Today, Borivske and Lyman directions.
1. Composition of the enemy’s forces and assets (Russian troops) operating in these directions.
They consist of the main forces of the Russian group of troops (GTG) “Zapad,” namely:
– 1st Tank Army (TA) operates with the forces of the 2nd Motor Rifle Division (MRD), specifically the 1st and 15th Motor Rifle Regiments (MRR), 1st Tank Regiment (TR) and the 4th Tank Division (TD) — 12th, 13th TR and 423rd MRR;
– 20th Combined Arms Army (CAA) operates with the forces of the 3rd MRD (252nd, 362nd, and 752nd MRR, 237th TR) and the 144th MRD (254th, 283rd, and 488th MRR, 59th TR);
– 25th CAA operates within the 67th MRD (31st, 36th, and 37th MRR, 19th TR), reinforced by the 164th and 169th Separate Motor Rifle Brigades (SMRB) and the 11th Separate Tank Brigade (STB).
Besides the mentioned forces and assets, the enemy actively uses formations of the so-called “mobilization reserve” (MR) from the composition of its territorial troops (TT) at the level of motor rifle/rifle regiment/battalion. In most cases, they have either been integrated into the “regular” makeup of these armies’ units and connections or subordinated to them as reinforcements.
Almost all first-echelon units and formations include assault units at the “assault company” level (1-2 per battalion), less frequently — “assault battalion” (1 per regiment), which are actively used to conduct attacking/assault actions in the tactical zone.
The forces and assets are distributed as follows in these directions:
Borivske direction
– 4th Tank Division (1st TA);
– part of the forces of the 2nd Motor Rifle Division (1st TA);
– main forces of the 3rd Motor Rifle Division (20th CAA);
– part of the forces of the 144th Motor Rifle Division (20th CAA).
Lyman direction
– main forces of the 144th Motor Rifle Division (20th CAA);
– part of the forces of the 3rd Motor Rifle Division (20th CAA);
– main forces of the 2nd Motor Rifle Division (1st TA);
– entire 25th CAA.
From the above, it follows that the command of the Russian GTG “Zapad” currently focuses its main efforts on the Lyman direction, where the main forces of two out of three armies included in its composition — the 20th and 25th CAA — are engaged. Moreover, the latter is deployed in full strength on the Lyman direction.
2. Current situation
For the Armed Forces of Ukraine, it can be considered sufficiently challenging but far from hopeless. During the summer and autumn-winter offensive actions in 2025-2026 in these directions, the Russian troops managed to:
– Break through to Oskil in the area of Kruglyakivka (essentially splitting the previously unified large operational bridgehead of the AFU on the left bank of the Oskil and along the northern bank of the Siverskyi Donets from Kupiansk to Bilohorivka);
– Reach the near approaches to Borova from the northeast (advance to the line Boryvska Andriyivka – Pershotravneve);
– Eliminate the AFU bridgehead on the Chornyi Zherebets River (the territory of the Serebryanske Forestry and north of it), create their own, and break through from it to the near approaches to Lyman from the northeast (reach the line Serednie — Dronyshcheve and the Kolodiazi area);
– Advance along the northern bank of the Siverskyi Donets, capture Torske, Zarichne, begin fighting for Yampil, and reach the southeastern outskirts of Lyman, as well as the Lyman-Zakytne road, initiating battles for Dibrova and Ozerne with their advanced infantry groups.
As of now, the Svatove group of Russian forces (mainly consisting of units and subunits of the 4th TD of the 1st TA + part of the forces of the 3rd MSD of the 20th Army) is attempting to expand its breakthrough to Oskil by conducting active attacking/assault actions in the direction of Lozova – Borova (evidently aiming to reach the area of Novoplatonivka – Shyikivka – Nizhe Solone – Pidlyman, which implies the capture of Borova itself).
In turn, the command of the 20th GCA in its sector is forced to solve two tasks simultaneously:
– With its 3rd MSD, it is attempting to break through from the line Katerynivka-Hrekivka in the direction of Hrekivka – Izumske and further northwest, bypassing the heights in the area of Novoyehorivka from the south and facilitating the advance of the 4th TD of the 1st TA on Borova.
– It is also attempting with its 144th MSD, reinforced by part of the 2nd MSD of the 1st TA, to “isolate” the Lyman defensive area of the AFU from the northwest with active offensive actions in the directions of Shandryholove – Dronyshcheve and Novoselivka – Yarova, while simultaneously applying frontal pressure on it from the north in the direction of Kolodiazi – Stavy.
The Russian 25th GCA, in turn, is essentially “ramming” directly from the east into the entire Lyman defensive area of the AFU, while simultaneously attempting to encircle it from the southeast, acting along the Siverskyi Donets.
During several days of the previous week (approximately from 17.03 to 19.03), the enemy made several focused but not very successful attempts on both directions (on at least 6 sections) to break through the AFU defense in the tactical zone with its advanced assault units, particularly using armored vehicles (25 to 28 units) and “small” mechanization tools (motorcycles, quad bikes, buggies, etc., in total — up to 90-95 units) in the following directions:
– from the area of Boryvska Andriyivka towards Novoplatonivka and Borova;
– from the area of Pershotravneve towards Shyikivka;
– from the area of Hrekivka towards Druzhilubivka;
– from the area of Serednie towards Oleksandrivka;
– from the area of Shandryholove – Derylove towards Dronyshcheve;
– from the area of Kolodiazi towards Stavy.
In turn, in the sector of the 25th ZVO, its advanced assault units continued stubborn battles for Yampil, where the Ukrainian Armed Forces effectively counterattacked the enemy a few days before the Russian attacks in the Lyman direction. Advanced infantry groups of this army were also observed along the Lyman-Zakytne road and along the Dibrova-Ozerne line, with active “infiltration” actions of small enemy infantry groups occurring in the direction of Zarichne-Lyman and on the southeastern outskirts of Lyman itself (area of Vyshneva and Partizanska streets).
Reports from Russian “sources” about the penetration and consolidation of their assault groups in the northern part of Lyman (area of Kozatskoho and Heroiv Desantnykiv lanes, as well as Pidstepna Street) are unlikely to be true. In Drobysheve, it also seems that Russian forces have not “leveled” anything, although some small infantry groups of theirs are likely present at the beginning of Slobozhanska Street at the entrance to the village.
3. Prospects
It is quite evident that in the near future, the command of the Russian “West” operational group will attempt to move to the “decisive phase” of the battles for the Lyman bridgehead of the Ukrainian Armed Forces on the Siversky Donets, which will essentially mean storming and capturing Lyman itself. The fact that simultaneously the Svatove group of enemy troops, specifically separated from the “West” operational group, has become more active in the direction of Borova, is unlikely to change the overall situation in this regard. The distribution of enemy forces and means deployed in the operational zone of the “West” operational group is very telling and clearly confirms this.
Currently, both the 1st Tank Army and the 20th ZVO of the “West” operational group are operating on quite stretched front lines, simultaneously in the direction of Kupyansk, towards Borova and Lyman. And only in the last direction is there a separate army specially allocated for this purpose — the 25th ZVO, focused and deployed in full strength.
As I wrote earlier, there are several important factors in the near future regarding the battles for Lyman, including:
– The stable control of the Sloviansk TPP, Mykolaivka, and Rayhorodok areas by the Ukrainian Armed Forces obviously creates the possibility to maintain more or less stable logistics for the entire Lyman defense area of the Ukrainian Armed Forces from the southern bank of the Siversky Donets.
The Russian command fully understands this. Therefore, it is likely that in the near future, the enemy will try to actively influence the Rayhorodok-Staryi Karavan-Starodubivka-Sloviansk TPP area, including through tactical and army aviation.
– The consistent encirclement of the Lyman defense area of the Ukrainian Armed Forces from the northwest and southeast by the Russian 20th and 25th ZVO respectively, may significantly assist the enemy in its further assault on the city itself. Therefore, it is most likely that before the assault on Lyman, the Russian 20th ZVO will attempt to fully occupy the Yarova-Novoselivka-Drobysheve-Pryshyb area, and then Drobysheve will evidently become key in this plan. In this regard, further attempts by the Russian 20th ZVO to reach the Oleksandrivka-Sosnove line and break through to Sviatohirsk are also quite likely.
For similar reasons, it is worth evaluating the possible actions of the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army (CAA) in the near future, which will evidently attempt at any cost to hold its advanced units in the Dibrova and Ozernyi area while controlling the forest area north and west of Yampil. The fact that the Armed Forces of Ukraine are still fighting for Yampil itself significantly complicates the task for the command of the Russian 25th CAA regarding further assaults on Lyman, as it effectively sidelines its advanced units and battalions that are already targeting the southern and southeastern parts of Lyman.
Currently, neither the 20th nor the 25th Russian CAA has ensured a stable and reliable encirclement of the Lyman defensive area from the northwest and southeast in their sectors, despite contrary statements by the Russian command.
Neither Yarova, Oleksandrivka, nor Sosnove (20th CAA sector) has been taken yet. Battles continue for Drobysheve and Novoselivka, and their bridgehead on the Netrius River in the Seredne area is also expanding very, very slowly, to say the least.
Similar to the Russian 25th CAA, which is currently forced to engage in stubborn combat both sides of the Lyman-Zakytne road and in the Yampil area, instead of preparing for a breakthrough into Lyman from the southeast.
– There is another factor that will undoubtedly be important for the further development of the situation around Lyman. It is the actions of the Russian 3rd CAA of the “Yug” Group, which is gradually advancing along the southern bank of the Siverskyi Donets towards Sloviansk.
It is evident that among the list of tasks that the command of this army is resolving in the Sloviansk direction, an important one is the task of facilitating the actions of the 25th Russian CAA in the Lyman direction.
At the beginning, I already mentioned that maintaining the ability of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to provide logistics for the Lyman defense district with the southern bank of the Siversky Donets through Raygorodok, Sloviansk TPP, and Starodubivka will be one of the key factors in the defense of Lyman.
It seems the command of the Russian 3rd CAA understands this too. After all, the persistent attempts of its advanced assault units to break through in the direction of Zakitne — Kryva Luka and Platonivka — Kalenyky testify to this (as the Russian 3rd CAA persistently “pushes” towards Piskunivka — Starodubivka and towards Mykolaivka, as well as the Sloviansk TPP, located to its north). Currently, in the area of Kryva Luka and Kalenyky, intense encounters are ongoing; the Ukrainian Armed Forces are trying to prevent further advancement of the assault groups of the Russian 3rd CAA towards Mykolaivka and Piskunivka. These battles are going with varying outcomes, but the leading infantry groups of the Russian forces are already 6 km from Piskunivka and 9 km from Mykolaivka.
So, to summarize…
It is obvious that the command of the Russian “Zapad” group cannot delay the assault on Lyman for too long. After all, before the start of the “big offensive” on Sloviansk and Kramatorsk, it evidently needs to secure the northeastern flank of the operational encirclement of this agglomeration, which implies the elimination of the entire Lyman bridgehead of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
Otherwise, the offensive of the “Yug” group by the 3rd CAA towards Sloviansk, head-on, that is, from the east, will be very challenging for them. Moreover, if the Russian forces cannot eliminate the Lyman bridgehead of the Ukrainian Armed Forces within some reasonable timeframe, then the position of their 20th CAA, which is already “stretched beyond all criteria” (and so much so that it had to be “reinforced” with part of the forces of the 2nd Motor Rifle Division from the 1st Tank Army), will become very complicated. This Russian army is already forced to operate in directions that diverge operational-tactically, meaning it is practically forced to turn its flanks in opposite directions — both towards Borova (from the southeast) and towards Lyman (from the north and northwest). And to do this simultaneously.
As far as I understand, this “great” Russian offensive on Sloviansk and Kramatorsk is clearly not far off, it is likely to happen approximately at the end of spring — the beginning of summer, but the Russian “Zapad” group, which must TIMELY secure it from the northeastern direction, has not yet fully completed all necessary “preparatory measures” not only regarding Sloviansk but even regarding the assault on Lyman and its surroundings.
Photo: General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
