, in the battles for Kostyantynivka (and behind it also lies Druzhkivka), the forces and means of the Southern Military District (and at the same time a number of reserves from the Central Military District and even the Dnipro Military District), which were theoretically supposed to be used for the “dash to Kramatorsk” from the south, are literally “burning out”. Moreover, if they “burn out” in these battles sufficiently deeply (for example, to a complete or partial loss of their combat capability), the entire idea of the “Sloviansk-Kramatorsk operational offensive operation” may not be salvaged even by the operational deployment of a fresh strike group of Russian troops in this direction.
I already wrote back in 2022 that it sometimes seems that the Russian command, in planning its actions, does not consider the possibility of any resistance from the Ukrainian command and the Armed Forces of Ukraine in general.
A certain sense of “unconditional” superiority, arrogance, and almost “ironclad” confidence in the superiority of their own intellectual abilities over Ukrainian opponents continually plays “cruel jokes” on the Russian command in this sense.
By the end of winter, any operational service officer, even of the lowest rank, could have concluded that the Russian troops would still have to storm Kostyantynivka in the spring of this year “with a lot of blood”. However, the Russian command, with an obstinacy that deserves far better use, continued and continues even now, ALREADY actually after the battles for Pokrovsk, to “draw arrows” towards Dobropillya, in other words, “in the wrong direction”.
They probably believe that the Armed Forces of Ukraine will voluntarily leave Kostyantynivka without a fight, and it will fall into their hands like a ripe fruit. And the advance of Russian troops on Kramatorsk from the south will take place exclusively in the form of a non-exhausting, rapid, and pleasant march.
Well, well, keep drawing…
Photo: 31st Separate Mechanized Brigade named after General-Khorunzhyi Leonid Stupnytskyi
