Negotiation season routine

Negotiation season routine
Oleksiy Kopytko

Recently:

• The date has been agreed upon, and preparations are underway for the first in-person meeting in months between the Ukrainian and Russian delegations in the presence of Americans (Abu Dhabi);
• Several rounds of contact have occurred between our side and Trump’s representatives;
• The Ukrainian side has talked to Europeans in various formats;
• A call was made by the leaders of Norway and Finland to Putin;
• An action was conducted in Oleshky as one of the “confidence-building measures”;
• An event took place in the US following Oleshky under the aegis of Melania Trump, during which it suddenly emerged that in the US, Dmitriev is parading…

On the eve of the meeting, where the Russian side will be represented by a speaking Pecheneg from Uman, OP head Kyrylo Budanov noted: we do not expect any breakthroughs from the meeting. This is obvious given the Russian representation.

At the same time, a story began to circulate about some super deal by spring, an “energy truce” by the new year, and even “territorial compromises” from Russia!

All of this is normal negotiation season routine. Recognizing another Russian ploy as nonsense and logical absurdity is quite easy.

The options for Putin are as follows:

• Continue the war for another year, await the outcomes of elections in Europe (France, Italy, Poland…) and the strengthening of AfD in Germany, gradually intensifying to break European support for Ukraine in 2027 and aim for maximum goals.
• Freeze until the new year, go for partial de-escalation to launch the political process in Ukraine, stir things up without military measures for a while, in exchange for freezing to demand the lifting of some sanctions.

Fighting under sanctions all winter, only to enter into some agreement in spring before the election results in a destabilized Europe – that’s strange. Why endure until spring? Why agree if it’s not played out to the end? It doesn’t make sense.

Dmitriev launched this set of letters on the air according to the classic Russian scheme: when the Kremlin feels pain, they launch a thought virus about “concessions,” so that a chorus of Witko of different sexes and ages starts singing about the need to “make concessions,” meaning to slow down military support for Ukraine. Meanwhile, a story is circulated that otherwise, Russia will bomb everything by the new year!

So, nothing new.
Where are the real negotiations taking place?

The Russians continue to commit war crimes. Facts for each region are available. In the Kharkiv region, there are drones and KABs again, with casualties and injuries.

Regarding Kyiv, Russia temporarily adjusted tactics: after weeks of drone and missile terror against the city, the focus temporarily shifted to destroying the external (energy) infrastructure supplying the capital. To weary Kyiv residents with domestic problems. Then, drones and missiles will fly again.

Meanwhile, today in Russia, the Afipsky refinery (Krasnodar) caught fire: the 6th in the last 10 days. We no longer count various “auras.”

Plus, SBS reported a new record – on November 5, the enemy lost 751 units of personnel (269 killed, 482 wounded). The previous record was on November 1. This reflects covert mobilization in Russia (there are increasing signals about the forced sending of dear Russians to war) and desperate (mostly unsuccessful) attempts by the Russian command to break Ukrainian resistance in the Dobropolya area, as well as in the south.

The Russians are also active in the Kharkiv region – in the northeast and on the left bank of Oskol. Recently, the anniversary of the Russian “capture” of Kupiansk quietly passed. That is, in a year (!) they could not solve the task of actually gaining control of the territory captured “in advance.” Although they caused much grief…

Putin’s main failure to date is that he could not swiftly remove sanctions, only scratch them.

Given the situation inside Russia and certain risks for Russia associated with the US election results, the freezing option until the new year, though less likely, remains viable. Chances are tied to the results “on the ground” at the time of the G20 meeting. This concerns both our rear, the front, and the Russian depth.

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