
Lyman Direction
The enemy (Russian forces) continues stabilization efforts (conducting active defense) in the zones of the 20th and 25th Combined Arms Armies (CAA) of the “Zapad” group of forces with the aim of holding the positions of their forward units and sub-units east of the city of Lyman (25th CAA), as well as preventing the advance of the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) units east of the Chornyi Zherebets River (20th CAA) northeast of Lyman.
As of the evening of 11/11/2026, the Russian command overall managed to stabilize the situation in this direction due to the completion of the active phase of the UAF’s offensive actions north of Lyman. Their forward units and sub-units continued to consolidate their positions in the 20th CAA zone, conducting sporadic offensive battles in certain areas to improve their tactical position. Additionally, they continued counterattacks in the zone of the Russian 25th CAA to push back its forward units directly from the city of Lyman.
1. In this direction, the enemy operates with the following forces and means (approximately):
20th CAA β operates on the Lyman direction with main forces:
– 3rd Motor Rifle Division (MRD) β 252nd, 362nd, and 752nd Motor Rifle Regiments (MRR), 237th Tank Regiment (TR), 99th Self-propelled Artillery Regiment (SAR) β likely, part of this division’s forces also operates in the Boryvsk direction;
– 144th MRD β 254th, 283rd, and 488th MRR, 59th TR, 856th SAR β also, apparently, one of its motor rifle regiments operates towards Borova;
– 236th Artillery Brigade (AB);
– other units and formations from the army’s set of forces β 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade (AAMB) β the same one “associated” with the Malaysian Boeing, 448th Separate Missile Brigade (SMB), 9th Command Brigade, 16th Engineer-Sapper Regiment (ESR), 533rd Command-Intel Center + companies and battalions of other types of troops, including a Separate Army Drone Systems Battalion (DSB) and 29th Separate Special Purpose Company (SSPC).
25th CAA β also operates on the Lyman direction with main forces:
– The 67th MSD β 31st, 36th, and 37th MSP, 19th TP, 83rd SAP β it’s possible that several units of this division are in the operational zone of the ‘Sever’ group or on the Kupyansk direction, under the operational command of the Russian 1st Tank Army (TA);
– The 164th Separate Motor Rifle Brigade (SMRB);
– The 169th SMRB;
– The 11th Separate Tank Brigade (STB);
– 73rd ABR;
– The 157th Separate Logistics Brigade;
– Other units and sub-units from the army’s force package, including the 6th Separate Hyperion BPS Battalion, the 552nd Command Intelligence Center, the 171st Command Air Defense Post, and the 25th Special Purpose Battalion.
It is evident that the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army does not have an ‘established’ anti-aircraft missile brigade or a missile brigade in its structure.
Reinforcement forces and means:
– The 1st MSP of the 2nd “Tamanskaya” MSD of the 1st TA is likely operating on the Lyman direction within the 20th CAA’s sector with several units;
– The 15th MSP of the 2nd “Tamanskaya” MSD of the 1st TA is also operating within the 20th CAA’s sector with several of its units;
– Additionally, the presence of several units of the 4th “Kantemirovskaya” Tank Division (TD) of the 1st TA is possible, likely regrouped into the 20th CAA’s sector over the past month.
2. The Current Situation on the Lyman direction is characterized by rather intense battles in the tactical zone along the Chorny Zherebets River from the village of Makiivka to the village of Torske, as well as in the large forest area to the east and southeast of the town of Lyman, directly near the Siverskyi Donets River from the north. Specifically:
– In the directions of Hrekivka β Makiivka and Novomyhailivka β Makiivka, the advanced Ukrainian units, evidently after liberating Hrekivka and Novomyhailivka, hold positions respectively 4 and 3.2 km from Makiivka.
– In the direction of Katerynivka β Novolubivka, advanced Ukrainian units have almost reached the eastern outskirts of the latter (they are less than 1 km away from it).
– In the direction of Zelena Dolyna β Novosadove, advanced Ukrainian assault groups have reached less than 1.5 km from the Chorny Zherebets River.
– In the direction of Kolodyazi – Ivanivka, apparently, Ukrainian assault groups are already on the southern outskirts of the latter. Although the enemy continues to hold an area west of Ivanivka up to 3.5 km deep.
– In the direction of Kolodyazi β Bilohorivka and Stavky β Myrne, the enemy continues to hold a narrow strip of land on the western bank of the Chorny Zherebets River, literally less than 1 km wide (up to 800-850 m). However, it is likely that Ukrainian infantry is already present in the area of the village of Myrne, where it is fighting with several Russian infantry groups trying to expand this strip to the south (towards the village of Zarichne) and to the west (towards the village of Stavky).
The situation there is changing quite dynamically, with both sides actively and continuously attacking and counterattacking each other. However, the enemy, evidently, is still unable to expand its zone of ‘confident control’ beyond the mentioned strip. On the other hand, Ukrainian assault groups have likely started to appear already in the southern part of the village of Yampilivka, which is located across the river, i.e., on its eastern bank.
– In the area of the large village of Zarichne, fierce counter-battles are ongoing. Evidently, Ukrainian units are holding not only the central part of the village (from Tsentralna Street to Gorky Street) but are also quite active in its southern part, trying to advance further south towards Yampil along Kleverna Street.
Additionally, information has already emerged in several sources about the presence of Ukrainian assault groups on the opposite, eastern bank of the Chornyi Zherebets River, in the central part of the village of Torske. Currently, I can neither refute nor confirm this information.
There are currently no grounds to claim that Ukrainian infantry has secured the northern part of the aforementioned forest from the side of the village of Zarichne, in the strip of the Russian 25th ZVA. However, both intersections of the Zarichne-Yampil road with the branch to Lyman are already clearly within the so-called “disputed” (“gray”) zone, which may well indicate the presence of Ukrainian infantry assault groups in these areas.
– In the forested area between Yampil and Lyman, quite active battles for specific positions, forest roads, clearings, and plots continue. It is apparent that the command of the forward parts and units of the Russian 25th ZVA is trying to maintain control over this area under any circumstances.
At the moment, it seems Russian units have withdrawn at least 4.5 km from its western part, which borders directly with the city of Lyman, but continue to hold its central and eastern parts.
Simultaneously, the enemy occasionally attempts to conduct active assault and infiltration actions from these positions towards the villages of Dibrova and Ozerne via the Lyman-Zakytne road. Evidently, to maintain the presence of their small infantry groups precisely in these areas. Additionally, the command of the Russian 25th ZVA has not ceased infiltration actions directly towards the city of Lyman.
It seems that currently small enemy infantry groups (mostly 3-4 servicemen) are present in the area of the village of Ozerne, in several basements on the southern and northern outskirts of the village of Dibrova, in the area of the camps “Patriot” and “Varadero,” as well as even on the northeast outskirts of Lyman itself (in several destroyed houses at the intersection of Slobozhanska and Nezalezhnosti Streets, in the area of the Avias + gas station).
– In the area of the village of Yampil, apparently infantry groups of both sides are also operating. Moreover, in the village itself, there are likely positions of both Ukrainian units and several Russian infantry groups.
Thus, it can be stated that as of now, the Ukrainian command has almost completely eliminated the threat to the Lyman defense district of the Armed Forces of Ukraine from the north and northwest, displacing the troops (forces) of the Russian 20th ZVA from the inter-river area of the Nitrius and Chornyi Zherebets rivers, north of Lyman. Additionally, it has greatly complicated any future offensive actions by the command of the Russian 25th ZVA towards Lyman. Moreover, the situation for the enemy in the strip of its 25th ZVA is likely continuing to develop, albeit quite slowly, but steadily in a negative direction for them. However, it is still too early to speak of a complete and final removal of the threat to the entire Lyman defense district of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
3. Regarding the further prospects of the situation development in the Lyman direction, I would highlight a number of tactical and operational-tactical factors in this regard, in particular:
– Having reached the Chornyi Zherebets River on a fairly wide front in the area of the Russian 20th Army, the Ukrainian command apparently has the opportunity to, let’s say, “consider” creating (or rather restoring) its own tactical bridgehead on its eastern bank.
Moreover, in this case, it can now act not on a wide front, as it did during the elimination of the enemy’s bridgehead in the 20th Army’s area, where the Armed Forces of Ukraine had to do so for completely objective reasons, but focus its efforts on one or two relatively narrow sections. This, in turn, will allow more effective concentration of their forces and resources. The key here is to choose the most successful and convenient section(s) and the moment to begin active actions.
– Another alternative option for the further actions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the Lyman direction might be a “scenario” similar to previous offensive actions of the Ukrainian troops in the Russian 20th Army’s area.
This involves a gradual but persistent pressure from the flanks on the 25th Army’s bridgehead, which is almost entirely covered by a rather dense forest area east of Lyman. This could force the command of the Russian 25th Army to withdraw its forward units and subdivisions to the east of this forest, initially beyond the Zarichne β Yampil road, and then, in fact, beyond the Chornyi Zherebets River.
At least two obvious factors might support this option. Namely, the presence of very complex logistical conditions, even on a tactical level, for the full logistics of Russian units operating in this forested area (in fact, it can only be carried out in more or less significant volumes via a single road, well known to the Ukrainian command, leading directly from the village of Torske to the forest area on the western bank of the river), as well as quite active attempts by Ukrainian units, clearly not unsuccessful, to advance towards Zarichne β Yampil, combined with holding positions directly in Yampil itself.
Under such circumstances, sooner or later, the command of the Russian 25th Army will simply have no choice but to withdraw its units from this semi-blocked bridgehead, which is also very difficult and hard to maintain. Otherwise, they will simply lose even a minimal level of combat capability due to “reasons beyond their control.”
– The third option is to leave everything “as is” and prepare for further defense. That is, consolidate on the achieved lines and positions while gradually “clearing” all remaining small infantry groups of Russian infiltrators in their tactical rear. Meanwhile, switch their operational-strategic attention to other more problematic directions.
As for me, such a decision may lead to the following outcome. The enemy, stabilizing the situation in this direction, will attempt to resume active offensive actions here over time. Since it is fully aware of the impact of this direction on its main operational-strategic goal β the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration. The operational connection of events in the Lyman direction (along the directions of Lyman β Sloviansk and Lyman β Izyum) with the development of events directly in the Sloviansk direction is obvious.
It is not accidental that the command of the Russian Western Group of Forces once concentrated 2 out of its 3 armies it has at its disposal in the Lyman direction.
To sum up.
Currently, the Ukrainian command on the Lyman front has operational initiative for several reasons. However, if we objectively assess the situation, it should be noted that they have not yet fully resolved the threat to the Lyman defense area of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The enemy’s forward positions are still 4.5β5 km from the city.
Therefore, a clear choice is now presented: to stop at the current achievements, deliberately cede the initiative to the enemy, and transition to defense on this front, or to attempt to bring Operation βVivaldiβ to its logical operational conclusion. In other words, to push both Russian armies’ troops (forces) beyond the Chorny Zherebets River. Or even aim higher and attempt to establish a foothold east of this river.
I find it difficult to say what decision the appropriate level of Ukrainian command will ultimately make. There are numerous factors both for and against all these options for further action, metaphorically speaking, a “wagon and a small cart” full. From the availability of appropriate combat-ready forces and equipment in this direction to the operational situation in other areas and the overall strategic situation in the entire war. But regarding this choice, one thing can already be said β delaying such a decision is clearly not advisable.
Photo: General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
