Dobropillia Direction
The enemy (Russian forces) continues offensive actions in this direction to reach the near approaches to Dobropillia from the south and southeast. To achieve this goal, the enemy command has deployed the forces of its 2nd and 51st Combined Arms Armies (CAA) of the “Center” Group towards Dobropillia. These two Russian armies are attempting to advance their main forces in the general directions of Pokrovsk — Dobropillia (village) and Novotoretske — Novyi Donbas.
Additionally, to speed up the pace of the offensive, the Russian command has concentrated and deployed a number of units and subdivisions from the 41st CAA of the “Center” Group, which also acts with part of its forces in the direction of Udachne — Serhiivka, adjacent to the 2nd CAA segment.
At the moment, the enemy has managed to reach the Vasylivka — Rodynske line in the 2nd CAA’s segment and Dorozhnje-Shakhove in the 51st CAA’s segment with the main forces of their forward units and subdivisions, as well as carry out several “penetrations” with their small infantry groups in the tactical zone to the north and northwest of these lines.
It is evident that the Russian command continues to build up its forces and means in both army segments, preparing for the next stage of intensifying offensive actions in the indicated directions (accumulating assault infantry in the forward echelon, means of motorizing it, deploying artillery).
1. Approximate composition of enemy forces and means deployed towards Dobropillia:
The 51st CAA operates in this direction with its main forces:
– 1st Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (SMRB);
– 5th SMRB;
– 9th SMRB;
– 110th SMRB;
– 114th SMRB;
– 132nd SMRB;
– 14th Separate Artillery Brigade (SAB).
Currently, it is likely that subunits from the 5th, 114th, and 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigades of this army are predominantly operating in the first echelon.
The 2nd CAA, likely operating in the “main strike” direction:
– 27th Motorized Rifle Division (MRD) – 433rd, 506th, and 589th Motorized Rifle Regiments (MRR), 268th Self-propelled Artillery Regiment (SAR);
– 15th SMRB;
– 30th SMRB;
– 385th Artillery Brigade (AB);
– 92nd Rocket Brigade (RB).
41st CAA — part of the forces operating in the 2nd CAA’s segment:
– 35th SMRB;
– 74th SMRB;
– 55th SMRB;
– 120th AB.
It should be remembered that within the 51st ZVA at least up to 7 separate rifle regiments of the “mobilization reserve” (MR) category are also deployed, which are either included in its “standard” brigades or attached to them as a means of reinforcement (namely: the 86th, 87th, 88th, 91st, 99th, 107th, and 111th separate rifle regiments).
Additionally, units and formations of the 2nd and 41st ZVA were also reinforced with additional formations of Russian “territorial troops” (TrV) at the level of a separate motorized rifle regiment (omsp). For example, the 1441st msp (41st ZVA) or the 1437th msp (27th msd of the 2nd ZVA), etc.
2. Current Situation in the direction of Dobropillia is characterized by active actions in the tactical zone of small infantry (assault) groups of the enemy simultaneously on several sections and directions. Furthermore, in a number of cases, these have been quite successful, despite the fact that during these “penetrations” the enemy’s assault infantry almost always suffers significant losses. In particular:
– In the direction of Sofiivka — Novomykolaivka, there were attempts by several small infantry groups of the enemy to advance. As a result, only a few Russian servicemen (up to 2-3 “bodies”) managed to survive, finding shelter both in the plantations to the south of Novomykolaivka and in Novomykolaivka itself.
– The enemy also continued attempts to bring additional assault infantry to Kucheri Yar, acting from the direction of quarries to its south and along the road between them and the “dachas Vilnoho” (several groups of 5-7 infantrymen were noted). They were timely detected, attacked by drones, and forced to retreat to their starting positions with losses.
– In the directions of Dorozhnye — Novyi Donbas and Nove Shakhove — Vilne, separate Russian “very small” infantry groups managed to advance to the areas of Novyi Donbas and Vilne, respectively. However, their numbers are unlikely to exceed 2-4 “bodies” at present, with the rest either destroyed or captured. Larger Russian infantry groups have evidently entrenched in Dorozhnye (up to 10 personnel) and on the southern outskirts of Vilne (up to 8-10 personnel).
– Attempts by the enemy to “drag” new batches of their “assailants” into Biletske also continued. Thus, from the direction of Zatyshok and Sukhetske, several infantry groups were active, some reaching 6-7 personnel — unsuccessfully. In Biletske, only a few individual Russian servicemen were recorded, who are being “chased” around by drones from basement to basement in a perpetual mode.
Similar attempts by the enemy to strengthen their presence in Biletske by moving troops there from the direction of Rodynske along railway and roads also proved unsuccessful.
– But to the west of Rodynske and in the direction of Rodynske — Shevchenko, numerous “infiltrations” of Russian infantry groups up to Vodyanske were recorded. Individual Russian infantry groups were also recorded in the area of the “Vodyanska” mine.
– The enemy is also continuing to consolidate along the Shevchenko — Novooleksandrivka line, gradually bringing in additional infantry groups from the direction of Rodynske.
– In the directions of Novooleksandrivka — Matyasheve and Vasylivka — Myrne, the enemy carried out a series of attacking/assault actions with more or less significant forces — several assault groups of 15-20 personnel. And although they suffered significant losses, the survivors managed to “entrench” in Vasylivka, and some Russian assailants even reached Myrne and the area south of Matyasheve.
It should also be noted that the Russian command continues to actively involve additional numbers of assault infantry, artillery, and UAV groups into the combat formations of their frontline units. For example, in the Novoekonomichne area, the movement of a Russian unit was detected (up to 70 personnel with 16-18 motorized vehicles such as buggies, cars, motorcycles, etc.). In the Novotroitske and Volodymyrivka areas, several additional infantry groups of 10-15 personnel were immediately recorded, and in Dorozhny and Novyi Shakhovyi, the enemy pulled up more batches of “infiltrators” of 10-14 personnel each. In the area between Nikanorivka and Zatyshko, the movement of a Russian assault group (up to 20 personnel) was detected and engaged by fire. In the Rodynske area, several groups of Russian UAV operators were observed (setting up control antennas, relay stations, and preparing launch positions for drones), and at least 20-30 Russian military personnel are recorded there daily. Additionally, the enemy almost permanently moves its assault infantry from Pokrovsk towards Hryshyne and Novooleksandrivka in groups of 25-27 personnel.
Furthermore, the movement of additional artillery and mortars by the enemy into the combat formations of its frontline units, as well as small armored groups, is being recorded. For example, between Novoekonomichne and Pokrovsk, a group of three tanks was detected during a march, and in the direction of Novoekonomichne — Chervonyi Lyman, the enemy tried to move to the artillery battery. In the rear of the 2nd and 51st CBAs, increased movement of enemy automotive equipment is also observed, from various types of cars, pickups, and vans to trucks. For example, in the tactical rear of just one 51st CBA, up to 40-45 vehicles are recorded moving in a day.
3. Regarding the further prospects of the situation development on the Dobropil direction, it can be quite confidently stated that the command of the Russian UC “Center” is currently preparing to significantly and massively increase its efforts in this direction shortly. And there is quite a logical explanation for this.
This urgency from the Russian command is due to the desire to reach the outskirts of Dobropillya as soon as possible and attempt to “storm” it “head-on.” It is evident that this haste is caused by two rather objective reasons, namely:
– the necessity to create favorable “starting” conditions for an offensive on Druzhkivka and further on Kramatorsk on the left flank of the UC “South” operational zone;
– the necessity to release additional forces and means from UC “Center” for the needs of UC “South” (most likely in the form of the 51st CBA).
A swift breakthrough to Dobropillya and its rapid capture will allow the Russian command to achieve these parameters simultaneously, significantly increasing its chances of breaking through to Kramatorsk from the south (considering that in such a case, an ADDITIONAL Russian combined-arms army may appear in this direction, not the smallest among others), after a hypothetically quick capture of Dobropillya.
Indeed, the capture of Dobropillya and the surrounding area by Russian troops will allow the Russian command to accomplish two important things within the framework of its already initiated Sloviansk-Kramatorsk offensive operation:
– Cover from the left (western) flank of their troop grouping, planning to advance on Kramatorsk from the south (along the axis of Kostyantynivka – Druzhkivka – Kramatorsk), against any counteroffensive actions by the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
– Significantly strengthen (using resources from UV “Center”) this grouping, which, in turn, will increase the tactical and operational density of troops in the direction of its main offensive “in the summer-autumn season of 2026”.
To me, such a prospect is very attractive for the Russian command. However, as always, there are nuances…
The fact is that the battles for Dobropillya may actually drag on. In that case, this “layout” may turn in the opposite direction. Since, in this case, UV “Center” simply will not be able to allocate anything significant from its composition to reinforce UV “South”, which will be forced to assault the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration independently and in the composition with which it “started” under Kostyantynivka. Unless, perhaps, it can receive 1-2 brigades. This can quite happen, especially considering two more factors:
– The 90th tank division (td) is ALREADY engaged in exhausting “stabilizing” battles in its own strip and the strip of the neighboring 29th AC UV “East”, where the respective grouping of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is currently counterattacking quite persistently;
– Obviously, the battles for Kostyantynivka, where the 8th AC and the 3rd army corps (AC) UV “South” still cannot “fully capture” it, have ALREADY been delayed “beyond the schedule”.
Then the respective Russian grouping will “creep” to the close approaches to Kramatorsk from the south in a very exhausted state, with NO prospect of significant reinforcement. Moreover, “along the way,” it will still have to participate, obviously, in no less fierce battles for Druzhkivka.
And if the AFU can indeed hold the “line” of Dobropillya – Druzhkivka, then the entire “main offensive” on the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration actually risks turning for the Russian troops into a frontal (exclusively from the east) bloody and costly assault with rather contradictory chances for final success.
Photo: 37th Separate Marine Brigade
