The draft Strategy for Economic Development of Ukraine for 2027–2042, prepared by the previous government, envisages productivity growth of up to 5% per year, an increase in investments to 24% of GDP, and the involvement of an additional 3.1 million people in the labor market.
At the same time, the proposed tools mainly consist of “reforms” that have been implemented, postponed, or remain at the level of political declarations for years. According to information published by ZN.UA, representatives of the World Bank and McKinsey were involved in the development of the document, and the cost of hiring consultants could have amounted to about 2 million dollars of donor funds. However, the project itself does not properly reflect the role of some of the developers.
The publication in “Dzerkalo Tyzhnya” reveals why the proposed strategy is unacceptable for fundamental reasons.
The strategy does not contain an honest diagnosis of the current state of the economy. The project lacks proper analysis of the consequences of manual management of the economy, selective pressure on entrepreneurs, politicization of law enforcement and control bodies, constant changes in tax rules, monopolization of certain markets, and personnel instability.
The authorities are essentially proposing to start another strategic cycle without recognizing their responsibility for the non-implementation of the previous National Economic Strategy until 2030. This approach condemns the new document to repeat old mistakes. When the reasons for failures are not established and responsibilities are not named, the same decisions will inevitably yield the same result.
Instead of a new development model, a list of old and incomplete reforms is proposed. A significant part of the measures mentioned in the strategy has been on the government agenda for many years. These include the reform of the Bureau of Economic Security, the renewal of labor legislation, the cumulative pension system, corporate governance reform, the opening of the rail transport market, automatic VAT refunds, strengthening competition policy, and regulation of debts in renewable energy. In fact, Ukraine is offered not a strategy for 2042, but an archive of government promises from the past decade.
There is no logical connection between the goals set and the proposed measures. The document lists desired indicators but does not provide convincing calculations of how they can be achieved. For example, increasing the supply of labor by 3.1 million people is linked to pension reform, the new Labor Code, the return of refugees, and the integration of veterans. However, there is no specific program proposed for the return of citizens, construction of affordable housing, development of social infrastructure, support for families with children, professional adaptation of veterans, or engagement of Ukrainians working abroad.
Macroeconomic goals are detached from the real state of the country. The strategy declares a shift to large-scale growth but does not offer mechanisms to overcome the current stagnation. In spring 2026, the National Bank lowered its growth forecast for Ukraine’s real GDP to 1.3% and predicted inflation acceleration to 9.4% by the end of the year. The World Bank assessed the possible growth of the Ukrainian economy in 2026 at approximately 1.2%, emphasizing the influence of hostilities, electricity shortages, high energy costs, and fiscal pressure. The document creates the illusion that merely recording optimistic figures will turn them into economic policy.
The strategy effectively ignores the main obstacle to investment. Private capital will not come to Ukraine at the necessary scale solely through the activities of UkraineInvest, holding conferences, or creating yet another set of advisory boards. Investors need insurance against military and political risks, an independent judiciary, predictable taxation, property rights protection, accessible long-term lending, and guarantees against arbitrary intervention by law enforcement agencies. However, the strategy does not propose a comprehensive insurance system for internal investments against military risks. Without this, the figure of 24% of GDP remains a mathematical abstraction.
The document lacks a genuine industrial policy. The strategy identifies transport, information technology, heavy engineering, defense industry, agricultural sector, building materials, electronic components, critical raw materials, and renewable energy as priorities.
But these sectors are almost not linked to specific governmental decisions. It is not determined which production chains Ukraine should create or bring back to its territory. Mechanisms for localization, support for exporting high-value-added products, development of industrial clusters, technology transfer, defense innovations, and integration of Ukrainian enterprises into European production networks are not foreseen. During times of war, the defense sector in the strategy remains essentially one of the items in the general list.
Institutional reforms are reduced to formal mentions. The document mentions corporate governance, competition policy, reform of the State Bureau of Economic Security, State Financial Monitoring, and state enterprises. However, it does not explain how to ensure the independence of these institutions from political influence. It does not answer how to end the practice of manually forming supervisory boards, ensure the real independence of the Antimonopoly Committee, prevent the use of economic investigations to pressure businesses, and move from political appointments of heads of control bodies to open competitive selection.
European integration is presented as a set of technical procedures rather than a change in the economic model. The strategy simultaneously declares deregulation and the implementation of a large volume of European legislation, but it does not explain how to avoid turning European integration into a new wave of bureaucratization. It is not determined who will pay for the modernization of enterprises in line with EU standards and how the state will support small and medium-sized businesses during the transition period.
The document lacks proper financial and executive architecture. The strategy cannot be considered realistic until the cost, sources of funding, responsible body, deadlines, intermediate indicators, and consequences of non-fulfillment are determined for each of its directions. The proposed project does not provide a full-fledged connection between strategic goals, the state budget, medium-term budget planning, the Ukraine Facility, international credit programs, and regional development strategies. Therefore, it is a presentation of intentions for which no one will be held accountable.
The new Cabinet of Ministers should not automatically inherit and approve this document. The project needs to be sent back for revision.
The document should focus on the defense-industrial complex, energy independence, the development of the processing industry, engineering, dual-use technologies, transport integration with the EU, agro-processing, and the production of high value-added products.
Separate cross-cutting areas should include war risk insurance, an independent judiciary, property rights protection, demonopolization, reform of controlling bodies, support for small and medium-sized businesses, the return of citizens, affordable housing, veteran policy, and the modernization of education.
Each goal should receive a specific set of tools, a financial assessment, a responsible executor, annual indicators, parliamentary oversight, and public reporting.
Without this, “Ukraine-2042” will remain not a map of the future, but another documentary testimony of lost time.
This is not the final document; work on it continues; however, it has a coherent structure, an overall finished look, and the existing 50-plus pages are sufficient to conclude how the government sees the future of Ukraine. In short — the same as it is now.
Illustration generated by the DALL-E service at the request of ZN.UA
